Corporate Taxation in Europe: Let's get it together! CEPS Commentary, 16 February 2015

More comprehensive cooperation in corporate taxation at European level could significantly advance the region’s socio-economic prosperity, but its potential contribution is unfortunately overlooked in the current search for growth and job creation. Lucrative tax niches established in some member states and the fear of losing fiscal autonomy prevent several countries from accepting the move towards an EU single market for taxation. If ‘Lux leaks’ and other revelations of tax avoidance and evasion can succeed in changing the dominant attitudes in the European tax debate, this commentary outlines the steps that need to be taken to allow tax policy to play a positive role in promoting economic prosperity.

The Politics of Budget Consolidation in Britain and Germany: the Impact of Blame-Avoidance Opportunities. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 05.2, 2005

According to parts of the literature, blame avoidance opportunities, i.e. the necessity and applicability of blame avoidance strategies, may differ among countries according to the respective institutional set-ups and between governing parties according to their programmatic orientation. In countries with many veto actors, a strategy of "Institutional Cooperation" among these actors is expected to diffuse blame sufficiently to render other blame avoidance strategies obsolete. In contrast, governments in Westminster democracies should resort to the more unilateral strategies of presentation, policy design and timing. At the same time, parties of the left are expected to have an easier time implementing spending cuts while right parties are less vulnerable when proposing tax increases. Evidence from the politics of budget consolidation in Britain and Germany does not corroborate these hypotheses. Instead, it seems that party competition conditions the effects institutions and the partisan complexion of governments have on the politics of blame avoidance.