10 resultados para Search for an Element
em Archive of European Integration
Resumo:
Since mid-2015 Turkey has been affected by a deep internal crisis, caused by rising political polarisation, increased levels of terrorist threat (posed by the Kurds and Islamic radicals) and the revived conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). As a consequence of this crisis, over 350,000 residents of south-eastern Turkey have been forced to leave their homes. At the same time, due to the migration crisis and despite mutual distrust in relations between Turkey and the EU, cooperation between Ankara and Brussels has been intensifying. Turkey’s ongoing destabilisation does not challenge the status of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), which is de facto controlled by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan; paradoxically, it strengthens the party. The internal crisis which the authorities have been deliberately fuelling is an element of a plan to rubber-stamp political change by introducing a presidential system of government. This is happening amid a thorough reconstruction of the socio-political order which has been underway for over a decade. In the upcoming months it is expected to result in the constitution being changed and, as a consequence, the institutionalisation of Erdoğan’s autocratic rule.
Resumo:
The Southern Caucasus is the site of three armed conflicts with separatist backgrounds, which have remained unsolved for years: the conflicts in Georgia's Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and Azerbaijan's conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (including the areas around Nagorno-Karabakh which were seized by Armenian separatists in the course of the war). Neither Georgia nor Azerbaijan have had any control over the disputed areas since the early 1990s. Both states are simultaneously in conflict with the separatists' informal patrons, respectively Russia and Armenia. After over a decade of relative peace during which the conflicts remained frozen, tension has recently risen considerably: in the case of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, large-scale fighting may break out in the coming months, whereas in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh and the Azeri-Armenian conflict, such a threat may materialise within the next five years. The current formula for politically resolving the conflicts is ineffective and close to exhaustion, and the prospect of any alternative peace plans being developed is rather distant. The conflicts in the Southern Caucasus are of increasing concern to the West, mainly because of the Western actors' constantly growing political and economic involvement in Georgia and Azerbaijan (including support for reforms and development of the gas and oil transmission infrastructures), as well as its less intensive commitments in Armenia. An outbreak of open fighting over the separatist regions would destabilise the Southern Caucasus, largely undoing the results of the actions which the EU, NATO and the USA have taken in the region in recent years. Moreover, the situation in the Southern Caucasus, especially the separatisms themselves, have in fact become an element in the wider geopolitical game between the West and Russia. For Russia, the stakes are maintaining its influence in the region, and for the West, demonstrating its ability to effectively promote democracy and economic modernisation in the countries bordering it.
Resumo:
In recent months in Ukraine, there has been a toughening of measures targeted at opposition leaders, in particular the former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and the former interior minister Yuri Lutsenko. These two have been charged with abuses of office when in power. The way in which the criminal investigations are being conducted shows that these measures are actually meant to prevent the two politicians from conducting regular political activities, or at least to make this practically impossible for them. These actions are an element of the Party of Regions’ long-term strategy, as it tries during the pre-election period to eliminate Yulia Tymoshenko from political life and weaken or even destroy her powerbase. Similar measures, although to a more limited extent, are being taken against other opposition groups. These actions are leading to the lowering of democratic standards in Ukraine, although these are still much higher than in Belarus or Russia; this has been proved, among other things, by the militia’s more restrained behaviour towards the protesters, and the fact that abuses of the law during the current investigations have not yet slipped into actual violations. The Ukrainian opposition is fragmented and disorganised; even the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc is unable to stage a major campaign in defence of its leader. This allows the authorities to feel free to tighten their policy towards the opposition.
Resumo:
Threats linked to Islamic fundamentalism have been hanging over Central Asia for almost two decades. Many believe that militant Islam has played a significant part in each major political crisis in the region, and Central Asia is perceived as an almost perfect environment for its further development. Such a picture of this region is a result of serious abuses and manipulations. The real threat posed by militant Islam seems to be rather limited, and its roots lie outside Central Asia. This region is unlikely to become a key front of global jihad. Nevertheless, this does not guarantee peace and safety in Central Asia, as the Islamic threat remains an element of the geopolitical rivalry in the region – the ‘New Great Game’.
Resumo:
In its attempts to catch up with the global trend, Russia began granting development assistance in 2004. From the onset of Russia’s commitment, the aid delivered has increased fivefold and reached approximately US$ 500 million in 2010. Russian aid, albeit distributed nearly exclusively via international organisations, has been granted above all to members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In recent months work on the establishment of the Russian development assistance system has been accelerated (a national strategy is being prepared and a specialised agency is to be established). This move proves that the Kremlin attaches weight to activity in this area which is an element of soft power politics, the foundations of which Moscow is currently attempting to lay. In its commitment to development co-operation Russia has sought on the one hand to increase its prestige on the international stage and on the other hand to gain another instrument of exerting its ascendancy in the CIS. The scale of aid and the way of delivering it have not made Russia an important global actor. Over the last five years Russia increased the funding allocated to development assistance several times, however, compared to other donors its aid does not appear impressive. The resources dedicated to this end stand at a mere 0.035% of Russian GDP. Unlike other non-Western superpowers such as China or India, Russia is not a competitor for Western countries in this area on the global scale. Nevertheless, within the CIS, Russia’s aid is building the country’s position as a donor. The long-term results of this aid are however being counteracted by the fact that Russia is expecting measurable and direct political and economic benefits in return. Although this policy helps Moscow achieve its objectives in the CIS, it does not develop Russian potential in the sphere of soft power or create a positive image of the country.
Resumo:
By highlighting informational threats and giving them a military dimension, the authors of the Russian Federation's military doctrine have outlined the concept of information warfare. It is a kind of combat conducted by both conventional and indirect methods, open and concealed, using military and civilian structures. It has two dimensions: broader ("non-nuclear containment", i.e. combat waged on various levels - political, economic, diplomatic, humanitarian, military) and narrower (as an element supporting of action). An analysis of these issues enables us to identify several rising trends over the period 2000-2014 in Russian security policy. These boil down to a blurring of the boundaries between internal and external threats, introducing non-military methods and organisational structures to armed combat, and conferring an ideological character on this combat. This leads to a blurring of the contours of inter-state conflicts, which allows Russia to take part in armed conflicts in which it is not officially a party.
Resumo:
China has reacted positively to Russia’s military intervention in Syria. The Chinese government perceives it as an element of the global fight against terrorism, and has emphasised the fact that Russia was acting in response to a request by the Syrian government. At the same time, Beijing has argued that the Syrian conflict cannot be resolved by military means and that a political compromise is necessary.
Resumo:
The Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 put a stop to the gradual scaling down of US military engagement in Europe, a policy that the United States had pursued since the end of the Cold War. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict became a watershed for the US perceptions of European security as Washington started to see the threat of a conflict between Russia and a NATO member as more probable. The United States decided that – despite the mounting challenges in the Pacific region and its involvement in conflicts in the Middle East – it had to invest more in European security. The US has stepped up the intensity of joint drills with the allies and the activities of its forces in Europe. However, its support for the allies has been subject to various limitations and should be treated as a political signal to Moscow, rather than an element in a broader strategy. The future of the policy of strengthening the eastern flank will depend on the outcome of the US presidential elections in November and on developments in the bilateral relations between Washington and Moscow.