The Eurozone crisis and the erosion of democratic legitimacy: Lessons from the gold standard. ACES Cases No. 2013.3

This paper makes four propositions. First, it argues that the euro’s institutional design makes it function like the interwar gold exchange standard during periods of stress. Just like the gold exchange standard during the 1930s, the euro created a ‘core’ of surplus countries and a ‘periphery’ of deficit countries. The latter have to sacrifice their internal domestic economic equilibrium in order to restore their external equilibrium, and therefore have no choice but to respond to balance of payments crises by a series of deflationary spending, price and wage cuts. The paper’s second claim is that the euro’s institutional design and the EU’s response to its ‘sovereign debt crisis’ during 2010-13 deepened the recession in the Eurozone periphery, as EMU leaders focused almost exclusively on austerity measures and structural reforms and paid only lip service to the need to rebalance growth between North and South. As Barry Eichengreen argued in Golden Fetters, the rigidity of the gold standard contributed to the length and depth of the Great Depression during the 1930s, but also underscored the incompatibility of the system with legitimate national democratic government in places like Italy, Germany, and Spain, which is the basis for the paper’s third proposition: the euro crisis instigated a crisis of democratic government in Southern Europe underlining that democratic legitimacy still mainly resides within the borders of nation states. By adopting the euro, EMU member states gave up their ability to control major economic policy decisions, thereby damaging their domestic political legitimacy, which in turn dogged attempts to enact structural reforms. Evidence of the erosion of national democracy in the Eurozone periphery can be seen in the rise of anti-establishment parties, and the inability of traditional center-left and center-right parties to form stable governments and implement reforms. The paper’s fourth proposition is that the euro’s original design and the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis further widened the existing democratic deficit in the European Union, as manifested in rising anti-EU and anti-euro sentiment, as well as openly Eurosceptic political movements, not just in the euro periphery, but also increasingly in the euro core.

Swiss Banking Secrecy; The Erosion of an Institution. IES WORKING PAPER 2/2008

Switzerland has for a long time been an important centre of banking services in Europe and beyond. Consequently, the banking sector has become important to Switzerland’s prosperity. This paper focuses on a central reason behind the success of the Swiss banking sector: the institution of banking secrecy, deeply enshrined in the Swiss history and tradition. The rapid development of international markets that eventually gave rise to a “group structuration process” has, however, progressively eroded Swiss banking secrecy. It has had to bend before the duty of transparency within the groups in order not to promote financial criminality through accelerated asset inflows. Switzerland has also had to develop a comprehensive legislative frame to tackle financial criminality, and to enter into international agreements providing for mutual assistance. This process has undoubtedly and irremediably weakened the Swiss banking secrecy. Most importantly, nevertheless, the questionable ethical and socio-economic grounds of this controversial institution could and should also start to erode it from within.

What Does Globalization Have to Do with the Erosion of Welfare States? Sorting Out the Issues. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 07.5, 1996

Is it really true that the economic processes described as globalization are eroding West European and North Ameri­ can welfare states (WS) ? This paper is a first step in a project aimed at answering the question. Focusing on conflict­ ing arguments about the economic mechanisms which generate pressures on WS, it groups them into three answers to the title question: globalization has everything, nothing, or something to do with it. Tentatively concluding that the third answer, that domestic and international economic mechanisms do interact in specific ways to strain WS, it sets the stage for the second stage of the project. That is to analyze the political mechanisms shaping the policy re­ sponses to those strains and perhaps themselves contributing to those strains. To expore the issues to be addressed in this second step. a brief preliminary exploration of recent social policy patterns suggests that domestic political fac­ tors go a long way toward explaining them without much recourse to globalization, especially in the U.S. but also, if to a lesser extent, in Western Europe.

The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB): China’s new multilateralism and the erosion of the West. Security Policy Brief No. 63, April 2015

China will launch a new development bank for Asia later this year, called the AIIB. 58 countries worldwide have already applied to become founding members, including numerous Western nations. This policy brief argues that the AIIB constitutes an important international development, as it reflects a new geopolitical reality and marks a new turn in China’s practice of multilateralism. It also looks critically at the European uncoordinated response to the AIIB, and what it tells about Europe’s shrinking role in the world.