7 resultados para Theatre of Witness
em Archive of European Integration
Resumo:
On 22 January 2013, French President François Hollande and German Chancellor Angela Merkel gathered in Berlin to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Élysée Treaty, the document that ended centuries of rivalry and warfare between their two countries. It is all too easy to forget the importance of Franco-German reconciliation. The 1950 Schuman Declaration, which led to the creation of the European Union’s (EU) predecessor, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), sought to render the prospect of war between France and Germany ‘not only unthinkable but materially impossible’. Over 60 years later, when the EU was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, the Norwegian Nobel Committee noted that indeed, ‘war between Germany and France is unthinkable’. Halfway around the world in Asia, the other theatre of World War II, tensions between China and Japan have arisen, with Taiwan and South Korea also in the fray. Nationalist movements in these countries have grown. This background brief lays out the issues for a timely reappraisal of the applicability, or otherwise, of the European integration and reconciliation processes to East Asia. The brief seeks to outline the contours of the historic act of Franco-German reconciliation, and its consequences ever since. Starting from a brief look at the history of rivalry and war between the two countries, the brief examines the events leading to the signing of the Élysée Treaty in 1963, and the development of Franco-German exchanges that have cemented the relationship. Difficulties between the countries are also raised. A timescale analysis of the opinion of the two publics is considered, as a measure of the success of Franco-German reconciliation.
Resumo:
Introduction. Ten years have elapsed since Malta’s accession in the European Union. One can still recall vividly the intense and acrimonious campaign prior to the membership referendum and the ensuing electoral victory that confirmed the Nationalist Party (PN) in power under the leadership of Edward Fenech Adami in 2003. In both cases the Maltese voted in favour of entry into the EU. During both exercises in democracy the Maltese were exposed to the rhetoric of both prophets of doom and prophets of plenty. For the former accession meant a loss of national and territorial independence, for the latter it meant the beginning of opportunity for all and, in some cases, the answer to all of Malta’s woes. Now, ten years later, a further appraisal of Malta’s membership and place in the European Union is called for. The purpose of this paper, however, is to reflect upon how this membership has affected the Roman Catholic Church in Malta and what prospects lie ahead for the Catholic community within Maltese society that remains in a state of constant flux on both the social and the religious level. It traces the major events that have accelerated the transformation of Malta into a secular society. The paper describes how these events, together with pressures that are being brought to bear by secular movements upon Maltese society, are profoundly affecting its Catholic identity and redrawing its moral landscape. It also discusses ways and means by which the Catholic Church in Malta can address these challenges and contribute towards the construction of a more humane Maltese society. In order to achieve this, it must first and foremost remain a coherent witness of a faith that is forever alive, dynamic and relevant.
Resumo:
The Eastern enlargement is about to be decided by the European Council. As expected, the “end game “ of the negotiations and assessments is heavily biased by a narrow perspective on net transfers, on income compensations to Central European farmers and on the psychological politics of a single “big bang “. None of these three so-called key items of the end game are of much relevance to appreciate the significance of enlargement. Net transfers have little to do with the costs and benefits of club membership for countries which pay, and can lead to addiction and lethargy rather than extra growth if market integration, macro-economic stability and domestic reforms are not taken serious (as the case of Greece before 1997 has demonstrated). Income compensations for Eastern farmers are crucial for this pressure group, and symbolically of some importance in domestic politics because of the perversity that rich farmers get more, but their absence is likely to serve the public interest in candidate countries far better. And being part of the big bang, as against getting in one or three years later, has assumed a dramatic meaning during this end game, far beyond its true proportions. This hectic European theatre tends to obscure what enlargement is mainly about, now that the stability and values have been secured for the peoples from Central Europe. In a guaranteed setting of peace, freedom and security, enlargement is about greater prosperity.
Resumo:
This paper examines the policies pursued by the European Central Bank (ECB) since the inception of the euro. The ECB was originally set up to pursue price stability, with an eye also to economic growth and financial stability as subsidiary goals, once the primary goal was secured. The application of a single monetary policy to a diverse economic area has entailed a pronounced pro-cyclicality in its real economic effects on the eurozone periphery. Later, monetary policy became the main policy instrument to tackle financial instability elicited by the failure of Lehman Brothers and the sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone. In the process, the ECB emerged as the lender of last resort in the sovereign debt markets of participating countries. Persistent economic depression and deflation eventually brought the ECB into the uncharted waters of unconventional policies. That the ECB could legally perform all of these tasks bears witness to the flexibility of the TFEU and its Statute, but its tools and operating procedures were stretched to their limit. In the end, the place of the ECB amongst EU policy-making institutions has been greatly enhanced, but has entailed repeated intrusions into the broader domain of economic policies – not least because of its market intervention policies – whose consequences have yet to be ascertained.
Resumo:
This paper examines the policies pursued by the European Central Bank (ECB) since the inception of the euro. The ECB was originally set up to pursue price stability, with an eye also to economic growth and financial stability as subsidiary goals, once the primary goal was secured. The application of a single monetary policy to a diverse economic area has entailed a pronounced pro-cyclicality in its real economic effects on the eurozone periphery. Later, monetary policy became the main policy instrument to tackle financial instability elicited by the failure of Lehman Brothers and the sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone. In the process, the ECB emerged as the lender of last resort in the sovereign debt markets of participating countries. Persistent economic depression and deflation eventually brought the ECB into the uncharted waters of unconventional policies. That the ECB could legally perform all of these tasks bears witness to the flexibility of the TFEU and its Statute, but its tools and operating procedures were stretched to their limit. In the end, the place of the ECB amongst EU policy-making institutions has been greatly enhanced, but has entailed repeated intrusions into the broader domain of economic policies – not least because of its market intervention policies – whose consequences have yet to be ascertained.