The uncertain future of the coal energy industry in Germany. OSW COMMENTARY #188, 2015-10-20

Germany’s current energy strategy, known as the “energy transition”, or Energiewende, involves an accelerated withdrawal from the use of nuclear power plants and the development of renewable energy sources (RES). According to the government’s plans, the share of RES in electricity production will gradually increase from its present rate of 26% to 80% in 2050. Greenhouse gas emissions are expected to fall by 80–95% by 2050 when compared to 1990 levels. However, coal power plants still predominate in Germany’s energy mix – they produced 44% of electricity in 2014 (26% from lignite and 18% from hard coal). This makes it difficult to meet the emission reduction objectives, lignite combustion causes the highest levels of greenhouse gas emissions. In order to reach the emission reduction goals, the government launched the process of accelerating the reduction of coal consumption. On 2 July, the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy published a plan to reform the German energy market which will be implemented during the present term of government. Emission reduction from coal power plants is the most important issue. This problem has been extensively discussed over the past year and has transformed into a conflict between the government and the coal lobby. The dispute reached its peak when lignite miners took to the streets in Berlin. As the government admits, in order to reach the long-term emission reduction objectives, it is necessary to completely liquidate the coal energy industry in Germany. This is expected to take place within 25 to 30 years. However, since the decision to decommission nuclear power plants was passed, the German ecological movement and the Green Party have shifted their attention to coal power plants, demanding that these be decommissioned by 2030 at the latest.

The expensive energy revolution in Germany. The implementation of the Energiewende is behind schedule. OSW Commentary No. 77, 2012-05-10

One year after the events of Fukushima the implementation of the new German energy strategy adopted in the summer of 2011 is being verified. Business circles, experts and publicists are sounding the alarm. The tempo at which the German economy is being rearranged in order that it uses renewable energy sources is so that it has turned out to be an extremely difficult and expensive task. The implementation of the key guidelines of the new strategy, such as the development of the transmission networks and the construction of new conventional power plants, is meeting increasing resistance in the form of economic and legal difficulties. The development of the green technologies sector is also posing problems. The solar energy industry, for example, is excessively subsidised, whereas the subsidies for the construction of maritime wind farms are too low. At present, only those guidelines of the strategy which are evaluated as economically feasible by investors or which receive adequate financial support from the state have a chance of being carried through. The strategy may also turn out to be unsuccessful due to the lack of a comprehensive coordination of its implementation and the financial burden its introduction entails for both the public and the economy. In the immediate future, the German government will make efforts not only to revise its internal regulations in order to enable the realisation of the energy transformation; it is also likely to undertake a number of measures at the EU forum which will facilitate this realisation. One should expect that the German government will actively support the financing of both the development of the energy networks in EU member states and the development of renewable energy sources in the energy sector.

Shale Gas and the EU Internal Gas Market: Beyond the Hype and Hysteria. CEPS Working Document No. 369, September 2012

This paper analyses the interplay between shale gas and the EU internal gas market. Drawing on data presented in the 2012 International Energy Agency’s report on unconventional gas and additional scenario analyses performed by the Joint Research Centre, the paper is based on the assumption that shale gas will not fundamentally change the EU’s dependence on foreign gas supplies. It argues that attention should be shifted away from hyping shale gas to completing the internal gas market. Two main reasons are given for this. First, the internal gas market is needed to enable shale gas development in countries where there is political support for shale gas extraction. And second, a well-functioning internal gas market would, arguably, contribute much more to Europe’s security of supply than domestic shale gas exploitation. This has important implications for the shale gas industry. As it is hard to see how subsidies or exemptions from environmental legislation could be justified, shale gas development in Europe will only go ahead if it proves to be both economically and environmentally viable. It is thus up to the energy industry to demonstrate that this is the case.

Basic statistics of the Community. Comparison with some European countries, Canada, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 1965. Sixth edition

Population; labour force; national product; agriculture; energy; industry; transport; external trade; social statistics; standard of living; trends of major economic indicators in the countries of the Community; supplementary statistics on iron and steel-trends from 1959-64.

Basic Statistics for Fifteen European Countries. Comparison with the United States of America and with the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. 3rd Edition, November 1961

Population; national product; agriculture; energy; industry; transport; external trade; standard of living; trends of major economic indicators in the six

Basic Statistics of the Community. Comparison with some European countries, the United States of America and with the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. Fourth Edition. November 1963

Population; national product; agriculture; energy; industry; transport; external trade; standard of living; trends of major economic indicators in the six; supplementary statistics on iron and steel-trends from 1952-62; supplementary statistics in an social field-employment, earnings, expenditure, social security

Basic Statistics of the Community. Comparison with some European countries, the United States of America and with the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. Fifth Edition. November 1964

Population; labour force; national product; agriculture; energy; industry; transport; external trade; social statistics; standar5d of living; trends of major economic indicators in the countries of the community; supplementary statistics on iron and steel-trends from 1956-63

The steel industry in the European Union: Composition and drivers of energy prices and costs. CEPS Special Report No. 80, 17 December 2013

This report assesses the energy costs borne by the steel industry in the EU between 2010 and 2012, and compares the energy costs, including both the energy components and other regulatory costs, to production costs, turnover and margins of steel-makers. The estimates of energy costs are based on primary sources, i.e. is on information provided by steel-makers through a written questionnaire. This information was validated by the research team by checking annual energy bills, when available, and other public sources. In this respect, this exercise represents a unique fact-based investigation into the costs of energy for steel-makers in Europe, whereas most of the information currently available in the public domain is based on secondary or statistical information. In 2012, the median EU steel plant pays about €33/MWh for gas, up from €26/MWh in 2010. As for electricity, in 2012 the EU median plant pays €62/MWh, up from €59/MWh in 2010. The report also includes a comparison with the prices of energy carriers paid by producers based in the US.