Niemiecki sieci na wschodzie. Niemiecki soft power w Europie Wschodniej, Azji Centralnej i na Kaukazie Południowym: polityka – administracja – kultura – nauka – społeczenstwo. OSW Raport, wrzesien 2010. = German networks in the east. German soft power in Eastern Europe, Central Asia and South Caucasus policy - administration - culture - science - the society of. CES Report, September 2010

Do realizacji niemieckich interesów w polityce zagranicznej, bezpieczeństwa i gospodarczej RFN wykorzystuje instrumenty soft power z obszaru dyplomacji publicznej, polityki rozwojowej, kulturalnej i naukowej. Budowanie sieci kontaktów i lobbing polityczny, programy współpracy rozwojowej oraz zagranicznej polityki kulturalnej i naukowej, mają służyć wspieraniu niemieckiej gospodarki uzależnionej od eksportu, uzyskaniu statusu europejskiego ośrodka technologii i innowacji oraz zwiększeniu wpływu RFN na działania zewnętrzne UE. Jednym z priorytetowych obszarów stosowania tych instrumentów są dla Niemiec państwa Europy Wschodniej, Kaukazu Południowego i Azji Centralnej. Decydują o tym bliskość geograficzna i otwierające się rynki zbytu, konieczność modernizacji gospodarek tych krajów, zagrożenia dla „miękkiego” bezpieczeństwa RFN oraz rozwój relacji UE z tymi państwami. Niemiecka aktywność jest w tych krajach niezależna od sytuacji politycznej i stanowi długofalową strategię ugruntowującą pozycję RFN jako ich najważniejszego europejskiego partnera gospodarczego i politycznego.

An Exercise in Legal Honesty: Re-writing the Court of Justice and the Bundesverfassungsgericht. IHS Political Science Series No. 136, February 2014

At a time of crisis – a true state of emergency – both the Court of Justice of the European Union and the German Federal Constitutional Court have failed the rule of law in Europe. Worse still, in their evaluation of the ersatz crisis law, which has been developed in response to financial and sovereign debt crises, both courts have undermined constitutionality throughout Europe. Each jurisdiction has been implicated within the techocratisation of democratic process. Each Court has contributed to an incremental process of the undermining of the political subjectivity of European Citizens. The results are depressing for lawyers who are still attached to notions of constitutionality. Yet, we must also ask whether the Courts could have acted otherwise. Given the original flaws in the construction of Economic and Monetary Union, as well as the politically pre-emptive constraints imposed by global financial markets, each Court might thus be argued to have been forced to suspend immediate legality in a longer term effort to secure the character of the legal jurisdiction as a whole. Crisis can and does defeat the law. Nevertheless, what continues to disturb is the failure of law in Europe to open up any perspective for a return to normal constitutionality post crisis, as well as its apparent inability to give proper and honest consideration to the hardship now being experienced by millions of Europeans within crisis. This contribution accordingly seeks to reimagine each Judgment in a language of legal honesty. Above all, this contribution seeks to suggest a new form of post-national constitutional language; a language which takes as its primary function, proper protection of democratic process against the ever encroaching powers of a post-national executive power. This contribution forms a part of an on-going effort to identify a new basis for the legitimacy of European Law, conducted jointly and severally with Christian Joerges, University of Bremen and Hertie School of Government, Berlin. Differences do remain in our theoretical positions; hence this individual essay. Nevertheless, the congruence between pluralist and conflict of law approaches to the topic are also readily apparent. See, for example, Everson & Joerges (2013).

The Grundgesetz After 50 Years: Analyzing Changes in the German Constitution. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 09.3, December 1999

Fifty years after its original drafting, the German constitution has seen its text amended many times. Indeed, among OECD countries, the Grundgesetz has one of the highest rates of constitutional change. This paper analyzes these changes. It does so in a quantitative manner in its first section, before proceeding to ask how the numerous changes can be explained. Three approaches from the legal and political science literature are presented: one emphasizing historical-structural factors, one analyzing changes as constitutional revisionism, and an institutional approach which focuses on the conditions for constitutional amendment. The strengths and weaknesses of each approach are then compared and contrasted, before the article concludes with an assessment of the characteristics of Gemuw constitutional policy.