EU Social Policy: Developments in the field and insights for the study of social policy. ACES Cases No. 2012.1

This paper focuses on the key features of EU social policy and the way it has been interpreted and seeks to identify new directions for study. EU social policy is considered along two main dimensions: its content and hallmark features and the main approaches to conceptualizing and theorizing it. Rather than the classic negative depiction of EU social policy, this piece suggests that it is more significant than usually allowed, not least because the empirical and theoretical lenses which have been applied to it were developed for other purposes. The implication is that developments in EU social policy are often overlooked, not least in how the EU has carved out a role for itself by constantly framing and reframing discourses relevant to social policy and social problems in an attempt to both influence how social actors at all levels of governance approach policy and secure their acceptance of its role in social policy. Therefore analyzing EU social policy outside of the traditional frames reveals interesting and significant developments especially around innovation in social policy and the attempt to legitimate the EU as a social policy actor.

De Gaulle and Europe: Historical Revision and Social Science Theory. Program for the Study of Germany and Europe Working Paper Series 8.5

The thousands of books and articles on Charles de Gaulle's policy toward European integration, whether written by historians, social scientists, or commentators, universally accord primary explanatory importance to the General's distinctive geopolitical ideology. In explaining his motivations, only secondary significance, if any at all, is attached to commercial considerations. This paper seeks to reverse this historiographical consensus by examining the four major decisions toward European integration during de Gaulle's presidency: the decisions to remain in the Common Market in 1958, to propose the Foucher Plan in the early 1960s, to veto British accession to the EC, and to provoke the "empty chair" crisis in 1965-1966, resulting in the "Luxembourg Compromise." In each case, the overwhelming bulk of the primary evidence-speeches, memoirs, or government documents-suggests that de Gaulle's primary motivation was economic, not geopolitical or ideological. Like his predecessors and successors, de Gaulle sought to promote French industry and agriculture by establishing protected markets for their export products. This empirical finding has three broader implications: (1) For those interesred in the European Union, it suggests that regional integration has been driven primarily by economic, not geopolitical considerations--even in the "least likely" case. (2) For those interested in the role of ideas in foreign policy, it suggests that strong interest groups in a democracy limit the impact of a leader's geopolitical ideology--even where the executive has very broad institutional autonomy. De Gaulle was a democratic statesman first and an ideological visionary second. (3) For those who employ qualitative case-study methods, it suggests that even a broad, representative sample of secondary sources does not create a firm basis for causal inference. For political scientists, as for historians, there is in many cases no reliable alternative to primary-source research.