EEAS reloaded: recommendations for the 2013 review. CEPS Commentary, 12 December 2012

The original Council Decision establishing the European External Action Service (EEAS) in 2010, called for a review of the organisation and functioning of the EEAS by mid-2013. This CEPS Commentary argues that the review process will offer a formal opportunity to address some of the Service's weaknesses and to give a new impetus to its further development. In particular, it urges stakeholders to go beyond a review of organisational matters and also look into the Service’s overall contribution to attaining the objectives of the EU’s foreign policy, into its cooperation with the member states’ diplomatic services, the services of the European Commission, the Council General Secretariat and the European Parliament. Four sets of recommendations are put forward.

EEAS 2.0. A legal commentary on Council Decision 2010/427/EU establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service. EIPA Working Paper, 2013

From the Preface. Pursuant to Article 13(3) of Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service, the High Representative is held to provide a review of the organisation and functioning of the EEAS by mid-­‐2013. This review will cover, inter alia, the implementation of Article 6(6), (8) and (11), so as to ensure an adequate geographical and gender balance and a meaningful presence of nationals from all member states in the EEAS. If necessary, the review will be accompanied by appropriate proposals for the revision of the 2010 Council Decision (e.g., suggestions for additional specific measures to correct possible imbalances of staffing). In that case, the Council will, in accordance with Article 27(3) TEU, revise the Decision in light of the review by the beginning of 2014. This short and user-­‐friendly legal commentary on the 2010 Council Decision is the first of its kind and is intended to inform those involved in the review process and to serve as a reference document for practitioners and analysts dealing with the EEAS. This commentary is not an elaborate doctrinal piece, but rather a textual and contextual analysis of each article, that takes account of i) other relevant legal provisions (primary, secondary, international), ii) the process leading to the adoption of the 2010 Council Decision (i.e. travauxpréparatoires), iii) the preamble of the Council Decision, and iv) insofar as it is possible at this stage, early implementation. Wherever relevant, cross-­‐references to other provisions of the EEAS Council Decision have been made so as to tie in the different commentaries and ensure overall consistency.

EEAS 2.0: A legal commentary on Council Decision 2010/427/EU establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service. CEPS Paperbacks. February 2013

This short and user-friendly legal commentary on the 2010 Council Decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the EEAS is the first of its kind. It is intended to inform those involved in the review process and to serve as a reference document for practitioners and analysts dealing with the EEAS. Rather than an elaborate doctrinal piece, this legal commentary is a textual and contextual analysis of each article that takes account of i) other relevant legal provisions (primary, secondary, international); ii) the process leading to the adoption of the 2010 Council Decision; iii) the preamble of the Council Decision and iv) insofar as it is possible at this stage, early implementation. Wherever relevant, cross-references to other provisions of the Council Decision have been made so as to tie in the different commentaries and ensure overall consistency.

The European Court of Justice and process-oriented review. Research Paper in Law, 01/2012

Structuralism is a theory of U.S. constitutional adjudication according to which courts should seek to improve the decision-making process of the political branches of government so as to render it more democratic.1 In words of John Hart Ely, courts should exercise their judicial-review powers as a ‘representation-reinforcing’ mechanism.2 Structuralism advocates that courts must eliminate the elements of the political decision-making process that are at odds with the structure set out by the authors of the U.S. Constitution. The advantage of this approach, U.S. scholars posit, lies in the fact that it does not require courts to second-guess the policy decisions adopted by the political branches of government. Instead, they limit themselves to enforcing the constitutional structure within which those decisions must be adopted. Of course, this theory of constitutional adjudication, like all theories, has its shortcomings. For example, detractors of structuralism argue that it is difficult, if not impossible, to draw the dividing line between ‘substantive’ and ‘structural’ matters.3 In particular, they claim that, when identifying the ‘structure’ set out by the authors of the U.S. Constitution, courts necessarily base their determinations not on purely structural principles, but on a set of substantive values, evaluating concepts such as democracy, liberty and equality. 4 Without claiming that structuralism should be embraced by the ECJ as the leading theory of judicial review, the purpose of my contribution is to explore how recent case-law reveals that the ECJ has also striven to develop guiding principles which aim to improve the way in which the political institutions of the EU adopt their decisions. In those cases, the ECJ decided not to second-guess the appropriateness of the policy choices made by the EU legislator. Instead, it preferred to examine whether, in reaching an outcome, the EU political institutions had followed the procedural steps mandated by the authors of the Treaties. Stated simply, I argue that judicial deference in relation to ‘substantive outcomes’ has been counterbalanced by a strict ‘process review’. To that effect, I would like to discuss three recent rulings of the ECJ, delivered after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, where an EU policy measure was challenged indirectly, i.e. via the preliminary reference procedure, namely Vodafone, Volker und Markus Schecke and Test-Achats.5 Whilst in the former case the ECJ ruled that the questions raised by the referring court disclosed no factor of such a kind as to affect the validity of the challenged act, in the latter cases the challenged provisions of an EU act were declared invalid.

Bologna Process Bucharest Ministerial Conference Takes Place amid Political Crisis in Romania. EUMA Papers Series Vol. 12, No. 5, May 2012

During the last week in April the Ministers responsible for higher education from 47 countries convened in Bucharest, Romania for the Ministerial Conference of the Bologna Process. On April 26 and 27, 2012 the venue for the meeting was the Palace of the Parliament, which was constructed by the dictator Nicolae Ceauşescu in 1984 and completed the year before his death by execution on Christmas Day 1989. One of the largest civilian buildings in the world was location for the first ministerial conference to take place since the European Higher Education Area (EHEA) became effective in 2010. Originally the creation of the EHEA was envisaged by the Bologna Process Declaration in 1999 which had representatives from 29 countries as signatories. This essay will describe the proceedings of the Ministerial Conference, report on the negotiations among delegates in parallel sessions and plenary sessions, discuss the thematic sessions with emphasis on “Global academic mobility: Incentives and barriers, balances and imbalances” and review the adoption of the Bucharest Communiqué and the Bologna Policy Forum Statement.

Is Withdrawal from the European Union a Manageable Option? A Review of Economic and Legal Complexities. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 28/2013

Withdrawal from the EU is no more a taboo subject. However, the process by which it can happen is unclear and potentially complex. The purpose of this paper is to show that a withdrawing Member State will not only rid itself from the constraints and obligations of EU rules, but it will also have to re-invent many policies and institutions to fill the gap left by the non-application of EU rules. The paper examines closely the case of the UK and Scotland and concludes that outright exit is not the best option for a withdrawing Member State. The best, but possibly the least feasible, option is an intermediate arrangement falling between full membership and complete separation from the EU. The exact position between the two extremes can only be determined by the exit negotiations and will be influenced by the political climate that will prevail at that time. While the final destination of an acceding country is well known [full adoption of the obligations of EU membership], the exiting country will be embarking on a trip with unknown destination and full of surprises.

Did Egypt's Parliamentary Election just trump citizens’ rights? Arab Citizenship Review No. 12, 19 November 2015

Since the Muslim Brotherhood rule was toppled in July 2013, the regime of President Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi has strived to consolidate his one-man rule; he painted the political opposition and civil society as traitors and foreign agents and exploited the fight against terrorism to suppress freedom of expression, justify a crackdown on the press, eclipse justice in courtrooms, throw thousands in prison, and tighten his grip on police forces. The regime has postponed parliamentary elections for some time, while it marginalised and weakened the non-Islamist political parties that helped Sisi take power. He did so by promoting electoral lists with candidates who are loyal to the president, to ensure control over the new assembly and by obstructing any political alliance that could form an opposition. At the same time, the security apparatus has been given free rein to control the public sphere and engineer the electoral process. This may ultimately lead to a parliament that includes no advocates for rights and liberties, which is particularly significant since the incoming assembly will review the huge amount of legislation that President Sisi has issued in the absence of a parliament. In addition, shortly before elections, President Sisi raised questions about the constitution, calling for it to be amended to reduce the powers of the parliament and increase those of the president. It is thus clear that Sisi seeks not only to consolidate his regime, without political opposition, but to free his rule of any effective oversight from society or parliament.