Social Policy Reforms in the EU: A Cross-national Comparison. Social Inclusion Monitor Europe (SIM) – Reform Barometer. Pilot Study

European countries are losing momentum for social policy reforms: The results of the SIM Europe Index report on social justice, published in September 2014, suggested a growing social divide among the member states. Assessing six policy areas of social inclusion, the data revealed the deteriorating social situation since 2009 across the EU. The report stressed, in particular, the difficulties southern EU member states were having in coping with the effects of the financial and economic crisis. This second report, the SIM Europe Reform Barometer, takes up these results and delivers two tasks: to impartially assess the extent of problem awareness of governments, and to ask whether they have enacted concrete social policy initiatives to tackle these challenges and to counterbalance the growing divide. Southern European member states, especially, did not or have not been able to pursue reforms to limit their withering levels of a socially inclusive society. In almost all key dimensions of social inclusion, those member states most affected by the implications of the protracted economic and fiscal crisis in the EU have been least able to confine the ongoing ‘internal devaluation’ in terms of socially balanced governmental activity. By contrast, some northern member states have legislated acts which seem well-suited to at least stabilise or even increase their level of social inclusion.

Money for structural reforms in the eurozone: making sense of contractual arrangements. Egmont Paper 57, May 2013

Executive Summary. Both the Commission’s proposal for a ‘Competitiveness and Convergence Instrument’ and the ‘contractual arrangement’ presented by President Van Rompuy share a common concept: associating EU money with national structural reforms under a binding arrangement. The targeted ‘structural reforms’ are the labour market reforms and product and services market reforms in eurozone ‘peripheral’ countries facing the most severe external imbalances. Their implementation would speed up and facilitate the ‘internal devaluation’ process of these countries. In the worst case scenario, failure to adopt the necessary reforms and to adjust wages and prices downwards may lead the most vulnerable countries to leave the eurozone under social and political pressure. Contracts seek to reduce this risk by increasing compliance with the country-specific recommendations for structural reforms issued by the EU institutions within the European Semester, and in particular with the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP). As for the financial support, it follows two different, albeit overlapping rationales. First, the perspective of obtaining EU funding would incentivize the governments of vulnerable countries to adopt reforms that would bear a high political and social cost in the short term. That is, without some form of incentive, it is unlikely that the necessary reforms would be undertaken and this could have significant negative consequences for the EMU as a whole. The second rationale amounts to outright solidarity: EU support is needed to cushion the inevitable socio-economic costs implied not only by the structural reform, but also by the internal devaluation taking place. To make sense of contractual arrangements, some points should be considered in future discussions: 1. Contracts on a voluntary basis only: Contracts cannot be mandatory unlike initially suggested in the Van Rompuy report. This stems not only from the inherent definition of a ‘contract’ – where mutual consent is key – but also from the non-binding nature of the preventive arm of the MIP. Making the country-specific recommendations issued by the EU institutions systematically binding would imply transfers of sovereignty from the national to the EU level that go well beyond the present discussion. Instead, contracts would introduce the possibility of making the preventive arm binding for some countries where corrections are most needed and urgent for the EMU as a whole.

Europe's social problem and its implications for economic growth. Bruegel Policy Brief 2014/03, 1 April 2014

The European Union faces major social problems. More than six million jobs were lost from 2008-13 and poverty has increased. Fiscal consolidation has generally attempted to spare social protection from spending cuts, but the distribution of adjustment costs between the young and old has been uneven; a growing generational divide is evident, disadvantaging the young. The efficiency of the social security systems of EU countries varies widely. Countries with greater inequality tended to have higher household borrowing prior to the crisis resulting in more subdued consumption growth during the crisis. The resulting high private debt, high unemployment, poverty and more limited access to education undermine long-term growth and social and political stability. Policymakers face three main challenges. First, addressing unemployment and poverty should remain a high priority not only for its own sake, but because these problems undermine public debt sustainability and growth. Second, bold policies in various areas are required. Most labour, social and fiscal policies are the responsibility of member states, requiring national reforms. But better coordination of demand management at European level is also necessary in order to create jobs. Third, tax/benefit systems should be reviewed for improved efficiency, inter- generational equity and fair burden sharing between the wealthy and poor.

Social cohesion in Europe after the crisis

In the last few years, Europe has been forced to re-think its socio-economic model. Social indicators speak for themselves. Real household income declined significantly between 2008 and 2012, employment rates are lower and the number of people in poverty saw a steady rise with a growing divergence between EU countries. In the eurozone, cuts in public spending and internal devaluation have been the main tools to aim at a correction of unsustainable fiscal positions and a strengthening of competitiveness. It has carried a heavy social price tag. Outside of the eurozone, austerity has also been the prevailing policy, seen as inevitable to avoid economic instability. The crisis has not hit everyone equally. The general losses have been high, but there have also been some quite important redistributive effects. With all the difficulties of defining and measuring 'fairness', it is clear that the adjustment has not been equitable. Apart from issues of market failure, there have been direct increases of inequality within each of the member states. Higher poverty rates have been observed, rises in inequalities between higher and lower income earners as well as intergenerational inequalities between age groups. Long-term consequences are only beginning to surface in the public debate as the most immediate pressures of the crisis are slowly overcome. In this report, the authors first of all look at the results of the survey we have carried out in seven European countries and review perceptions of the socio-economic model. Subsequently, they assess the importance of the social dimension in the broader context of the European growth model. The authors discuss the impact of the structural challenges of globalisation, demography and technological change. They then review the EU’s performance in the crisis. Finally, the authors make a number of recommendations on how to bridge the gap between Europeans‘ expectations and reality.

Social Europe. Can the EU again improve people's life prospects? CHALLENGE EUROPE Issue 22. Challenges and new beginnings; Priorities for the EU’s new leadership. September 2014

In the following, I will briefly review the main EU policies developed over the past five years in the field of employment and social affairs. I will put these in the context of the macroeconomic policy response during the same period and conclude by reflecting on systemic reforms which Europe needs to strengthen its economic recovery and to at last make progress towards the employment and social inclusion targets of the Europe 2020 Strategy.

Ukraine's cooperation with the IMF - unfulfilled hopes for deeper reforms. OSW Commentary No. 52, 2011-06-15

The Party of Regions took power in early 2010, after Ukraine had been plunged deep in economic crisis. Over the next year, with the external markets recovering, the country’s economic situation started to improve gradually. Ukraine’s economic stabilisation was also strengthened by its resumed cooperation with the International Monetary Fund, which provided for a loan worth $15.1 billion. The issuing of successive tranches of the loan was made dependent on the implementation of a comprehensive reform programme. The cooperation went quite smoothly at first; however, as the economic situation in Ukraine improved, the reformist zeal of the Ukrainian government started to fade, and obstacles began piling up. As a result, Ukraine was refused the third tranche, scheduled for this March, and for the moment the credit line remains frozen. Even though the IMF has numerous reservations about the Ukrainian government’s economic policy, the fundamental condition for resuming cooperation is reform of the pension system, which the parliament should adopt. The difficulties with fulfilling the obligations made to the IMF reflect the wider problem with implementing reforms in Ukraine, as the Party of Regions promised after taking power. Changes which do not affect the interests of influential lobbies are quite easy to carry out. Often, however, these changes are not conducive to the economy’s liberalisation; moreover, the influential lobbies are successful in blocking reforms that could harm their businesses. Another impediment to the changes is that some reforms are likely to bring about painful social consequences, and that can affect public support for the ruling group. Even though theoretically possible, it does not seem likely that Ukraine’s cooperation with the IMF will be terminated. But even if this cooperation is continued, deeper reforms in Ukraine are likely to be postponed until after the parliamentary elections in autumn 2012.

From stabilisation to stagnation. Viktor Yanukovych's reforms. OSW Point of View Number 32, March 2013

After winning the 2010 presidential election, Viktor Yanukovych and his government developed an ambitious and comprehensive programme of reforms across key areas of social and political life. The return to a presidential system of government created the ideal conditions for the introduction of deep reforms: it allowed Viktor Yanukovych to consolidate more power than any other Ukrainian president before him.The authorities launched an overhaul of the tax and the pension systems, and of the Ukrainian gas sector. Kyiv also completed its negotiations on an Association Agreement with the EU and on a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area. However, the reformist zeal of Ukraine’s political elite progressively diminished as the parliamentary election approached, the economy slowed down, and the polls showed a decline in support for the ruling Party of Regions. Many of the reforms still remain in the planning stages, and in many areas the government has moved backwards. Viktor Yanukovych has proved unable to make systemic changes, and has increasingly used his powers to crush political opposition in Ukraine. The outcome of the latest parliamentary elections prevents the formation of a stable parliamentary majority, which in turn, removes any chance of reform before the 2015 presidential ballot.

Poor and under pressure: the social impact of Europe's fiscal consolidation. Bruegel Policy Contribution, Issue 2015/04, March 2015

Europe faces major challenges related to poverty, unemployment and polarisation between the south and the north, which impact adversely the current living conditions of many citizens, and also negatively impact medium- and long-term economic growth. Fiscal consolidation exaggerated social hardship. In vulnerable countries there was no alternative to fiscal consolidation, but in most EU countries and at aggregate EU level, consolidation was premature when the cyclical position of the economy was deteriorating. Spending on social protection was shielded relative to other spending categories, but public bank rescue costs were high. While the changes in the tax mix favoured job creation, the overall tax burden become more regressive. There is an increasing generational divide between the elderly and the young in terms of social indicators. Social spending on elderly people was favoured relative to spending on families, children and education. There is now a serious danger that a lost generation might develop in several member states. Forceful policies should include bold structural reforms, better use of the European economic governance framework, more demand promotion, and a revision of national tax/benefit systems for fair burden sharing between the wealthy and poor.

Eurozone Crisis and Social Models: What We Can Learn from Italy and Spain. CES Papers - Open Forum #20, 2013-2014

This paper considers the role of social model features in the economic performance of Italy and Spain during the run-up to the Eurozone crisis, as well as the consequences of that crisis, in turn, for the two countries social models. It takes issue with the prevailing view - what I refer to as the “competitiveness thesis” - which attributes the debtor status of the two countries to a lack of competitive capacity rooted in social model features. This competitiveness thesis has been key in justifying the “liberalization plus austerity” measures that European institutions have demanded in return for financial support for Italy and Spain at critical points during the crisis. The paper challenges this prevailing wisdom. First, it reviews the characteristics of the Italian and Spanish social models and their evolution in the period prior to the crisis, revealing a far more complex, dynamic and differentiated picture than is given in the political economy literature. Second, the paper considers various ways in which social model characteristics are said to have contributed to the Eurozone crisis, finding such explanations wanting. Italy and Spain ́s debtor status was primarily the result of much broader dynamics in the Euro- zone, including capital flows from richer to poorer countries that affected economic demand, with social model features playing, at most, an ancillary role. More aggressive reforms responding to EU demands in Spain may have increased the long term social and economic costs of the crisis, whereas the political stalemate that slowed such reforms in Italy may have paradoxically mitigated these costs. The comparison of the two countries thus suggests that, in the absence of broader macro-institutional reform of the Eurozone, compliance with EU dictates may have had perverse effects.

What role for social investment in the new economic governance of the Eurozone? EPC Policy Brief, 10 November 2015

The EU, and the Eurozone in particular, has been going through a period of prolonged economic difficulty. While there are some signs of recovery, growth rates remain too low, only returning to the already modest growth rates of the pre-crisis period. This not only affects the creation of jobs, but also, through lower tax revenues and stagnant GDP levels, the consolidation of public finances.

Social Rights in Post-Revolutionary Tunisia: Is a Consensus-driven Policy Still on The table? EUSpring Policy Brief/Citizenship Review No. 17, June 2016

The immolation of street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi and the demonstrations that followed in December 2010 triggered the Tunisian revolution. But there were more deep-seated issues at stake: unemployment, poverty and exclusion, coupled with a deep sense of injustice, humiliation and helplessness of the peripheries to influence the political centre. Five years after the revolution, the social and economic problems are still persistent and arguably worse. Many people believe Tunisians are facing a distorted revolution; political progress has not coincided with reforms leading to welfare.