Castles in the sand: Mali and the demise of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy. CEPS Commentary, 28 January 2013

The threat posed by the crisis in Mali is direct, multidimensional and without regard to geographical proximity or historical and colonial heritage, writes Giovanni Faleg. France’s solitary intervention in Mali and the EU’s absence there raise two important questions for the future of the EU’s supposedly ‘Common’ Security and Defence Policy. The first has to do with the crisis itself; its nature and the threat posed by the terrorist groups and militias that are being countered by French armed forces. The second concerns the causes and implications of yet another example of the EU’s inability to take responsibility for security matters in its neighbourhood and beyond.

The Governance Gap in European Security and Defence. CEPS Policy Brief No. 310, 19 December 2013

The true causes of the EU’s inertia as a security actor in its neighbourhood and beyond are not a lack of capability or even austerity measures, but the absence of a core group of states committed to driving integration forward, argues Giovanni Faleg. Member states are reluctant to set clear common strategic priorities and struggle to agree on a revision of the institutional rules. Their strategic cultures and interests differ significantly; they hold different visions of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and are unwilling to use the CSDP instruments at their disposal.

Common Security and Defence in 2014: Revise and resubmit. CEPS Commentaries, 27 March 2014

The conclusions of the December 2013 European Council on defence sounded like a ‘revise and resubmit’ recommendation for the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). That outcome was not too disappointing in itself, because precise technical guidelines were provided to revamp Europe’s defence, with good prospects of real progress. But it was not too ambitious either, as a clear indication of Europe’s future role in global security was in effect postponed until 2015, thus requiring ‘resubmission’ at a later date. Furthermore, member states did not seem particularly committed to reaching a formal agreement on a common strategic narrative; a sign that the governance gap continues to affect CSDP. Giovanni Faleg asks whether the European Council on defence marked the twilight of CSDP, or whether we will now see a new phase of cooperation, characterised by escalating external pressures in the southern neighbourhood and a resurgent Russian threat in the east.

Trading off sovereignty. The outcome of Belarus's integration with Russia in the security and defence field. OSW Commentary No. 107, 2013-04-25

Although the Republic of Belarus is constitutionally designated as a neutral country1, it is in fact closely connected with Russia’s own security and defence architecture. Within the Union State of Belarus and Russia, the armed forces are integrated to an extent unequalled in the world. A legacy of the Soviet division of labour, the Belarusian defence industry complex remains structurally dependent on Russia, which is its main raw material provider, outlet for exports and intermediary on world markets. Bilateral military cooperation also builds on the perception of common threats and partly shared security interests. Hence it unfolds regardless of the disputes that sporadically sour relations between Minsk and Moscow, standing out as the main achievement of the Union State – if not the only one.