Why come here if I can go there? Assessing the ‘Attractiveness’ of the EU’s Blue Card Directive for ‘Highly Qualified’ Immigrants. Paper on Liberty and Security in Europe No. 60, 14 October 2013

This paper analyses the attractiveness of the EU’s Blue Card Directive – the flagship of the EU’s labour immigration policy – for so-called ‘highly qualified’ immigrant workers from outside the EU. For this purpose, the paper deconstructs the understanding of ‘attractiveness’ in the Blue Card Directive as shaped by the various EU decision-making actors during the legislative process. It is argued that the Blue Card Directive sets forth minimum standards providing for a common floor – not a common ceiling: the Directive did not, as originally envisaged by the European Commission, create one European highly skilled admission scheme. This raises questions regarding its concrete use. A critical focus is placed on the personal scope of the Blue Card Directive and the level of rights offered, and a first comparative perspective on the implementation of the Directive in five member states is provided.

The Kremlin plays the immigration card. OSW Commentary No. 112, 2013-08-19

Russia is currently the world’s second most popular destination country for international migrants (second only to the United States). In recent years, Russia’s relatively high economic growth has attracted foreign workers from poorer neighbouring republics in Central Asia, as well as from Ukraine and Belarus. In the absence of a consistent immigration policy, the largescale influx of immigrants has become a major issue affecting social relations in Russia. The majority of Russians oppose the arrival of both foreign workers and internal migrants from Russia’s North Caucasus republics, claiming that their presence in Russia contributes to the escalation of ethnic and religious tensions, fuels organised crime and corruption, and increases competition on the labour market. As many as 70% of Russians are in favour of restricting the number of immigrants allowed into the country, calling on the government for a more stringent policy on immigration. Since the end of July the authorities have responded to these calls by carrying out a series of raids on markets and construction sites across Moscow, where most immigrants tend to find employment. The raids have led to arrests and deportations. However, these measures should not be seen as a serious attempt to deal with the problem of economic migrants in the capital, mainly because of the highly selective and staged nature of the crackdown. This, coupled with the timing of the initiative, might indicate that the raids are a part of an ongoing election campaign, particularly in the run-up to the Moscow mayoral elections scheduled for 8 September. By adopting anti-immigration rhetoric, the Kremlin is seeking both to garner support among Russian voters, who tend to be easily swayed by nationalist sentiments, and to steal the anti-immigration card from the opposition and its leader Alexei Navalny. The opposition has been calling for a clearer policy on this issue and has blamed the government for the current lack of control over migrant numbers, accusing the authorities of benefiting from the widespread corruption linked to immigration. In a broader context, the actions taken by the government are a response to the declining legitimacy of the current ruling elite. By attempting to address the immigration issue, the Kremlin is trying to restore its image as a government attentive to social problems and capable of solving them effectively.

Prime Minister Fico’s Russian card. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER NUMBER 175/01.07.2015

Since the beginning of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict, the position of Slovakia’s left-wing government towards Russia has been ambiguous. Bratislava has accepted the EU sanctions targeting Russia and the plan for strengthening NATO’s eastern flank. At the same time, however, Prime Minister Robert Fico’s government has maintained close political relations with the Kremlin. It has called for the intensification of Slovak-Russian economic relations and has repeatedly criticised the sanctions, speaking in tandem with Russian propaganda in so doing. Slovakia’s Prime Minister is hoping that by playing the role of one of the leaders in the EU and NATO who are most willing to cooperate with Russia, he will gain economic benefits and win votes in next spring’s upcoming parliamentary elections. Despite numerous pro-Russian gestures, Slovakia has been limiting the number of areas in which Moscow could exert pressure on Bratislava. As it strives to become independent of Russia, Slovakia has ensured possible alternative fuel supplies for itself. Moreover, it has been gradually replacing Russian-made military equipment with equipment made in the West. The Slovak government does intend to develop the country’s cooperation with Russia, including in strategic areas involving supplies and transit of oil and gas, as well as supplies of nuclear fuel. Nevertheless, it has been making efforts to gain easy access to an alternative source of supplies in each of these areas. Beset by crises, Russia has ever fewer economic cooperation opportunities to offer Slovakia, and Slovak businesses operating on the Russian market have to take into account the growing risk of insolvency of local contractors. To a great extent, therefore, Slovak-Russian relations have been reduced to rhetorical statements confirming the desire for closer cooperation, and to visions of joint projects accompanied by an ever shorter list of feasible cooperation initiatives.

The EU Blue Card - is there a need for a more comprehensive approach? IES Policy Brief Issue 2015/3 June 2015

This Policy Brief reviews the implementation of the EU Blue Card (BC) Directive in Member States and offers some suggestions on how to improve its potential. Firstly, it traces back the origin of the current partitioned approach in labour migration and the objectives that an EU labour migration policy should achieve according to the Commission. Secondly, it reports on the content of the directive and its implementation in Member States. Thirdly, there is an analysis of the weaknesses of the directive in terms of numbers of BCs issued and harmonization achieved. Finally, recommendations are put forward on how to improve EU labour migration policy.