National Security and Secret Evidence in Legislation and before the Courts: Exploring the Challenges. CEPS Liberty and Security in Europe No. 78/January 2015

This study provides a comparative analysis of the national legal regimes and practices governing the use of intelligence information as evidence in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden. It explores notably how national security can be invoked to determine the classification of information and evidence as 'state secrets' in court proceedings and whether such laws and practices are fundamental rights- and rule of law-compliant. The study finds that, in the majority of Member States under investigation, the judiciary is significantly hindered in effectively adjudicating justice and guaranteeing the rights of the defence in ‘national security’ cases. The research also illustrates that the very term ‘national security’ is nebulously defined across the Member States analysed, with no national definition meeting legal certainty and “in accordance with the law” standards and a clear risk that the executive and secret services may act arbitrarily. The study argues that national and transnational intelligence community practices and cooperation need to be subject to more independent and effective judicial accountability and be brought into line with EU 'rule of law' standards.

Open Season for Data Fishing on the Web: The Challenges of the US PRISM Programme for the EU. CEPS Policy Brief No. 293, 18 June 2013

The revelation of the top-secret US intelligence-led PRISM Programme has triggered wide-ranging debates across Europe. Press reports have shed new light on the electronic surveillance ‘fishing expeditions’ of the US National Security Agency and the FBI into the world’s largest electronic communications companies. This Policy Brief by a team of legal specialists and political scientists addresses the main controversies raised by the PRISM affair and the policy challenges that it poses for the EU. Two main arguments are presented: First, the leaks over the PRISM programme have undermined the trust that EU citizens have in their governments and the European institutions to safeguard and protect their privacy; and second, the PRISM affair raises questions regarding the capacity of EU institutions to draw lessons from the past and to protect the data of its citizens and residents in the context of transatlantic relations. The Policy Brief puts forward a set of policy recommendations for the EU to follow and implement a robust data protection strategy in response to the affair.

Who will monitor the spies? CEPS Commentary, 8 January 2014

A majority of national governments across the EU have long tried to cordon off their practices of mass interception of communications data and cyber-hacking of foreign companies and diplomats from supranational scrutiny by the EU institutions and courts, arguing that they remain within the remit of their ‘exclusive competence’ on grounds of national security. In light of the revelations that some EU member states (namely the UK, France, Germany and Sweden) are running their own secret interception programmes, however, the question of whether the EU can and should intervene becomes more pressing. This commentary, by a team of JHA specialists at CEPS, offers four important legal reasons why the covert surveillance programmes of member states should not be regarded as falling outside the scope of EU intervention.

The anatomy of Russian information warfare. The Crimean operation, a case study. OSW Point of View Number 42, May 2014

The Crimean operation has served as an occasion for Russia to demonstrate to the entire world the capabilities and the potential of information warfare. Its goal is to use difficult to detect methods to subordinate the elites and societies in other countries by making use of various kinds of secret and overt channels (secret services, diplomacy and the media), psychological impact, and ideological and political sabotage. Russian politicians and journalists have argued that information battles are necessary for “the Russian/Eurasian civilisation” to counteract “informational aggression from the Atlantic civilisation led by the USA”. This argument from the arsenal of applied geopolitics has been used for years. This text is an attempt to provide an interpretation of information warfare with the background of Russian geopolitical theory and practice.

The Kharkiv oblast: a fragile stability. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 172/03.06.2015

Kharkiv oblast, which is located in the immediate vicinity of the Donbas region, and which shares a 315-km stretch of Ukraine’s border with Russia, was one of the regions where attempts were made to kindle separatist sentiments during the spring of last year. Some central government buildings were briefly occupied by pro-Russian demonstrators who declared a ‘Kharkov People’s Republic’, but efficient countermeasures by the Ukrainian institutions of force quickly calmed the situation in the region. However, the oblast still remains a target for acts of sabotage, which are probably directed by Russian secret services. Nevertheless, the situation in the region is now stable, both in terms of public sentiment and local politics. The main competitors in the arena of local politics are Hennadiy Kernes, the mayor of Kharkiv, and Arsen Avakov, the current head of the Ukrainian Interior Ministry. Despite many years of hostility, neither of the politicians appears to have initiated a power struggle as yet – Kernes retains his influence on the city council, and Avakov controls the local security services.