Beyond individuals: a more effective structure for the Commission. EPC Commentary, 9 September 2014

In recent days, Brussels has been excited by the circulation of diagrams showing a re-organisation and allocation of posts in the new European Commission, reputedly coming from somewhere within Jean-Claude Juncker’s team. Many have pointed out that some of the appointments seem unlikely, also noting that the diagram seems to miss the Enterprise and Single Market portfolios, where it is difficult to envisage their complete merger into other portfolios, given their size and importance. In addition, not only is the source of the document unknown, it could have been leaked for a specific purpose, for example to test out the reactions in some Member States or to push individual EU countries into action, for example by appointing a woman to get a better portfolio.

Judicial Selection, Lay Participation, and Judicial Culture in the Czech Republic: A Study in a Central European (Non)Transformation. College of Europe Research Paper in Law 03/2014

Introduction. The idea that “merit” should be the guiding principle of judicial selections is a universal principle, unlikely to be contested in whatever legal system. What differs considerably across legal cultures, however, is the way in which “merit” is defined. For deeper cultural and historical reasons, the current definition of “merit” in the process of judicial selections in the Czech Republic, at least in the way it is implemented in the institutional settings, is an odd mongrel. The old technocratic Austrian judicial heritage has in some aspects merged with, in others was altered or destroyed, by the Communist past. After 1989, some aspects of the judicial organisation were amended, with the most problematic elements removed. Furthermore, several old as well as new provisions relating to the judiciary were struck down by the Constitutional Court. However, apart from these rather haphazard interventions, there has been neither a sustained discussion as to how a new judicial architecture and system of judicial appointments ought to look like nor much of broader, conceptual reform in this regard. Thus, some twenty five years after the Velvet Revolution of 1989, the guiding principles for judicial selection and appointments are still a debate to be had.