Estimating the Bridge Financing Needs of the Single Resolution Fund: How expensive is it to resolve a bank? CEPS Special Report No. 122, 25 November 2015

The Single Resolution Board (SRB) will be responsible for the resolution of banks in the euro area from 1 January 2016. However, the resources of the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) at the disposal of the SRB will only gradually be built up until 2023. This paper provides estimates of the potential financing needs of the SRF, based on the euro area bank resolutions that actually occurred between 2007 and 2014. We find that the SRF would have been asked to put a total amount of about €72 billion into these failing banks, which is more than the target for the SRF (€55 billion) but less than the amount the SRF could draw on, if the ex-post levies are also taken into account. As this sum would have been required over eight years, the broad conclusion is that bridge financing, in addition to the existing alternative funding, would only have been needed in the early years of the transition.

Croatia and the structural funds – Doing without an Ottoman Empire bypass bridge. CEPS Commentary, 29 July 2013

In his latest commentary, Associate Senior Fellow Michael Emerson hails Croatia’s accession to the EU as a fine step forward towards the official goal of integration of the whole of the Balkans into the EU. At the same time, he warns of the folly underway of the serious attention being paid by the European Commission to the newest member state’s petition to construct a multi-million euro bridge over a 9-km stretch of Bosnian land (the ‘Neum corridor’) that inconveniently but temporarily interrupts a non-stop drive along Croatia’s Dalmatian coast.

Down the road to Dubrovnik – Doing without an Ottoman Empire bypass bridge. CEPS Commentary, 29 July 2013

As Europeans speed down the road to Dubrovnik, Croatia's treasured jewel of the Adriatic coast, Michael Emerson discusses in a seasonal commentary one topical issue: What to do now over the 9 km of Bosnian coastline that separates north and south Croatia? Several options are under consideration, one of which would mean a very expensive bridge and dubious use of EU structural funds.

EU-US S&T Collaborations, Challenges and Opportunities for Development. Innovation Diplomacy, Special case in point: the Hellenic-American innovation bridge and its underlying dimensions. ACES Working Papers, October 2012

Developed and developing economies alike face increased resource scarcity and competitive rivalry. Science and technology increasingly appear as a main source of competitive and sustainable advantage for nations are regions alike. However, the key determinant of their efficacy is the quality and quantity of entrepreneurship-enabled innovation that unlocks and captures the pecuniary benefits of science enterprise in the form of private, public or hybrid goods (for instance, bio-entrepreneur-millionaires, knowledge for the public good - ie: public health awareness, and new public-private research centers funded partly by bio-entrepreneur-millionaires and monies levied as taxes on bio-ventures).

The EEAS and the Eastern Partnership: let the blame game stop. CEPS Commentary, 4 September 2012

In the first year and a half of its existence, the EEAS and its head have become the target of extensive criticism for the shortcomings of EU foreign policy; shortcomings that in fact date back to the creation of the European Union. The EU’s diplomatic service has been blamed variously for ‘lacking clarity,’ ‘acting too slowly’ and ‘being unable to bridge the institutional divide’. In this Commentary author Hrant Kostanyan argues that the EEAS’ discretionary power in the Eastern Partnership multilateral framework is restricted by the decision-making procedures between a wide range of stakeholders: the member states and the partner countries, as well as by the EU institutions, international organisations and the Civil Society Forum. Since this decision-making process places a substantial number of brakes on the discretionary power of the EEAS, any responsible analysis or critique of the service should take these constraints into consideration. Ultimately, the EEAS is only able to craft EU foreign policy insofar as it is allowed to do so.