The Baltic states on the conflict in Ukraine. OSW Commentary [no doc #] 2015-01-23

Before Russia began its aggression against Ukraine, including the annexation of Crimea, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia had felt a higher level of security due to their membership in NATO and the EU. This has now changed. The authorities of these states claim that Russia has been pursuing an aggressive policy towards them for a long time, using various instruments of pressure. They claim that Russia is now able to organise acts of sabotage against them in several areas and that these could threaten both their internal stability and the territorial integrity of the region. The Baltic states’ reaction to the threat from Russia has demonstrated that the level of cooperation between them is low. It has also revealed certain weaknesses in several areas of how these states function, which Moscow may be willing to use for its own purposes. Paradoxically, this has created a chance for the Baltic states’ governments to take measures which in different political circumstances would meet with resistance from society, such as strengthening the military sector and the level of energy security.

The Baltic states’ Territorial Defence Forces in the face of hybrid threats. OSW Commentary Number 165, 19.03.2015

From the Introduction. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its aggression in eastern Ukraine have triggered a debate about the main directions of defence policy in the Nordic and Baltic region. In the Baltic states, but also in the Nordic countries and Poland, much attention is being paid to questions of Territorial Defence Forces (TDF). TDF are viewed as one of the elements in the national defence systems’ response during the early stages of a hybrid conflict. The Baltic states have decided to adapt their Territorial Defence Forces to new threats by making a number of changes to their functioning, depending on the local conditions in each case. Given the growing uncertainty in the region, they have opted not to undertake any in-depth reforms of TDF at this stage, as that could entail a temporary disorganisation in the armed forces. In the coming years Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania will invest in increasing the size and combat readiness of their Territorial Defence Forces, providing them with better training and equipment, and creating a system of incentives to encourage more people to serve in volunteer formations.

NATO’s presence in the Baltic states – reassurance of allies or deterrence for Russia? OSW COMMENTARY Number 169, 29.04.2015 2015-04-29

In late March and early April, the US Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) held an exercise in Estonia, during which US F-16s destroyed ground targets in an Estonian firing range. Around the same time the Americans held a drill with the Swedish and Finnish Air Forces over the Baltic Sea. The United States has been playing a leading role in the process of strengthening NATO’s presence in the Baltic states. As far as the Western European allies are concerned, Germany will follow in the footsteps of Denmark and the United Kingdom, both of which made significant military contributions to the strengthening of the allied presence in 2014, and will deploy the largest number of troops in 2015. Non-aligned Sweden and Finland, key for the performance of NATO operations in the Baltic states, have been emphasising their military and political readiness to co-operate with NATO in the event of potential crises or conflicts. Comparing NATO ‘s military presence in the Baltic states before and after the outbreak of the Russian intervention in Ukraine, it is clear that NATO has stepped up its engagement considerably. However, its scope is still relatively small, given the much larger military potential and mobilisation capacity of Russia. Moreover, the message sent by NATO’s actions may be diminished by the political, military and financial constraints faced by the allies and Sweden and Finland. It seems that the greatest risk to the military security of the Baltic states currently appears to be the possibility that Russia could wrongly assess the reliability of NATO’s security guarantees.

Between continuation and adaptation: The Baltic states’ security policy and armed forces. OSW COMMENTARY 190/23.11.2015

The Baltic states have responded to the annexation of Crimea and the increased Russian military activity in the Nordic and Baltic region by taking measures to strengthen their own military potential. At the same time, they have intensified efforts to have the USA and NATO step up their military presence on their respective territories. Changes concerning the security policies and the armed forces of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have included increases in defence spending, the number of soldiers and members of volunteer Territorial Defence Forces, speeding up modernisation programmes, and – in the case of Lithuania – the reintroduction of conscription. In the coming years the Baltic states will focus on developing those of their military capabilities directly related to the defence of the country’s territory. However, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia will not stop participating in the foreign missions of NATO, which is the guarantor of their security. The extent to which these plans can be implemented will depend primarily on the economic and demographic situations of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

Holes in the skies over NATO's Central European member states. OSW Commentary No. 119, 22.10.2013

Over the past few months, four Central European states have made decisions which will determine the shape of their air forces over the next decade. On 11 October, Romania signed a contract under which it will buy twelve used US F-16A/B multi-role fighter aircraft from Portugal. In August, Slovakia signed contracts with Russia’s MiG for repairs and the limited modernisation of its twelve MiG-29 fighter aircraft currently in service. The Czech Republic entered into a preliminary agreement in July with Sweden on extending the lease of fourteen JAS-39 Gripen multi-role fighter aircraft (the new Czech government will hammer out the details following the parliamentary election). Bulgaria, which has been facing financial problems and political instability, in June postponed the purchase of new (non-Soviet) combat aircraft at least until the end of this year. If Sofia decides to buy any within the next few years, these will be not more than twelve relatively old and worn-out machines (most likely F-16A/B from Portuguese or Dutch army surplus). Given the fact that Hungary in 2012 made the same decision regarding its fourteen Gripen aircraft as the Czech Republic, there are good grounds to claim that the capabilities Central European NATO member states have to take action in airspace are durably limited. The region’s saturation with combat aircraft is the lowest when compared to the entire continent (with the exception of the Baltic states). Furthermore, the machines to be used in the coming decade will be the oldest and the least advanced technologically (all of them belong to the so-called “fourth generation”, the roots of which date back to the 1970s). The problem with gaining full interoperability within NATO has not been resolved in its Central European member states. By modernising its MiG-29 aircraft, Slovakia is to say the least postponing the achievement of interoperability once again. Bulgaria will gain interoperability by buying any Western combat aircraft. However, it is very unlikely to introduce new machines into service earlier than at the end of the present decade. Since the introduction of new fifth generation multi-role combat aircraft or transitional 4+ generation machines in the region’s air forces is unrealistic, the defence of the airspace of NATO member states in Central Europe can be termed an ever more porous sky.

Estonia in the eurozone - a strategic success. OSW Commentary No. 53, 2011-06-20

The adoption of the euro in January 2011 topped off Estonia’s integration policy. In the opinion of Estonian politicians, this country has never been so secure and stable in its history. Tallinn sees the introduction of the euro primarily in the political context as an entrenchment of the Estonian presence in Europe. The process of establishing increasingly close relations with Western European countries, which the country has consistently implemented since it restored independence in 1991, has been aimed at severing itself its Soviet past and at a gradual reduction of the gap existing between Estonia and the best-developed European economies. The Estonian government also prioritises the enhancement of co-operation as part of the EU and NATO as well as its principled fulfilment of the country’s undertakings. It sees these as important elements for building the country’s international prestige. The meeting of the Maastricht criteria at the time of an economic slump and the adoption of the euro during the eurozone crisis proved the determination and efficiency of the government in Tallinn. Its success has been based on strong support from the Estonian public for the pro-European (integrationist) policy of Estonia: according to public opinion polls, approximately 80% of the country’s residents declare their satisfaction with EU membership, while support for the euro ranges between 50% and 60%. Since Estonia joined the OECD in 2010 and adopted the euro at the beginning of 2011, it has become the leader of integration processes among the Baltic states. The introduction of the euro has reinforced Estonia’s international image and made it more attractive to foreign investors. The positive example of this country may be used as a strong argument by the governments in Lithuania and Latvia when they take action to meet the Maastricht criteria. Vilnius and Riga claim they want to adopt the euro in 2014. The improving economic situation in the Baltic states will contribute to the achievement of this goal, while an excessively high inflation rate, as in 2007, may be the main impediment1.

Closing the gap? Military co-operation from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. OSW Report, December 2012

The contracting defence budgets in Europe, the difficulties in developing the EU’s security policy, NATO's transformation, the reorientation of US security policy and the problems experienced by European defence industries – all together have in recent years created an increased interest in political, military and military-technological co-operation in Europe.It has manifested itself in concepts of closer co-operation within NATO and the EU (smart defence and pooling&sharing), bilateral and multilateral initiatives outside the structures of NATO and the EU (such as the Nordic Defence Co-operation or the Franco-British co-operation) and debates about the prerequisites, principles and objectives of bilateral, multilateral and regional security and defence co-operation. The present report aims to analyse the potential for security and defence co-operation among selected countries in the area between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, i.e. the Nordic states (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden), the Baltic states (Lithuania Latvia and Estonia), Poland's partners in the Visegrad Group (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia) as well as Romania and Bulgaria. The authors were guided by the assumption that those states are Poland's natural partners for closer regional military co-operation. It may complement ‘the Western’ direction of Poland's security and defence policy, i.e. relations with the partners from the Weimar Triangle and the US. Its goal is not to replace the existing security structures but rather to strengthen military capabilities in the region within NATO and the EU.

Stosunki Rosja-NATO przed i po 11 wrzesnia. Dazenia Litwy, Lotwy i Estonii do integracji z NATO i UE a stosunki tych krajow z Rosja. Prace OSW 4/2002. = Relations between Russia and NATO before and after the 11th of September. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia's aspirations to integrate with NATO and the EU in the context of these countries' relations with Russia. OSW Study 4/2002

Membership of NATO and the EU is a priority of the foreign policies of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The main stimulus that drives these membership aspirations is the will to ensure the security of these countries and to ultimately separate them from the post-Soviet space. Additionally, the authorities of the Baltic States believe that membership of both these organisations will make their counties more attractive for Western investors. The way to implement these priorities is not only through consistent adjustments to the standards prevailing in NATO and the EU, but it also involves refusing to join the post-Soviet structures and seeking out states that are willing to strongly support the Baltic States aspirations. The implementation of this policy has resulted in the status of the Baltic States preparations for membership in both international structures being assessed as good, and they are reckoned to be realistic candidates for NATO and EU enlargement.

No other choice but co-operation. The background of Lithuania's and Latvia's relations with Belarus. OSW Commentary No. 99, 2013-01-04

For years now Belarus has been a key economic partner for Lithuania and Latvia. These two Baltic states have well-developed port infrastructure and thus provide what are the geographically closest and also the cheapest exit to international outlets for Belarusia’s petrochemical and chemical industries, both of which are export-oriented. As a result, the transit of Belarusian goods is one of the major sources of income for the state budgets of the two countries. This economic interdependence has affected the stance Riga and Vilnius take on Minsk at the EU forum. When in February and March 2012 the Council of the European Union was resolving the issue of imposing economic sanction on selected Belarusian companies which backed Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s regime, this triggered a discussion on what the point of such measures is and on possible economic losses in Lithuania and Latvia. As a result of firm resistance from Latvia (which was backed by Slovenia), the Council removed those companies which were most strongly engaged in co-operation with Latvian partners from the list of those to be covered with economic sanctions. Lithuania, which is more critical of the political situation in Belarus, did not express its official opposition to the sanctions. Despite some differences in the policies adopted by Riga and Vilnius, it turned out that Minsk could count on strong support from local business groups in both of these countries, as these groups fear impediments in this highly profitable co-operation and also retaliation from the Belarusian government. The existing economic bonds mean that neither Vilnius nor Riga have any other choice but to co-operate with Belarus. They must therefore adopt a carefully balanced policy towards Minsk. At the same time, being EU member states, they do not officially deny that a problem exists with the violation of human rights by Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s regime. It is for this reason that the governments of Latvia and Lithuania will be interested in maintaining the status quo in relations with Minsk. On the other hand, Belarus in a way also has no other choice but to use the ports in Lithuania and Latvia, and this will prevent it from excessively escalating tension in relations with these two countries.

The Party of Regions monopolises power in Ukraine. OSW Commentary No. 40, 2010-09-29

Since the Party of Regions took power in Ukraine, the process of strengthening the executive branch of government at the expense of the others, together with the instrumental use of the law, has been progressing steadily. By seeking to restrict criticism of the government, the ruling party is aiming at marginalisation of opposition groups and establishing informal control over the main media (largely by exerting pressure on their owners). The role of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) is growing, as it is used increasingly frequently to put pressure on Western-oriented NGOs. The government’s control over the judiciary is expanding. These trends had existed before the Party of Regions’ ascension to power, but they were much weaker, as the previous governments did not enjoy such a strong position or the ability to achieve their ends so efficiently. The Party of Regions is planning to take another step towards total power during the local elections scheduled for October 2010. The party is determined to establish control over the local self-governments; to this end, it has amended the legislation in a way which now undermines local civil initiatives. These changes not only illustrate the interests and political standpoint of the ruling elite; they also result from systemic reasons, and these are deeply rooted in the Soviet past. The present Ukrainian state has evolved through the evolutionary transformation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. As a result, the main features of the previous system have been sustained, including the weakness of the representative bodies and the instrumental use of the law. Twenty years into its independent development, Ukraine has developed a merely formal democracy, which is distant from EU standards.

Brexit will deepen the fault lines within the EU over mobility. CEPS Commentary, 12 July 2016

Much has been made of the divide that opened up in 2015 between eastern and western member states as a result of acrimonious discussions on how to handle the refugee crisis and distribute asylum applicants across the EU. Against the prevailing political sentiment in certain member state capitals, Germany and France pushed through a plan devised by the European Commission to relocate 120,000 refugees, by a qualified majority vote in the Council. Rather than creating an east/west divide, however, the vote split the group of (relatively) new Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) of the EU into two factions: Romania, Czechia, Slovakia and Hungary voted against the plan, whereas several other CEECs, namely Poland, Bulgaria and the Baltic states, joined the controversial motion on the side of the other (northern, southern and western) member states. Finland abstained. Few member states have shifted their positions in the meantime. If anything, in fact, they have coalesced among the Visegrad 4, following a change of government in Poland; and they have hardened, as a result of new proposals by the Commission to fine member states that refuse to accept refugees. With Hungary’s referendum on the Commission’s relocation scheme scheduled for October 2nd, tensions are set to intensify even further.