6 resultados para TRADE STRUCTURE
em Archive of European Integration
Resumo:
For more than 20 years, the United States and the European Union have engaged in often-contentious negotiations over access to government procurement. The EU is dissatisfied with the level of procurement that the US has opened under the WTO Government Procurement Agreement and, as a consequence, it does not give the US its most comprehensive coverage. The US has been constrained in responding to the EU’s requests for greater access, especially to state procurement, by both its federal structure of government and by domestic purchasing requirements. At the current time, neither party has proposed a way to break the impasse. This paper reviews the current state of affairs between the US and the EU on government procurement, examining the procurement that they open to one another and the procurement that they withhold. It then proposes a strategy for the two sides to use the TTIP negotiations to move forward. This strategy includes both steps to expand their current commitments in the TTIP, as well as to develop a longer-term approach by making the TTIP a ‘living agreement’. This strategy suggests that the EU and the US could find a way to expand their access to government procurement contracts and at least partially defuse the issue.
Resumo:
How has the integration of trade policy and negotiating authority in Europe affected the external bargaining capabilities of the European Community (EC)? This paper analyzes the bargaining constraints and opportunities for the EC created by the obligation to negotiate as a single entity. The nature of demands in external~ the voting rules at the EC level, and the amount of autonomy exercised by EC negotiators contribute to explaining, this paper argues, whether the EC gains some external bargaining clout from its internal divisions and whether the final international agreement reflects the position of the median or the extreme countries in the Community. The Uruguay Round agricultural negotiations illustrate the consequences of the EC's institutional structure on its external bargaining capabilities. Negotiations between the EC and the U.S. were deadlocked for six years because the wide gap among the positions of the member states at the start of the Uruguay Round had prevented the EC from making sufficient concessions. The combination of a weakened unanimity rule and greater autonomy seized by Commission negotiators after the May 1992 reform of the Common Agricultural Policy made possible the conclusion of an EC-U.S. agricultural agreement. Although the majority of member states supported the Blair House agreement, the reinstating of the veto power in the EC and the tighter member states' control over the Commission eventually resulted in a renegotiation of the U.S.-EC agreement tilted in favor of France, the most recalcitrant country.
Resumo:
This paper analyses empirically how increasingly close trade relations between China and Russia might affect the European Union (EU). We show that EU countries are complementary to Russia on the Chinese market. However, Chinese exports are increasingly relevant substitutes for EU exports on the Russian market. This means that an increase in China-Russia economic cooperation should have a negative impact on European exports. We simulate a scenario in which trade tariffs between Russia and China are eliminated, which is found to reduce EU exports to Russia. Finally, a more granular approach to the question analyses which sectors in Europe will be more affected by the increasing economic links between China and Russia, and finds that electronic machinery, equipment and machinery, and nuclear reactors will be particularly affected. Such findings obviously show quickly China is moving up the ladder in terms of export structure and how strategically important it is for Europe to continue upgrading its industry to compete at the highest level of that ladder.
