Gazprom’s evolving strategy in a new commercial and political context: how should the EU react? EPC Policy Brief, 27 April 2015

After years of unchallenged commercial domination of a sizeable portion of the EU's gas market, Gazprom is confronted with a statement of objections issued on 22 April by the EU Commission for abusing its dominant market position. The company was already prevented from going ahead with its South Stream project aimed at consolidating Gazprom's grip on Southeast Europe's markets by bypassing Ukraine – due to alleged non-compliance of intergovernmental agreements with the EU regulatory framework. Furthermore, it walked away from negotiations that could have allowed it to access more than 50% of the OPAL pipeline – an onshore branch of the offshore Russian German Nord Stream pipeline –, whilst its attempts to go downstream through the acquisition of European distribution and transmission operators, such as Wingas and DESFA, failed due to current political tensions and the risk of a negative Commission ruling on the operation. Does this mean that the Russian gas behemoth – so often portrayed as the energy arm of the Kremlin – is not so powerful after all? This Policy Brief aims to frame the erosion of Gazprom's power in a wider perspective, analysing its peculiar position at a time of transition, with the global gas business going from a sellers' to a buyers' market, and providing recommendations on how Europe should deal with it. It will be argued that Gazprom – despite still being affected by the Kremlin's political priorities – is moving towards more commercially sound behavior. The EU should profit from this evolution without being tempted by mercantilist options, and rather use the political momentum provided by the energy union to remove barriers to solidarity and to increase competition on the trading platforms.

China’s foreign direct investments within the ‘16+1’ cooperation formula: strategy, institutions, results. OSW Commentary Number 191|27.11.2015

The ‘16+1’ formula of cooperation between the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and China was launched in 2012. One of its priorities involved increasing the inflow of China’s foreign direct investments (FDI) to the region. China has been interested in carrying out investments which are likely to help Chinese companies gain competitive advantage in areas such as advanced technologies, recognizable brands and distribution channels. The following sectors were identified as areas of priority importance in CEE: construction and modernisation of transport infrastructure, including motorways; development of the network of railways, airports and sea ports; energy, in particular renewable sources of energy and nuclear energy; companies trading in commodities; the food production sector. China’s strategy mainly involves purchasing existing companies, preceded by cherry picking the most favourable candidates for investment, rather than making large greenfield investments.