Now We Are One...A Rough Start for the EEAS

The first year of the European External Action Service (EEAS) has already elicited much comment, both internally and externally. This contribution briefly reviews the nature of this commentary and then suggests some possible short-term ‘wins’ for the Service, as well as some challenges that will require a longer-term perspective. The main shorter-term issue considers the need to create stronger linkages and priorities between existing strategies and to start the difficult process of melding a common mindset within the Service. The longer-term challenges revolve around recruitment, balance and resources. The latter is particularly important in order to enable the delegations to assume their full roles. The barrage of criticism that greeted the EEAS’s first birthday is also a commentary on how critical the role of the Service is to achieving the core goals of the Lisbon Treaty in external relations; namely, to aim towards more coherence, effectiveness and visibility.

Rounding out a satisfactory Trio Presidency: Greece sets the stage for its Italian successor. CEPS Commentary, 3 July 2014

Expectations of the Greek presidency were not high: the budget was limited, the legislative term was drawing to a close and the European Parliament dissolved in mid-April for the elections. However, Greece made the most of its resources to progress on some very important dossiers and brought about a satisfactory close to the Trio presidency previously held by Ireland and Lithuania. The Greek presidency managed to finalise work on the Trio priorities, mainly in relation to banking union, the Digital Agenda, the competitiveness of EU enterprises and the Compact for Growth and Jobs. It also advanced legislation to tackle tax evasion as a necessary complement to spending cuts, and set the agenda for migration and maritime affairs, in close cooperation with Italy.

EU Naval Force EUNAVFOR MED sets sail in troubled waters. CEPS Commentary, 26 June 2015

Apprehending pirates in the Indian Ocean is one thing. Defeating the networks through which smugglers traffic migrants through North Africa is quite another. The European Union’s new naval force deployment in the Mediterranean - EUNAVFOR MED - drew criticism from international partners and the general public alike when plans for a “boat-sinking” operation were unveiled, raising fears about unacceptable levels of violence and collateral damage; a European version of Mexico’s drug war. Yet the problems of EUNAVFOR MED lie less in clumsy public diplomacy than in the perilous mismatch between its stated objectives and the absence of a clear strategy and mandate, and this creates both operational and political risks for member states. Phase 1 of the operation: surveillance and assessment, has begun with no legal mandate to carry out the crucial phases 2 and 3: seek and destroy, whose military planning and outcomes are undetermined. Despite these limitations, the naval force could nevertheless mark a turning point in the EU’s security narrative, because it means that the Union is finally addressing the threats to security and the humanitarian tragedies in its southern neighbourhood.