The internet in Russia: the cradle of civil society. OSW Commentary No. 72, 2012-03-21

In the last decade, along with economic and technological growth, Russia has seen a dynamic development of the internet. Today the net is an everyday tool of work, information and entertainment for 40% of Russians – the most educated, active and affluent part of the society. The spread of the internet (known in Russia as the Runet) has, in turn, brought about significant political and social consequences. With the political and social sphere in Russia strictly controlled by the government, most of this activity has moved to cyberspace. The internet has become an alternative to the state-controlled media, a site for the free exchange of views and a home to numerous social initiatives. In this way, it has become a school of citizenship for Russians, and a kind of ‘test tube’ that has spawned social and political activity. This activity went beyond cyberspace in the election period in 2011/2012, and turned into massive street protests. The potential of the internet has also been used by the Russian government, both to shape public opinion (via loyal online media) and to monitor civil initiatives, especially opposition ones. The state has many instruments of technical control and supervision of the internet and its users’ activity. This control was used in the election period 2011/2012, when selected sites were blocked and pressure exerted on independent websites. These actions were a warning sign from the government, aimed at discouraging internet users from any opposition activity. However, it does not seem feasible that any restriction of such activity can be effective. The scale of this activity is now enormous, and attempts to censor the net and resorting to repression against internet users on a wider scale would only fuel resentment towards the government.

The press and freedom of speech in Ukraine ahead of parliamentary elections. OSW Commentary No. 90, 2012-09-20

The independence of the mass media has been regularly restricted over the past two years in Ukraine. Following a period of relative freedom in 2005–2010, the scope of direct and indirect government control of the press has increased, cancelling out the achievements of the Orange Revolution in this area. The press in Ukraine is less and less able to perform its role as watchdog on the government and politicians and as a reliable source of information on the situation in the country to the public. This is mainly due to: (1) the concentration of the most important mass media in the hands of Ukraine’s most powerful oligarchs, whose business interests depend on the government; (2) the use of the press as instruments in political and business competition; (3) the ruling class’s subordination of the institutions which supervise the press; (4) repression used against media critical of the government and (5) the lack of an independent public broadcasting corporation. As a consequence, the press has hardly any impact on the political processes taking place ahead of the parliamentary election scheduled for 28 October. This is also an effect of a passiveness present in the Ukrainian public, who are tired of politics and are focused on social issues. Cases of abuse or corruption scandals revealed by the press do not provoke any response from the public and are rarely investigated by the public prosecution authorities. The more popular a given medium is, the more strongly it is controlled by the government. At present, television has to be recognised as the least reliable of the mass media. In turn, Internet news journals are characterised by the greatest pluralism but also have more limited accessibility. The political conditions in which the mass media operate in Ukraine lead to various forms of pathology. The most serious of them are censorship by the owners and self-censorship performed by journalists, and a great share of political advertorials. As the parliamentary election is approaching, the pathologies of the Ukrainian media market have been showing up with greater intensity.