Beyond retrenchment over Iran: can the EU offer a framework for regional security? CEPS Commentary, 3 September 2012

A new and far-reaching round of sanctions imposed recently on Iran by the EU is starting to hurt the country, its economy and its citizens. Yet Iran’s leadership seems deaf to demands for international weapons inspectors to be allowed unhindered access to its nuclear enrichment facilities. With a regime that is not likely to sway to international and domestic pressure, and in view of the shifting strategic landscape in the Middle East, the question is whether the twin-track approach of sanctions and diplomacy should be kept up, or whether it should make way for an alternative set of policies that could preserve the fragile stability in the wider Middle East and turn a vicious circle into a virtuous one. In this new Commentary, CEPS Senior Research Fellow Steven Blockmans argues that the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, supported by the European External Action Service, is in a good position to offer a negotiated way out of this seemingly intractable situation.

Reviewing Member States’ Commitment to the European External Action Service. EPIN Working Paper No. 34, 20 November 2012

Based on interviews with diplomats from a representative cross-section of nine member states and members of the EEAS itself, the research findings of this EPIN Working Paper confirm long-standing traditions and member state perceptions of cooperation with European institutions. The paper also reveals new aspects of the intergovernmental method of foreign policy shaping and making in the European Union; in particular how different national positions can positively or negatively affect the consolidation of the EEAS and the role of the EU as an international actor. As such, the Working Paper makes an original contribution to the existing literature on one of most discussed actors in the European Union’s post-Lisbon architecture in the domain of EU external action.

EEAS 2.0. A legal commentary on Council Decision 2010/427/EU establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service. EIPA Working Paper, 2013

From the Preface. Pursuant to Article 13(3) of Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service, the High Representative is held to provide a review of the organisation and functioning of the EEAS by mid-­‐2013. This review will cover, inter alia, the implementation of Article 6(6), (8) and (11), so as to ensure an adequate geographical and gender balance and a meaningful presence of nationals from all member states in the EEAS. If necessary, the review will be accompanied by appropriate proposals for the revision of the 2010 Council Decision (e.g., suggestions for additional specific measures to correct possible imbalances of staffing). In that case, the Council will, in accordance with Article 27(3) TEU, revise the Decision in light of the review by the beginning of 2014. This short and user-­‐friendly legal commentary on the 2010 Council Decision is the first of its kind and is intended to inform those involved in the review process and to serve as a reference document for practitioners and analysts dealing with the EEAS. This commentary is not an elaborate doctrinal piece, but rather a textual and contextual analysis of each article, that takes account of i) other relevant legal provisions (primary, secondary, international), ii) the process leading to the adoption of the 2010 Council Decision (i.e. travauxpréparatoires), iii) the preamble of the Council Decision, and iv) insofar as it is possible at this stage, early implementation. Wherever relevant, cross-­‐references to other provisions of the EEAS Council Decision have been made so as to tie in the different commentaries and ensure overall consistency.

EEAS 2.0: Recommendations for the amendment of Council Decision 2010/427/EU on the European External Action Service. CEPS Special Report No. 78, 13 November 2013

This Special Report offers recommendations for the amendment of the Council Decision 2010/427/EU establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service. Its purpose is to contribute, in practical legal terms, to the ongoing review of the Decision in 2013, as well as to the possible discussion on its revision that may take place in 2014. In particular, it sheds light on possible adjustments in the application of the Decision ‘à droit constant’, but also suggests potential alteration of its formulation.

EEAS 2.0: A legal commentary on Council Decision 2010/427/EU establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service. CEPS Paperbacks. February 2013

This short and user-friendly legal commentary on the 2010 Council Decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the EEAS is the first of its kind. It is intended to inform those involved in the review process and to serve as a reference document for practitioners and analysts dealing with the EEAS. Rather than an elaborate doctrinal piece, this legal commentary is a textual and contextual analysis of each article that takes account of i) other relevant legal provisions (primary, secondary, international); ii) the process leading to the adoption of the 2010 Council Decision; iii) the preamble of the Council Decision and iv) insofar as it is possible at this stage, early implementation. Wherever relevant, cross-references to other provisions of the Council Decision have been made so as to tie in the different commentaries and ensure overall consistency.

Foreign policy at the service of modernisation: old wine in a new wineskin. OSW Commentary No. 39, 2010-08-31

Russia’s contacts with the external world over the past year have been characterised by a gradual improvement in its relations with the West, as well as the use of non-confrontational rhetoric, the most far-reaching example of which was the address President Dmitri Medvedev gave to Russian ambassadors this July. In an attempt to harmonise foreign policy with the widely propagated programme for the modernisation of Russia1 President Medvedev presented a vision of the Russian Federation as a responsible global power which is open to co-operation. According to this vision, Russian foreign policy would help to attract foreign investments and technologies. The West was presented as a partner, not a rival. Both this rhetoric and the atmosphere of co-operation in relations with the USA and the EU contrast with the assertive and aggressive Russian policy which was symbolised by and culminated in the Russian-Georgian conflict of 2008. The changes observed in Russian foreign policy are quite limited, and are not constructing a new external strategy. Those changes are rather an attempt to find more efficient ways to implement old strategic goals. The new image of a responsible global power is inconsistent, and Russian policy is still assertive and geopolitically motivated. Although a new rhetoric is really in place, the Russian political elite’s perception of their country’s place and role in the contemporary international order remains unchanged. Moscow’s readiness to become engaged in genuine co-operation with the West has not increased significantly; it is still to a great extent declarative in nature.

The Common Security and Defence Policy: National Perspectives. Egmont Paper No. 79, May 2015

FOREWORD. When one looks at the present state of the CSDP, one cannot help but look on with disenchantment at the energy that appears to have abandoned both institutions and Member States. Commentators increasingly take for granted that nothing much should be expected from this field of EU policy. The reasons for this state of mind are well known: the recent economic and financial strains, which have impacted all EU action since 2008, means that most of the Member States will struggle to keep their defence budgets at their present level in the future, and we may even see reductions. Furthermore, and to put it mildly, most of the recent CSDP operations have also experienced a lack of enthusiasm. Adding to this overall trend, the EU is far from presenting a common vision of what security and defence should really mean. Many of the Member States do not want to be involved in all of today’s international turmoils, and they rarely share the strategic culture which inspires those Member States who see themselves as having special responsibilities in dealing with these crises. In the end it may be that Member States diverge fundamentally on the simple question of whether it is relevant for the EU to engage in most of the ‘hot’ crises Europe faces; many prefer to see Europe as a soft power, mostly dedicated to intervening on less dramatic fronts and more inclined to mend than to fight. For whatever reason given, it remains that if there is a lack of common understanding on what CSDP should really be about, it should not come as a surprise if this policy is presently in stalemate. As an additional blow, the Ukrainian crisis, which dragged on for the whole of last year, could only add to the downward spiral the EU has been experiencing, with a new Russia aggressively confronting Europe in a manner not too distant from the Cold War days. This attitude has triggered the natural reaction among EU Member States to seek reassurances from NATO about their own national security. Coupled with the return of France a few years ago into the integrated military command, NATO’s renewed relevance has sent a strong message to Europe about the military organisation’s credibility with regard to collective defence. Surprisingly, this overall trend was gathering momentum at the same time as other more positive developments. The European Council of December 2013 dedicated its main session to CSDP: it underlined Europe’s role as a ‘security provider’ while adopting a very ambitious road map for Europe in all possible dimensions of the security sector. Hence the impression of a genuine boost to all EU institutions, which have been invited to join efforts and give CSDP a reinvigorated efficiency. In the same way, the increasing instability in Europe’s neighbourhood has also called for more EU operations: most recently in Iraq, Libya, Northern Nigeria or South Sudan. Pressure for further EU engagement has been one of the most constant features of the discussions taking place around these crises. Moreover, a growing number of EU partners in Asia, Latin America or Eastern Europe have shown a renewed eagerness to join CSDP missions in what sounds like a vote of confidence for EU capacities. What kind of conclusion should be drawn from this contradictory situation? Probably that the EU has much more potential than it can sometimes figure out itself, if only it would be ready to adapt to the new global realities. But, more than anything else, an enhanced CSDP needs from all Member States strong political will and a clear vision of what they want this policy to be. Without this indispensable ingredient CSDP may continue to run its course, as it does today. It may even grow in efficiency but it will keep lacking the one resource that would definitely help it overcome all the present shortcomings that have prevented Europe from finding its true role and mission through the CSDP. Member States remain central to EU security and defence policy. This is why this collection of essays is so valuable for assessing in no uncertain way the long road that lies ahead for any progress to be made. Pierre VIMONT Senior Associate at Carnegie Europe Former Executive Secretary-General of the European External Action Service

The next step after Japan? (Virtual reality, training and crisis management). Transatlantic Security Paper No. 2, June 2012

The recent crisis in Japan, which combined tsunami and technological events, shows that any crisis, especially those in developed and developing countries, is from here out a hybrid crisis, mixing natural factors and human/technological (NATECH). Faced with such dramatic events, which exceed any means available for emergency rescue service, it is necessary a) to remain prudent and b) to prepare. One of the means for preparing is unquestionably training. However, here, undoubtedly there are important constraints: How to train, for example, while reproducing vividly and realistically, an event? How to exceed the admittedly useful, although very limited, level of the table-top exercise? How also to avoid the unnecessary mobilization of dozens, even hundreds, of field and operation staffers to take part in an exercise which could lead to a disappointing outcome? A major crisis, a major exercise, in effect. The solution of virtual reality has emerged, in Europe and in the United States. It is also sometimes called “serious game”.