Key Issues and Developments in Farmland Sales Markets in the EU Member States and Candidate Countries. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 12, February 2012

This paper describes recent developments in sales markets of agricultural land in selected member states of the European Union and its candidate countries. Analysis focuses on the importance of the sales market for agricultural land, the average size of transacted plots, and the evolution and magnitude of the land sales prices. The share of agricultural land sold on the market is relatively stable in most of the old member states, with the exception of Finland, the Netherlands and the UK, where a more dynamic market is observed. For the new member states, the sales market for agricultural land is strongly affected by public sales under the ongoing land privatisation programmes, while strong variation prevails in the private sales market. Substantial differences are also observed in both the average size of the transacted plots and the sales prices. For the latter, price regulations partially explain the heterogeneity in the evolution of sales prices.

Sales Market Regulations for Agricultural Land in EU Member States and Candidate Countries. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 14, February 2012

All agricultural markets are subjected to institutional regulations that – in one way or another –affect the functioning of these markets, and this is no different for the agricultural land market in the EU. In this paper, we describe the existing regulations in the sales markets for agricultural land in selected EU member states and candidate countries. The analysis focuses on three types of sales market regulations and institutions: quantity regulations, price regulations and transaction costs. The differences in the regulatory framework between land acquisition and ownership by domestic and foreign investors are analysed, as well as the taxes associated with land sales and ownership, zoning regulations and market imperfections.

Executives as Agents: Expatriate managers in subsidiaries of multinational banks. ACES Working Papers, June 2012

Performance and behavior between domestic and foreign-owned banks are grounded in assumptions about the ability of parent banks to provide subsidiaries with capital and knowledge and to manage asymmetric information and agency problems in the parent-subsidiary relationship. We complement research on internal capital markets and investigate how foreign owners of banks in emerging markets use their power to appoint executives at their subsidiaries to manage agency problems in the parent-subsidiary relationship. We find that perceived corruption and poor ICRG risk scores are associated with the appointment of parent-country executives as supervisors on behalf of the foreign owner. By contrast, a focus on retail clients, the absence of organizational routines and poor creditor rights are associated with the appointment of host-country executives. These bank and country characteristics create agency problems within the subsidiary, but not necessarily between the subsidiary and its parent. As such, they create a need for host-country executives’ superior knowledge of local markets and staff rather than for the supervisory role of parent-country executives.