11 resultados para Road Safety Barriers
em Archive of European Integration
Resumo:
The EU began railway reform in earnest around the turn of the century. Two ‘railway packages’ have meanwhile been adopted amounting to a series of directives and a third package has been proposed. A range of complementary initiatives has been undertaken or is underway. This BEEP Briefing inspects the main economic aspects of EU rail reform. After highlighting the dramatic loss of market share of rail since the 1960s, the case for reform is argued to rest on three arguments: the need for greater competitiveness of rail, promoting the (market driven) diversion of road haulage to rail as a step towards sustainable mobility in Europe, and an end to the disproportional claims on public budgets of Member States. The core of the paper deals respectively with market failures in rail and in the internal market for rail services; the complex economic issues underlying vertical separation (unbundling) and pricing options; and the methods, potential and problems of introducing competition in rail freight and in passenger services. Market failures in the rail sector are several (natural monopoly, economies of density, safety and asymmetries of information), exacerbated by no less than 7 technical and legal barriers precluding the practical operation of an internal rail market. The EU choice to opt for vertical unbundling (with benefits similar in nature as in other network industries e.g. preventing opaque cross-subsidisation and greater cost revelation) risks the emergence of considerable coordination costs. The adoption of marginal cost pricing is problematic on economic grounds (drawbacks include arbitrary cost allocation rules in the presence of large economies of scope and relatively large common costs; a non-optimal incentive system, holding back the growth of freight services; possibly anti-competitive effects of two-part tariffs). Without further detailed harmonisation, it may also lead to many different systems in Member States, causing even greater distortions. Insofar as freight could develop into a competitive market, a combination of Ramsey pricing (given the incentive for service providers to keep market share) and price ceilings based on stand-alone costs might be superior in terms of competition, market growth and regulatory oversight. The incipient cooperative approach for path coordination and allocation is welcome but likely to be seriously insufficient. The arguments to introduce competition, notably in freight, are valuable and many e.g. optimal cross-border services, quality differentiation as well as general quality improvement, larger scale for cost recovery and a decrease of rent seeking. Nevertheless, it is not correct to argue for the introduction of competition in rail tout court. It depends on the size of the market and on removing a host of barriers; it requires careful PSO definition and costing; also, coordination failures ought to be pre-empted. On the other hand, reform and competition cannot and should not be assessed in a static perspective. Conduct and cost structures will change with reform. Infrastructure and investment in technology are known to generate enormous potential for cost savings, especially when coupled with the EU interoperability programme. All this dynamism may well help to induce entry and further enlarge the (net) welfare gains from EU railway reform. The paper ends with a few pointers for the way forward in EU rail reform.
Resumo:
The single market is often perceived as the panacea for Europe’s economic troubles. It is believed that completing the single market would boost welfare, stimulate growth and increase European competitiveness. • However, identifying and quantifying the channels through which market integration is expected to engender growth is methodologically complex. Although the overwhelming prediction from the literature is for single market integration to generate positive and significant aggregate effects, we conclude that the impact so far has fallen short of initial expectations, because: (1) Barriers continue to prevail in the EU, preventing the exploitation of the potential benefits of full market integration (2) ‘Complementary policies’ to support the single market were not, or were insufficiently, put in place (3) The single market project has not sufficiently been framed as a key part of the process of creative destruction that Europe needs to embrace to successfully modernise its economy. • That single market integration generates positive and significant aggregate effects does not imply that its effects are positive and significant for every sector. There is therefore an important role for European Union and national distributional policies to ensure that losers are sufficiently compensated by the winners, and to overcome political resistance to completing the single market.
Resumo:
This book provides an independent and in-depth contribution on the status of bilateral economic exchanges and persistent trade barriers between the European Union and China. A second objective is to encourage a frank and open dialogue, based on a scientific evaluation and without prejudice, of the possibility of a preferential trade agreement between the two sides. The study, commissioned by the Foreign Trade Association, was carried out by CEPS, in cooperation with the World Trade Institute (WTI) at the University of Bern. Jacques Pelkmans, CEPS Senior Research Fellow, served as overall study leader and Joseph Francois, Managing Director and Professor of Economics at the World Trade Institute, led the WTI team.
Resumo:
Foreword. The Foreign Trade Association, which represents the European and international distribution and retail sector, commissioned this study in light of the importance of China as a sourcing country and its attractiveness as a rapidly growing consumer market. We believe that open borders and free trade can contribute to a broader choice and lower costs for consumers and create growth and employment in both Europe and China. This independent study aims to provide an in-depth contribution on the status of bilateral economic exchanges and persistent trade barriers that exist between the European Union and China. The second objective of the report is to encourage a frank and open dialogue, based on a scientific evaluation and without prejudice, on the possibility of a preferential trade agreement between the two sides. This study should be read by anyone who is interested in economic relations between the EU and China and in trade policy in general. The report provides many interesting findings and raises a number of surprising points. Overall, this study is one of the most significant contributions to the discourse on EU-China relations in recent years. We hope that this study will stimulate fresh thoughts on the benefits of closer future cooperation between two regions that have been interlinked since the times of antiquity and the first Silk Road.