Between Apathy and Anger: Challenges to the Union from the 2014 Elections to the European Parliament. EPIN [Working] Paper No. 39, 20 May 2014

This EPIN study brings together contributions from a ​broad selection of member states ​and ​provid​es ​insightful analysis ​into the 2014 elections to the European Parliament on the ground. The report reveals the different factors that impede the development of genuine European elections and the consequences of the ballot in the member states covered by the study​, namely Bulgaria, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Spain and the UK​,​ and at EU level. The report finds that: • The EP Resolution to encourage European parties to nominate candidates for the next Commission President has not really increased public interest in the EU and voter turnout will probably remain low. • Visibility of the European top candidates in most member states has been quite limited. • National manifestos do not coincide – and sometimes event conflict with – the European parties’ manifestos. • Election debates focus on national issues; EU issues are only brought to public debate when they are relevant for domestic politics. • Again, we will see a protest vote against governments and large parties. The EP elections are still perceived as a test ahead of local and national elections, or as a vote of confidence in national governments. • This year the protest vote also concerns the EU. The report predicts a more eurosceptic ballot that might complicate decision-making in the EU, exacerbate the conflict between the national and European levels and increase tensions among member states.

What kind of European Banking Union? Bruegel Policy Contribution [2012/12?]June 25, 2012

This paper discusses the creation of a European Banking Union. First, we discuss questions of design. We highlight seven fundamental choices that decision makers will need to make: Which EU countries should participate in the banking union? To which categories of banks should it apply? Which institution should be tasked with supervision? Which one should deal with resolution? How centralised should the deposit insurance system be? What kind of fiscal backing would be required? What governance framework and political institutions would be needed? In terms of geographical scope, we see the coverage of the banking union of the euro area as necessary and of additional countries as desirable, even though this would entail important additional economic difficulties. The system should ideally cover all banks within the countries included, in order to prevent major competitive and distributional distortions. Supervisory authority should be granted either to both the ECB and a new agency, or to a new agency alone. National supervisors, acting under the authority of the European supervisor, would be tasked with the supervision of smaller banks in accordance with the subsidiarity principle. A European resolution authority should be established, with the possibility of drawing on ESM resources. A fully centralized deposit insurance system would eventually be desirable, but a system of partial reinsurance may also be envisaged at least in a first phase. A banking union would require at least implicit European fiscal backing, with significant political authority and legitimacy. Thus, banking union cannot be considered entirely separately from fiscal union and political union. The most difficult challenge of creating a European banking union lies with the short-term steps towards its eventual implementation. Many banks in the euro area, and especially in the crisis countries, are currently under stress and the move towards banking union almost certainly has significant distributional implications. Yet it is precisely because banks are under such stress that early and concrete action is needed. An overarching principle for such action is to minimize the cost to the tax payers. The first step should be to create a European supervisor that will anchor the development of the future banking union. In parallel, a capability to quickly assess the true capital position of the system’s most important banks should be created, for which we suggest establishing a temporary European Banking Sector Task Force working together with the European supervisor and other authorities. Ideally, problems identified by this process should be resolved by national authorities; in case fiscal capacities would prove insufficient, the European level would take over in the country concerned with some national financial participation, or in an even less likely adverse scenario, in all participating countries at once. This approach would require the passing of emergency legislation in the concerned countries that would give the Task Force the required access to information and, if necessary, further intervention rights. Thus, the principle of fiscal responsibility of respective member states for legacy costs would be preserved to the maximum extent possible, and at the same time, market participants and the public would be reassured that adequate tools are in place to address any eventuality.

Banking Union in the Eurozone and the European Union. CEPS Commentary, 12 June 2012

In this new CEPS Commentary, Jacopo Carmassi, Carmine Di Noia and Stefano Micossi present a rationale and detailed outline for the creation of a banking union in Europe. They argue that it is essential to clearly distinguish between what is needed to address a ‘systemic’ confidence crisis hitting the banking system – which is mainly or solely a eurozone problem – and ‘fair weather’ arrangements to prevent individual bank crises and, when they occur, to manage them in an orderly fashion so as to minimise systemic spillovers and the cost to taxpayers, which is of concern for the entire European Union.

Banking Union in three steps. CEPS Commentary, 12 June 2012

As the banking crisis in the eurozone becomes even more acute, CEPS Chief Executive Karel Lannoo exhorts the EU to not lose further precious time in creating a fully functional bank union, which would entail three main steps: creating a single supervisory authority, a common deposit protection and a harmonised bank resolution and liquidation system.

An incomplete step toward a banking union. CEPS Commentary, 5 July 2012

In this Commentary, Daniel Gros applauds the decision taken by Europe’s leaders at the eurozone summit at the end of June to transfer responsibility for banking supervision in the eurozone to the European Central Bank. It represents explicit recognition of the important fact that problems might originate at the national level, but, owing to monetary union, they can quickly threaten the stability of the entire eurozone banking system. In his view, the next small, incremental step, although one not yet officially acknowledged, will necessarily be the creation of a common bank rescue fund.

Preparing for a post-Assad Syria: What role for the European Union? CEPS Commentary, 2 August 2012

In this CEPS Commentary, Steven Blockmans notes that a prolonged period of instability lies ahead for Syria, with an on-going risk of spill-over effects affecting the entire region. The author argues that the EU’s plans for a post-Assad Syria should extend beyond the half-hearted responses to the monumental changes that have ripped through other parts of the Arab world. In recognition of the geostrategic shifts in the Middle East and the Gulf, and pursuant to the obligation imposed upon it by the Lisbon Treaty, the EU should plan for the creation of a regional space of shared security. Such a plan would fit well into the current efforts to revamp the European Security Strategy.