Europe’s most wanted? Recalibrating Trust in the European Arrest Warrant System. CEPS Paper Liberty and Security in Europe 55/21 March 2013

This paper assesses the uses and misuses in the application of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) system in the European Union. It examines the main quantitative results of this extradition system achieved between 2005 and 2011 on the basis of the existing statistical knowledge on its implementation at EU official levels. The EAW has been anchored in a high level of ‘mutual trust’ between the participating states’ criminal justice regimes and authorities. This reciprocal confidence, however, has been subject to an increasing number of challenges resulting from its practical application, presenting a dual conundrum: 1. Principle of proportionality: Who are the competent judicial authorities cooperating with each other and ensuring that there are sufficient impartial controls over the necessity and proportionality of the decisions on the issuing and execution of EAWs? 2. Principle of division of powers: How can criminal justice authorities be expected to handle different criminal judicial traditions in what is supposed to constitute a ‘serious’ or ‘minor’ crime in their respective legal settings and ‘who’ is ultimately to determine (divorced from political considerations) when is it duly justified to make the EAW system operational? It is argued that the next generation of the EU’s criminal justice cooperation and the EAW need to recognise and acknowledge that the mutual trust premise upon which the European system has been built so far is no longer viable without devising new EU policy stakeholders’ structures and evaluation mechanisms. These should allow for the recalibration of mutual trust and mistrust in EU justice systems in light of the experiences of the criminal justice actors and practitioners having a stake in putting the EAW into daily effect. Such a ‘bottom-up approach’ should be backed up with the best impartial and objective evaluation, an improved system of statistical collection and an independent qualitative assessment of its implementation. This should be placed as the central axis of a renewed EAW framework which should seek to better ensure the accountability, impartial (EU-led) scrutiny and transparency of member states’ application of the EAW in light of the general principles and fundamental rights constituting the foundations of the European system of criminal justice cooperation.

Big business in the Russian economy and politics under Putin's rule; The Russian power industry shortly before reforms; Ukrainian metallurgy: the economic link in the oligarchical system. OSW Study 5/2002

Big business in Russia: The pace of ownership transfer in the Russian economy has speeded up considerably over the last year. There has been a significant rise in the number of acquisitions of whole enterprises, and large blocks of shares in individual firms and plants. Similarly the number of mergers, bankruptcies and take-overs of failing firms by their strongest competitors has grown. The Russian power industry: This study is an overview of the current condition and principles on which the Russian power sector has been functioning so far. This analysis has been carried out against the background of the changes that have been taking place in the sector since the beginning of the 1990s. This text also contains a description of guidelines and progress made so far in implementing the reform of the Russian power industry, the draft of which was adopted by the government of the Russian Federation in summer 2001. However, the purpose of this study is not an economic analysis of the draft, but an attempt to present the political conditions and possible consequences of the transformations carried out in the Russian power sector. The final part attempts to evaluate the possibilities and threats related to the implementation of the reform in its present shape. Ukrainian metallurgy: The metallurgic sector, like the east-west transit of energy raw materials, is a strategic source of revenue for Ukraine. Over the last ten years, this sector has become Kiev's most important source of foreign currency inflows, accounting for over 40 per cent of its total export revenues. The growth of metallurgic production, which has continued almost without interruption since the mid-1990s, has contributed considerably to the increase in GDP which Ukraine showed in 2000, for the first time in its independent history.

An Assessment of the Penalties System for Infringements of EU Competition Law: Can Personal Sanctions be the Missing Piece of the Puzzle? IES WORKING PAPER 6/2013

Competition law seeks to protect competition on the market as a means of enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring an efficient allocation of resources. In order to be successful, therefore, competition authorities should be adequately equipped and have at their disposal all necessary enforcement tools. However, at the EU level the current enforcement system of competition rules allows only for the imposition of administrative fines by the European Commission to liable undertakings. The main objectives, in turn, of an enforcement policy based on financial penalties are two fold: to impose sanctions on infringing undertakings which reflect the seriousness of the violation, and to ensure that the risk of penalties will deter both the infringing undertakings (often referred to as 'specific deterrence') and other undertakings that may be considering anti-competitive activities from engaging in them (often referred to as 'general deterrence'). In all circumstances, it is important to ensure that pecuniary sanctions imposed on infringing undertakings are proportionate and not excessive. Although pecuniary sanctions against infringing undertakings are a crucial part of the arsenal needed to deter competition law violations, they may not be sufficient. One alternative option in that regard is the strategic use of sanctions against the individuals involved in, or responsible for, the infringements. Sanctions against individuals are documented to focus the minds of directors and employees to comply with competition rules as they themselves, in addition to the undertakings in which they are employed, are at risk of infringements. Individual criminal penalties, including custodial sanctions, have been in fact adopted by almost half of the EU Member States. This is a powerful tool but is also limited in scope and hard to implement in practice mostly due to the high standards of proof required and the political consensus that needs first to be built. Administrative sanctions for individuals, on the other hand, promise to deliver up to a certain extent the same beneficial results as criminal sanctions whilst at the same time their adoption is not likely to meet strong opposition and their implementation in practice can be both efficient and effective. Directors’ disqualification, in particular, provides a strong individual incentive for each member, or prospective member, of the Board as well as other senior executives, to take compliance with competition law seriously. It is a flexible and promising tool that if added to the arsenal of the European Commission could bring balance to the current sanctioning system and that, in turn, would in all likelihood make the enforcement of EU competition rules more effective. Therefore, it is submitted that a competition law regime in order to be effective should be able to deliver policy objectives through a variety of tools, not simply by imposing significant pecuniary sanctions to infringing undertakings. It is also clear that individual sanctions, mostly of an administrative nature, are likely to play an increasingly important role as they focus the minds of those in business who might otherwise be inclined to regard infringing the law as a matter of corporate risk rather than of personal risk. At the EU level, in particular, the adoption of directors’ disqualification promises to deliver more effective compliance and greater overall economic impact.

The Second Phase of the Common European Asylum System: A Step Forward in the Protection of Asylum Seekers? IES WORKING PAPER 7/2013

The aim of this paper is to analyse what is the impact of the second phase of the creation of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) in the protection of rights of Asylum Seekers in the European Union. The establishment of a CEAS has been always a part of the development of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Its implementation was planned in two phases: the first one, focused on the harmonisation of internal legislation on minimum common standards; the second, based on the result of an evaluation of the effectiveness of the agreed legal instruments, should improve the effectiveness of the protection granted. The five instruments adopted between 2002 and 2005, three Directives, on Qualification, Reception Conditions and Asylum Procedures, and two Regulations, the so-called “Dublin System”, were subjected to an extensive evaluation and modification, which led to the end of the recasting in 2013. The paper discusses briefly the international obligations concerning the rights of asylum seekers and continues with the presentation of the legal basis of the CEAS and its development, together with the role of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in asylum matters. The research will then focus on the development in the protection of asylum seekers after the recasting of the legislative instruments mentioned above. The paper will note that the European standards result now improved, especially concerning the treatment of vulnerable people, the quality of the application procedure, the effectiveness of the appeal, the treatment of gender issues in decision concerning procedures and reception. However, it will be also highlighted that Member States maintained a wide margin of appreciation in many fields, which can lead to the compression of important guarantees. This margin concerns, for example, the access to free legal assistance, the definition of the material support to be granted to each applicant for international protection, the access to labour market, the application of the presumptions of the “safety” of a third country. The paper will therefore stress that the long negotiations that characterised the second phase of the CEAS undoubtedly led to some progress in the protection of Asylum Seekers in the EU. However, some provisions are still in open contrast with the international obligations concerning rights of asylum seekers, while others require to the Member State consider carefully its obligation in the choice of internal policies concerning asylum matters.

Can the new refugee relocation system work? Perils in the Dublin logic and flawed reception conditions in the EU. CEPS Policy Brief No. 332, October 2015 Thursday, 1 October 2015

This Policy Brief argues that the newly adopted EU temporary relocation (quota) system constitutes a welcome yet timid step forward in addressing a number of central controversies of the current refugee debate in Europe. Two main challenges affect the effective operability of the new EU relocation model. First, EU member states’ asylum systems show profound (on-the-ground) weaknesses in reception conditions and judicial/administrative capacities. These prevent a fair and humane processing of asylum applications. EU states are not implementing the common standards enshrined in the EU reception conditions Directive 2013/33. Second, the new relocation system constitutes a move away from the much-criticised Dublin system, but it is still anchored to its premises. The Dublin system is driven by an unfair and unsustainable rule according to which the first EU state of entry is responsible for assessing asylum applications. It does not properly consider the personal, private and family circumstances or the preferences of asylum-seekers. Policy Recommendations In order to respond to these challenges, the Policy Brief offers the following policy recommendations: The EU should strengthen and better enforce member states’ reception capacities, abolish the current Dublin system rule of allocation of responsibility and expand the new relocation distribution criteria to include in the assessment (as far as possible) asylum-seekers’ preferences and personal/family links to EU member states. EU member countries should give priority to boosting their current and forward-looking administrative and judicial capacities to deal and welcome asylum applications. The EU should establish a permanent common European border and asylum service focused on ensuring the highest standards through stable operational support, institutional solidarity across all EU external borders and the practical implementation of new distribution relocation criteria.