Meeting Competition: Why it is not an Abuse under Article 82. Research Papers in Law, 3/2004.

Introduction. Meeting competition occurs when an undertaking lowers its prices in response to the entry of a competitor. Despite accepting that meeting competition can be compatible with Article 82, the Commission2 and the Court of justice3 have repeatedly condemned the practice due to the modalities of implementation or “particular circumstances”.4 However, existing precedent on the subject remains obscurely reasoned and contradictory, such that it is at the present time impossible to give clear advice to undertakings on the circumstances in which meeting competition is compatible with Article 82. Not only is such legal uncertainty in itself damaging but, in so far as it discourages meeting competition, it appears to us to be harmful to competition. As concerns the latter point, it will be seen that some of the most powerful arguments against prohibiting meeting competition are based on the counterproductive nature of the remedies. The present article does not, however, aim to propose a simple solution to distinguish abusive and non-abusive meeting competition.5 Nor does the article aim to give a comprehensive overview of the existing case law in this area.6 Instead, it takes a more economic approach and aims to lay out in a (brief but) systematic fashion the competitive concerns that might potentially be raised by the practice of meeting competition and in doing so to try to identify the main flaws in the Court and Commission’s approach.

MODEL COUNTRIES IN POLITICAL ANALYSIS. Is Turkey a Model for State-Building in the Arab World? Jean Monnet Occasional Paper No. 10/2014

This study analyzes the Turkish case as a model country for the state-building processes in the Arab world in the aftermath of the Arab revolts that took place in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. To this end, it deals with the Turkish case in three phases: the founding of the Turkish Republic, political developments until 2002, and the post-2002 Justice and Development Party period. The study focuses on state-society relations manifested in the form of a secular-religious cleavage intertwined with problematic civil-military relations. Each phase of Turkey’s history is compared to cleavages and civil-military relations in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. After analyzing the constitution-making processes in the latter three countries following the Arab revolts, the study concludes by discussing the viability of the Turkish model in the light of Turkey’s search for a new constitution.

Factor Markets in General Computable Equilibrium Models. Factor Markets Working Document No. 47, May 2013

One objective of Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models is the analysis of economy-wide effects of policy measures. The focus of the Factor Markets project is to analyse the functioning of factor markets for agriculture in the EU-27, including the Candidate Countries. While agricultural and food markets are fully integrated in a European single market, subject to an EU-wide common policy, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), this is not the case for the agricultural factor markets capital, labour and land. There are partly serious differences with regard to member state regulations and institutions affecting land, labour and capital markets. The presentation of this heterogeneity of factor markets amongst EU Member States have been implemented in the CGE models to improve model-based analyses of the CAP and other policy measures affecting agricultural production. This final report comprises the outcome of a systematic extension and improvement of the Modular Applied GeNeral Equilibrium Tool (MAGNET) model starting from an overview of the current state of the art to represent factor markets in CGE models to a description of work on labour, land and capital in MAGNET.

Is the "Dubai model" a new paradigm for growth and investment strategies for oil-based economies? Case study: Eurasia. ACES Working Papers No. 8, 2008

The first part of the paper addresses the theoretical background of economic growth and competitive advantage models. Although there is a whole set of research on a relationship between foreign direct investments and economic growth, little has been said on foreign direct investments and national competitive advantage with respect to economic growth of oil and gas abundant countries of Middle East and Central Asia. The second part of our paper introduces the framework of the so-called "Dubai Model" in detail and outlines the key components necessary to develop sustainable comparative advantage for the oil-rich economies. The third part proceeds with the methodology employed to measure the success of the "Dubai Model" in the UAE and in application to other regions. The last part brings the results and investigates the degree to which other oil and gas countries in the region (i.e. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Iran) have adopted the so-called "Dubai Model". It also examines if the Dubai Model is being employed in the Eurasian (Central Asian) oil and gas regions of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The objective is to gauge if the Eurasian economies are employing the traditional growth strategies of oil-rich non-OECD countries in managing their natural resources or are they adopting the newer non-traditional model of economic growth, such as the "Dubai Model."

Reform momentum and its impact on Greek growth. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2015/12, July 2015

Greece has an imperfect track-record of structural reform implementation. However, the poor growth outcome of the Greek programmes is also a consequence of the timing and composition of reforms, which were not optimally geared towards a speedy transition to a new growth model based on the private sector. While the main responsibility for this lies with the Greek authorities, international institutions share the responsibility for the poor growth-enhancing effect of reforms. In the current context, further structural reform efforts should be mainly targeted at supporting Greece's speedy return to solid growth rates. This is not only because poverty and unemployment have reached very high levels, but also for political economy reasons: reforms must quickly be seen to be working in order to buttress the consensus in favour of reform. Further efforts should be made to improve Greece’s business environment and to liberalise product markets, in addition to shifting taxation away from labour and towards consumption. Reforms to improve the quality of institutions should continue and are very much needed in the Greek setting, while taking into account that their demanding implementation might use up administrative capacity and their impact on growth will only be seen over long time horizons.

Late Putin. The end of growth, the end of stability. OSW POINT OF VIEW #55, 2015-10-05

Since Vladimir Putin returned to the Kremlin as President in May 2012, the Russian system of power has become increasingly authoritarian, and has evolved towards a model of extremely personalised rule that derives its legitimacy from aggressive decisions in internal and foreign policy, escalates the use of force, and interferes increasingly assertively in the spheres of politics, history, ideology or even public morals. Putin’s power now rests on charismatic legitimacy to a much greater extent than it did during his first two presidential terms; currently the President is presented not only as an effective leader, but also as the sole guarantor of Russia’s stability and integrity. After 15 years of Putin’s rule, Russia’s economic model based on revenue from energy resources has exhausted its potential, and the country has no new model that could ensure continued growth for the economy. The Putinist system of power is starting to show symptoms of agony – it has been unable to generate new development projects, and has been compensating for its ongoing degradation by escalating repression and the use of force. However, this is not equivalent to its imminent collapse.

Is there a way out of the Polish pickle? EPIN Commentary No. 31/22 January 2016

Poland is making headline news again. This time, however, not in a role of Central European Wunderkind surfing the economic crisis, but for reasons to be less proud of. Ever since the Prawo and Sprawiedliwość (PiS, a member of European Conservatives and Reformists group in the European Parliament) government took power after the elections in November, Poland has experienced political turmoil and is now facing accusations that the rule of law is in danger. This constitutes a major challenge for the European Union and for its other member states, which are looking for ways to deal with a recalcitrant state that makes a rapid U-turn on democratic fundamentals and takes any criticism hysterically. This is not the first time that the organisation has had to deal with such a case, yet solutions have not yet been found. Hungary is a case in point. And now Polish leaders too seem convinced about the virtues of the concept of illiberal democracy. Which prescription should the EU use to buck the trend and what are the potential side-effects?