The European Union's promotion of regional economic integration in Southeast Asia: Norms, markets or both? Bruges Political Research Paper No. 25/May 2012

The EU‘s external action includes a preference for regional interlocutors and a tendency to promote regionalism. This work concentrates on the southeast Asian area and it aims at investigating the nature of EU‘s promotion of ASEAN regional integration. The EU‘s ideas and practices of regionalism as well as the single market experience influence the EU‘s international action. The power deriving from the EU‘s institutionalized market is used by the Union in a normative way to diffuse the EU‘s ideas and principles, advance the EU‘s interests and spread its model of economic integration through political dialogue, development cooperation and preferential trade arrangements. This action seems to result in a certain diffusion of the EU‘s ideas and practices in southeast Asia as well as in a subsequent reappropriation and redefinition of external inputs by ASEAN.

Juncker’s Mission to the New Energy Team: Avoiding the hard choices. CEPS Commentary, 24 September 2014

In his mission letter to Arias Cañete, Jean-Claude Juncker asked the designated Commissioner for Climate Action and Energy to focus on further developing EU policy for renewables in order to “be a world leader in this sector” and on promoting the EU Emissions Trading System “to ensure that we reach our climate goals in a cost-effective way”. Furthermore, he would like Alenka Bratušek, the designated Vice-President for Energy Union, to focus on “completing the internal energy market” and on “increasing competition”. In assessing the feasibility and desirability of this remit, this commentary finds these objectives to be very ambitious but more importantly, partially conflicting, given the state of play in EU energy markets.

Priorities for the Juncker Commission: Policy recommendations and advice from the research team at CEPS. CEPS Special Report No. 92, 22 October 2014

In the months leading up to his nomination as President of the European Commission by the European Council in June 2014 through to his approval by the European Parliament in mid-July and finally his approval at a second special summit in August, CEPS’ researchers have closely followed the travails of Jean-Claude Juncker. We have also carefully studied his fundamental restructuring of the College in re-grouping commissioners around seven project teams, each headed by a vice-president. In our view, these changes promise to improve internal coordination, policy-making and transparency of rule-making and hopefully will reduce the personalisation of portfolios. This Special Report brings together under a single cover a series of 14 separate commentaries prepared by senior CEPS researchers, offering their assessment of these profound changes underway and their policy advice to the new commissioners from the perspective of their field of specialisation.

The single market and competitiveness - the challenges for the Juncker team. CHALLENGE EUROPE Issue 22 - Challenges and new beginnings: Priorities for the EU's new leadership, September 2014

The announcement of the new European Commission is encouraging for single market supporters, especially in terms of how internal co-ordination and cross functional working will be organised. It is particularly significant that the responsibility for the single market in both goods and services is to be combined under one Commissioner portfolio. There is much to be gained from a combined focus, especially on enforcing the existing rules. A unified Consumer focus is also much welcomed. The European Parliament's Internal Market and Consumer Protection Committee (IMCO), which I had the privilege to Chair over the last five years, was extremely critical of the fragmented approach to consumer policy and legislation adopted by the outgoing Commission. A strong consumer focus underpins a dynamic and well-functioning market place and encourages more competition.

How EU Fiscal Norms Will Become a Safety Net for the Failure of National Golden Rules. European Policy Brief No. 6, January 2012

If introduced successfully, national Golden Rules will completely overturn fiscal governance in the eurozone. Golden Rules would almost always be more stringent than EU-level fiscal norms. EU fiscal norms will hence evolve into a safety net in case a Golden Rule fails. The possibility of such a failure is, indeed, not to be dismissed. Because of the severity of the Golden Rules, eurozone leaders should reflect on their design. There is a real risk that they will undercut public investment, which would be at the cost of the EU’s other long-term challenges.

Restoring Order in Global Health Governance: Do Metagovernance Norms Affect Interorganizational Convergence? CES Open Forum Series #23, 2014-2015

This paper theorizes about the convergence of international organizations in global health governance, a field of international cooperation that is commonly portrayed as particularly hit by institutional fragmentation. Unlike existing theories on interorganizationalism that have mainly looked to intra- and extraorganizational factors in order to explain why international organizations cooperate with each other in the first place, the paper is interested in the link between causes and systemic effects of interorganizational convergence. The paper begins by defining interorganizational convergence. It then proceeds to discuss why conventional theories on interorganizational- ism fail to explain the aggregate effects of convergence between IOs in global (health) governance which tend to worsen rather than cushion fragmentation — so-called "hypercollective action" (Severino & Ray 2010). In order to remedy this explanatory blind-spot the paper formulates an alternative sociological institutionalist theory on interorganizational convergence that makes two core theoretical propositions: first that emerging norms of metagovernance are a powerful driver behind interorganizational convergence in global health governance, and secondly that IOs are engaged in a fierce meaning-struggle over these norms which results in hypercollective action. In its empirical part, the paper’s core theoretical propositions are corroborated by analyzing discourses and practices of interorganizational convergence in global health. The empirical analysis allows drawing two far-reaching conclusions. On the one hand, interorganizational harmonization has emerged as a largely undisputed norm in global health which has been translated into ever more institutionalized forms of interorganizational cooperation. On the other, discourses and practices of interorganizational harmonization exhibit conflicts over the ordering principles according to which the policies and actions of international organizations with overlapping mandates and missions should be harmonized. In combination, these two empirical findings explain why interorganizational convergence has so far failed to strengthen the global health architecture.