Care for the old rather than sleepwalk into war in East Asia. CEPS Commentary, 23 June 2014

In view of the demographic dynamics of East Asia, in this commentary Wolfgang Pape makes a plea for a kind of ‘geriatric peace’ in the region rather than further territorial disputes and expensive military build-up.

The Evolving Integration in East Asia - Too many reservations? CEPS Essay No. 5, 29 April 2013

East Asian economic integration is less well known in Europe than is desirable in the EU’s own enlightened self-interest. It is also badly understood, not least because a range of ‘soft’ cultural, historical and political aspects are insufficiently appreciated in Europe. This CEPS Essay offers a deeper personal reflection on the emergence and development of East Asian economic cooperation and market-driven integration. It attempts to address some of the lingering reservations on both sides and to render the reservations in East Asia more intelligible to Europeans.

Student's cross-perception of the economic crises in the European Union and in Southeast Asia. EU Centre in Singapore Working Paper No. 11, December 2012

The financial crisis of 1997-1998 in Southeast Asia and the European Union’s financial crisis of 2008 followed by the sovereign debt crisis represented major policy events in the regions and beyond. The crises triggered policy adjustments with implications on economic and other policies. This paper aims at evaluating the perception of university students in the European Union (EU) and Southeast Asia on the management of these crises. It strives to confirm several ex ante assumptions about the relationship between students’ background, their policy orientation and their knowledge of the European Union and ASEAN policies. It also provides an analysis of the students’ evaluation of the geopolitical importance of the global regions and the EU and ASEAN policies. The paper is based on opinion surveys conducted during the first part of 2012 at four universities, two in the EU and two in ASEAN countries. In the eyes of EU and ASEAN students, the EU crisis is not being managed appropriately. The citizens of the EU surveyed were even significantly more critical of the EU’s anti-crisis measures than any other surveyed group. Their ASEAN counterparts were generally more positive in their evaluations.

Hostages to Moscow, clients of Beijing. Security in Central Asia as the role of the West diminishes. OSW Study 10/2014

The goal of this publication is to attempt to assess the thirteen years (2001- -2014) of the West’s military presence in the countries of post-Soviet Central Asia, closely associated with the ISAF and OEF-A (Operation Enduring Freedom – Afghanistan) missions in Afghanistan. There will also be an analysis of the actual challenges for the region’s stability after 2014. The current and future security architecture in Central Asia will also be looked at closely, as will the actual capabilities to counteract the most serious threats within its framework. The need to separately handle the security system in Central Asia and security as such is dictated by the particularities of political situation in the region, the key mechanism of which is geopolitics understood as global superpower rivalry for influence with a secondary or even instrumental role of the five regional states, while ignoring their internal problems. Such an approach is especially present in Russia’s perception of Central Asia, as it views security issues in geopolitical categories. Because of this, security analysis in the Central Asian region requires a broader geopolitical context, which was taken into account in this publication. The first part investigates the impact of the Western (primarily US) military and political presence on the region’s geopolitical architecture between 2001 and 2014. The second chapter is an attempt to take an objective look at the real challenges to regional security after the withdrawal of the coalition forces from Afghanistan, while the third chapter is dedicated to analysing the probable course of events in the security dimension following 2014. The accuracy of predictions time-wise included in the below publication does not exceed three to five years due to the dynamic developments in Central Asia and its immediate vicinity (the former Soviet Union, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran), and because of the large degree of unpredictability of policies of one of the key regional actors – Russia (both in the terms of its activity on the international arena, and its internal developments).

Russia's turn towards Asia: more words than actions. OSW Commentary No. 92, 2012-10-08

The APEC summit in Vladivostok (8–9 September) was expected to confirm Russia’s ambitions to play a more significant role in the Asia-Pacific region (particularly in East Asia) and balance Moscow’s foreign policy by shifting some of its focus from Europe to Asia. The measures taken ahead of the summit included both the implementation of economic projects in Russia’s Far East and greater diplomatic engagement in the region. The summit itself, however, was less effective than expected. Russia failed to define its place in the Asia-Pacific order, and did not propose any new political or economic initiatives that would go beyond the discussions that have already been held within APEC for years, including plans for a free trade area.

Capitalism without Capitalists? A Bottom-Up View of Industrial Transformation in East Germany. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 00.1, 1999

Research on the industrial transition in East Germany and its outcomes has long focused on the strategy of the Treuhand­ anstalt (IHA). According to institutionalists, David Stark and Lazlo Brust!: (1998), the powerful position of the German privatization agency was not only a result of German unification but also a function of a pathway rooted in the institutional peculiarities of the East German economy before 1989. This paper shows that neither a simple top-down perspective nor the pathway approach, as Stark and Brust!: suggested, are adequate for explaining the internal dynamic of enterprise transformation as well as the outcomes of this process. First of all, the dissolution of the former organizational structures and hierarchies was less coordinated by the 1HA than is often assumed. Often Kombinates fell apart more quickly from below than they could be dismantled from above since enterprises or their units chose the exit­ option and had good reasons to do so. Secondly, although the privatization by the 1HA resulted in the clear dominance of Western investors, the new ownership structure of East German industry as a whole could be characterized as a "capitalism without (East German) capitalists." In fact, what exists in East Germany is rather a kind of "small business capitalism" (KleinbetriebsknpitalifmllS) in which small-and medium-sized producers dominate the landscape. Finally, there was no single starting point in 1989. Two different industrial orders shaped the industrial history of the East German regions which were not destroyed between 1945-89, but rather transformed into the state socialist production system. It can be shown that these older historical patterns are relevant for transition and their outcomes as well.

Niemiecki sieci na wschodzie. Niemiecki soft power w Europie Wschodniej, Azji Centralnej i na Kaukazie Południowym: polityka – administracja – kultura – nauka – społeczenstwo. OSW Raport, wrzesien 2010. = German networks in the east. German soft power in Eastern Europe, Central Asia and South Caucasus policy - administration - culture - science - the society of. CES Report, September 2010

Do realizacji niemieckich interesów w polityce zagranicznej, bezpieczeństwa i gospodarczej RFN wykorzystuje instrumenty soft power z obszaru dyplomacji publicznej, polityki rozwojowej, kulturalnej i naukowej. Budowanie sieci kontaktów i lobbing polityczny, programy współpracy rozwojowej oraz zagranicznej polityki kulturalnej i naukowej, mają służyć wspieraniu niemieckiej gospodarki uzależnionej od eksportu, uzyskaniu statusu europejskiego ośrodka technologii i innowacji oraz zwiększeniu wpływu RFN na działania zewnętrzne UE. Jednym z priorytetowych obszarów stosowania tych instrumentów są dla Niemiec państwa Europy Wschodniej, Kaukazu Południowego i Azji Centralnej. Decydują o tym bliskość geograficzna i otwierające się rynki zbytu, konieczność modernizacji gospodarek tych krajów, zagrożenia dla „miękkiego” bezpieczeństwa RFN oraz rozwój relacji UE z tymi państwami. Niemiecka aktywność jest w tych krajach niezależna od sytuacji politycznej i stanowi długofalową strategię ugruntowującą pozycję RFN jako ich najważniejszego europejskiego partnera gospodarczego i politycznego.