The Gulf Cooperation Council as a New Regional Power: Time for the EU to Propose a Strategic Partnership. Bruges Regional Integration & Global Governance Papers 3/2012, November 2012

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is a de facto regional power in the Arab world. Its role has been crucial in some of the outcomes of the Arab Spring. The GCC countries have been very pragmatic in dealing with the uprisings, avoiding any revolutionary spill-over throughout the Gulf region. This paper examines to what extent the policies of the European Union (EU) in the Gulf have changed since the beginning of the Arab Spring. It argues that despite the calls by the European Parliament and by the High Representative Baroness Ashton to improve the relationship, the EU’s support for a new policy in the Gulf after the Arab Spring is stalling, and little new or concrete has been achieved. The paper concludes that the Union needs a reinforced partnership that merges the various EU policies in the region into a single strategic partnership with the Arab countries.

The European Union’s Role in the Formation of India’s Climate Change Policy. Bruges Regional Integration & Global Governance Papers 2/2012, September 2012

This paper focuses on the role of the European Union (EU) in the formation of India’s climate change policy; an increasingly high profile issue area. It is based on an extensive study of relevant literature, EU-India policy documents and the execution of thirteen semi-structured interviews with experts; many of whom have experienced EU-India cooperation on climate change first-hand. A three-point typology will be used to assess the extent of the EU’s leadership role, supporting role or equal partnership role in India, with several sub-roles within these categories. Further, for clarity and chronology purposes, three time periods will be distinguished to assess how India’s climate policy has evolved over time, alongside the EU’s role within that. The findings of the paper confirm that the EU has demonstrated signs of all three roles to some degree, although the EU-India relationship in climate policy is increasingly an equal partnership. It offers explanations for previous shortcomings in EU-India climate policy as well as policy recommendations to help ensure more effective cooperation and implementation of policies.

Towards a new design of South American integration? Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series, Special Issue January 2013

The design of South American integration is becoming different. This has been quite common in the trajectory of over six decades of initiatives aimed at generating institutional frameworks to facilitate regional integration. However, even when it has become apparent that the previous design is undergoing a new process of change, it would be difficult to predict for how long the one that is beginning to take shape will remain in effect. The experience of recent decades suggests great caution in forecasts that are optimistic about any eventual longevity. Several factors are contributing to this redesign. Some are external to the region while others are endogenous. The combination of these factors will influence the future design of South American integration. If past lessons are correctly capitalized and certain advantage is derived from the leeway provided by a decentralized international system with multiple options, we can anticipate that what will predominate in the region will be multidimensional integration agreements (with political and economic objectives at the same time) and with cross-memberships and commitments. If this were the case, the actual impact on regional governance, social and productive integration and the competitive insertion at a global scale will depend largely on the following factors: the quality and sustainability of the strategy for development and global and regional insertion of each country; the combination of a reasonable degree of flexibility and predictability in the commitments made and their corresponding ground rule, and the density of the network of cross-interests that can be achieved as a result of the respective regional integration agreements, reflected in multiple transnational social and production networks.

Brexit or not? Time for the EU to move. EPC Commentary, 8 September 2014

The deteriorating relationship between the United Kingdom (UK) and the rest of the EU, including the prospect of a referendum on EU membership, would have dominated the Union’s agenda had it not been for the economic/financial crisis, followed by the external crisis which we are now facing in the East. Precisely because of these crises, it is now time for the incoming European Commission to take the bull by the horns and ensure that the EU can move on from a potential referendum and its possible outcomes. The June European Council noted that “the UK raised some concerns related to the future development of the EU. These concerns will need to be addressed. In this context, the European Council noted that the concept of ever closer union allows for different paths of integration for different countries, allowing those that want to deepen integration to move ahead, while respecting the wish of those who do not want to deepen any further.” While the EU has, arguably, successfully developed at different speeds for decades, to address the UK’s (fundamental) concerns, it is now time to work out whether and how the UK can be accommodated, and what this would mean in practice. UK membership is desirable but not at any price, so the aim should be to keep the UK in, while also ensuring that the principles on which the EU is built are protected. There will need to be a modus operandi which enables the EU and in particular, the Eurozone, to continue to make progress in addressing the shortcomings of European integration and European Monetary Union (EMU) in particular, while at the same time offering a reform package that can satisfy the UK. This does not necessarily mean that all EMU reforms have to be within the EU framework: additional intergovernmental arrangements could also be a possibility. However, this could add to the complexity and inefficiency of the system, as well as sidelining the supranational element of EU governance which will be needed to make EMU function.

The Border Management Programme in Central Asia: Explaining the European Union's Choice of Implementing Partners. Bruges Regional Integration & Global Governance Papers 3/2014

Between 2003 and 2014 the European Union’s (EU) Border Management Programme in Central Asia was implemented by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). However, the latter’s implementing responsibilities have just come to an end, with the next phase of the programme to be implemented by an EU member state consortium. This paper seeks to explain why the EU chose the UNDP to implement the programme in the first place; why the programme was redelegated to the UNDP over successive phases; and why, in the end, the EU has opted for a member state consortium to implement the next phase of the programme. The paper will draw on two alternative accounts of delegation: the principal-agent approach and normative institutionalism. Ultimately, it will be argued that both the EU’s decision(s) to delegate (and redelegate) implementing responsibilities to the UNDP, and its subsequent decision to drop the organisation in favour of an EU member state consortium, were driven for the most part by a rationalist ‘logic of consequentiality’. At the same time, a potential secondary role of a normative institutionalist ‘logic of appropriateness’ – as a supplementary approach – will not be discounted.

The sultans of swing: Turkey's stance on integration with the European Union. OSW Point of View Number 37, November 2013

Despite a rise in anti-EU rhetoric and a growing assertiveness in Ankara’s relations with Brussels, Turkey will continue to seek closer integration with the European Union in the coming years. The current stalemate in the accession process has been a source of irritation to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s government. Nonetheless, a complete collapse of accession talks would be a much worse scenario for the ruling AKP party. Currently, the government is primarily interested in keeping the negotiation process alive, rather than hoping to gain full membership any time soon. Erdoğan’s government will likely seek to continue the accession talks because the AKP is acutely aware of their importance for the country’s domestic politics, for its the economy, and – although to a lesser extent – for Turkey’s international standing. The opportunity to capitalise on this process will encourage the Turkish government to avoid crises in its relations with the EU, or to at least mitigate the impact of any potential diplomatic fallouts.

Greater Europe. Putin's vision of European (dis)integration. OSW Study 46/2013

On several occasions since 2001 Vladimir Putin has raised the concept of ‘Greater Europe’, a partly-integrated common space comprising mainly Russia and the European Union. This concept has never been recast into a detailed political programme. While it has been championed as‘a Europe without dividing lines’, the concept would in practice permanently split Europe into two geopolitical blocs – the Western bloc of the European Union, with Germany in the dominant role, and the Eastern bloc, consisting of the emerging Eurasian Union, with Russia in a hegemonic position. In recent years Russia has undertaken a number of initiatives aimed at implementing some elements of the concept. However, most of these have failed to become reality. In this context, we should expect Russia’s policy to focus on implementing its priority project of Eurasian integration, based on the structures of the Customs Union/the Eurasian Union. The Greater Europe project, on the other hand, will be postponed until the time when, as Moscow believes, a weakened EU will be ready to accept Russian proposals.

Eurasian integration. Russia's attempt at the economic unification of the post-Soviet area. OSW Study 44/2013

In 2009, Vladimir Putin, the then Russian prime minister, gave impetus to the establishment of closer relations within what was then a still narrow group of three countries: Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus. Russia was determined in embarking on the implementation of the principles of the Customs Union among these three states and, since 2012, within the Common Economic Space as well. This process of integration is intended to bring about the introduction of ‘four freedoms’ in this area: the free movement of goods, services, capital and labour. From Moscow’s point of view, building up such integration structures is especially necessary in order to counteract the economic expansion of the European Union and China. It also feels it is important to take measures against the loosening of the bonds between the CIS countries and Russia. At the same time, close co-operation is expected to guarantee for Russia that the strong politico-economic influences in this area will be maintained. Despite the numerous limitations of the integration process, such as the small number of the participating states or limited progress in implementing the CES, this is still the most advanced integration programme in the region seen since the collapse of the USSR. Progress in putting the rules of the Customs Union into practice can be seen as a success for Moscow. In turn, the formation of the CES is still at an early stage, and it is difficult to determine at this point to what extent the three countries will harmonise their markets.

The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutionalist Perspective, CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 05.2, 25 October 1994

Many European and American observers of the EC have criticized "intergovemmentalist" ac­ counts for exaggerating the extent of member state control over the process of European integra­ tion. This essay seeks to ground these criticisms in a "historical institutionalist" account that stresses the need to study European integration as a political process which unfolds over time. Such a perspective highlights the limits of member-state control over long-term institutional de­ velopment, due to preoccupation with shorHerm concerns, the ubiquity of unintended conse­ quences, and processes that "lock in" past decusions and make reassertions of member-state control difficult. Brief examination of the evolution of social policy in the EC suggests the limita­ tions of treating the EC as an international regime facilitating collective action among essentially sovereign states. It is ore useful to view integration as a "path-dependent" process that has pro­ duced a fragmented but still discernible "multitiered" European polity.

The Eurasian Economic Union: a time of crisis. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 195/27.01.2016

The Eurasian Economic Union (EaEU), a project forced through by Russia which links it to Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, is currently struggling with serious problems. The economic crisis in Russia – mainly caused by the fall in the price of oil on world markets and exacerbated by sanctions imposed by Western countries in connection with the Ukraine conflict – is affecting these uncompetitive post-Soviet economies which are dependent on Russia. This has resulted in increased economic and political tension among the members of the EaEU. From Russia’s point of view, however, the EaEU project remains useful, because it is not economic integration that is Moscow’s priority. The Union remains its most important instrument for implementing the Kremlin’s geo-political objectives, in particular maintaining its sphere of influence and preventing post-Soviet countries from integrating with the West, as well as restricting their rapprochement with China. Moscow is pushing for the EaEU to include new countries, strengthening its tools for political dominance within the Union, and promoting its project on the international stage. However, the future of this project will depend on both the continued determination of the Kremlin, and whether the other countries can change the rules for integration by taking advantage of the current crisis.