The future of the Franco-German tandem. OSW Commentary No. 83, 2012-07-11

Following the victories of François Hollande in the presidential election and the Socialist Party in the parliamentary election, the existing model of relations between Germany and France as symbolised by the Merkel-Sarkozy duo is undergoing a transformation. Along with the defeat for Sarkozy, who had fostered close cooperation with the German Chancellor, we are witnessing a change in the German-French modus operandi, which was based on making confidential agreements concerning the anti-crisis measures in the eurozone and then presenting ready-made solutions to other EU members (as in the case of the successive versions of the document currently known as the fiscal pact). However, a conflict in bilateral relations, which would mean a total breakdown of the Franco-German engine, is rather unlikely. In fact, François Hollande’s proposals have diminished the appearance of the two states’ exceptional compatibility, and have restored the specific relationship affected by the natural rivalry between two states, who because of their economies’ different orientation have divergent interests. Nevertheless, both sides are destined to reach a compromise, as neither can attain its goals in the face of the other’s opposition. In the long term, Hollande is likely to maintain a common front with Germany in fighting the crisis, while at the same time trying (with his allies from the south of the EU) to limit Berlin’s political and economic superiority.

Does the European Union create the foundations of an information society for all? Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 11/2005

In order to increase the use of information and communication technologies (ICT) in the European Union Member States, the European Commission, on the initiative of Commissioner E. Liikannen, launched in December 1999 a bold programme called “eEurope”. Soon after its creation, the eEurope programme was integrated into the so- called Lisbon agenda for Europe to become the “most advanced knowledge based economy” in the world. We try to assess if the programme is successful in achieving its stated objective of promoting a knowledge based economy through the development of an “information society for all”. First, we conclude that eEurope, due to its origins and its procedures, has intrinsic limits both as regards its scope and effectiveness. Second, we show how Member States have adopted different trajectories towards the “knowledge based society”. To identify these heterogeneous paths of growth, we have selected a set of variables that, combined together, represent the institutional arrangements specific to a country or a group of countries. We found sharp differences between two advanced models that we label, respectively, as Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon. Without asserting the superiority of a model, we propose policy orientations to help Europe overcome those gaps hindering the move towards knowledge economies where information society technologies are widely diffused.

Confidentiala "Mode 3" Systems Approach for Knowledge Creation, Diffusion and Use: Towards a 21st Century Fractal Innovation Ecosystem. ACES Working Paper (Report) No. 4, 2007

"Mode 3" allows and emphasizes the co-existence and co-evolution of different knowledge and innovation paradigms: the competitiveness and superiority of a knowledge system is highly determined by its adaptive capacity to combine and integrate different knowledge and innovation modes via co-evolution, co-specialization and coopetition [sic] of knowledge stock and flow dynamics. What results is an emerging fractal knowledge and innovation ecosystem, well-configured for the knowledge economy and society. The intrinsic litmus test of the capacity of such an ecosystem to survive and prosper in the context of continually glocalizing [sic] and intensifying competition represents the ultimate competitiveness benchmark with regards to the robustness and quality of the ecosystem's knowledge and innovation architecture and topology.

The Dangers and Inanity of (Euro-) Nationalism: From Communitarianism to Cosmopolitanism. Egmont Paper No. 77, April 2015

INTRODUCTION In the current times of multifaceted crisis, nationalism looks, more than ever, like a positive and necessary feeling. It seems both natural and indispensable if we are to have viable political and social institutions that meet the needs and preferences of all citizens. The following paper contests this vision. Its criticism of nationalism is directed not only at its national forms, but also at any defence of collective identity based on the same model, such as the various forms of European nationalism. Furthermore, the same overriding criticism can be made of different kinds of nationalism, regardless of their more or less open and progressive political content. In order to ground our argument theoretically and practically, we will try to show that nationalism is always potentially harmful to individual rights, and unnecessary for the maintenance of a just social and political system. We will thus oppose any acritical defence of the intrinsic value of a specific community and the belief in its artificial homogeneity. The historical construction of a supposedly homogeneous community, and the insistence on its values, which are perceived as superior and binding, facilitate the absorption of the individual into the collective. As we will explain further in more details, this holistic approach is typical of communitarian approaches. In that respect, it does not really matter whether they appeal to passion or to reason, to some irrational binding features of the community or to more rational political aspects of a common identity. The main problem in nationalism is not the emotion it can trigger, it is not even its reliance on particular values. What makes nationalism problematic is, firstly, that it tends to overlook the intrinsically divisive and contradictory nature of individual and collective interests in unjust societies; secondly, that it attributes an intrinsic superiority to a particular community over others; and thirdly, that it sees politics as a means to promote the interests, values or identity of that community. As an alternative, we will very briefly advocate a cosmopolitan approach that grounds political legitimacy in a demanding approach to individual freedom, rather than in a shared collective identity. However, even if only briefly, we will also carefully distinguish our own vision of cosmopolitanism from those commonly put forward. Frequently, cosmopolitan perspectives entangle their identity frameworks with concrete political projects, without clearly explaining how the latter derive from the former. Our approach to cosmopolitanism, on the other hand, is, first and foremost, a critical vision of all communitarian postulates according to which politics should be based on some form of collective identity. Thus, we insist on the conceptual distinction between a general stance on identity issues and the more practical political ideology one stands for. In a subsequent step, we link this cosmopolitan framework with a progressive approach to individual rights. Because of our demanding approach to individual freedom, our cosmopolitanism goes hand in hand with a revival of identity-free sovereignty. It is therefore distinct from the severe condemnation of sovereignty often found in most mainstream cosmopolitan positions. Finally, instead of the frequent confusion found in public discourses and in the literature between ideals and reality, our position acknowledges the deep gulf separating these two dimensions. It therefore sketches out very general strategic principles to bring normative ideals closer to political reality.