Simulation Results on the Impact of Changes in the Main EU Policy Tools on Farm Investment Behaviour. Factor Markets Working Document No. 56, June 2013

This paper completes the comparative analysis of the investment demand behaviour, of a sample of specialised arable crop farms, for farm buildings and machinery and equipment, as a function of the different types and levels of Common Agricultural Policy support, in selected European Union Member States. This contribution focuses on their quantitative interdependence calculating the relevant elasticity measures. In turn, they constitute the methodological tool to simulate the percentage expected change in average net investment levels associated to the implementation of the, recently proposed and currently under discussion, reductions in the Pillar I Direct Payments disbursed under the Common Agricultural Policy. Evidence suggests a statistically significant elastic and inelastic relationship between both types of subsidies and the investment levels for both asset classes in Germany and Italy, respectively. An elastic dependence of investment in farm buildings on decoupled subsidies exists in Hungary while changes in the level of coupled payments appear to translate into less than proportional changes in the demand for both farm buildings and machinery and equipment in France. Coupled payments appear to influence the UK demand for both asset classes in an elastic manner while decoupled support seems to induce a similar effect on investment in machinery and equipment. Since the currently discussed Common Agricultural Policy reform options imply, almost exclusively, a reduction in the level of support granted through Direct Payments, simulated effects were expected to reveal a worsening of the farm investment prospects for both asset types (i.e., a larger negative investment or a smaller positive one). The actual evidence largely respects this expectation with the sole exception of investment in machinery and equipment in France and Italy reaching smaller negative or larger positive levels irrespectively of the magnitude of the implemented cuts in Direct Payments.

Synthesis Report on the Impact of Capital Use. Factor Markets Working Document No. 57, August 2013

This paper examines the drivers of productivity in EU agriculture from a factor markets perspective. Using econometrically estimated production elasticities and shadow prices of factors for a set of eight EU member states, we focus on field crop farms represented in the FADN database for the years 2002-08. As it turned out that output reacts most elastically to materials input, we investigate this factor further and find different rationing regimes represented in different member states. Marginal return on materials is low in Denmark and West Germany, but significantly above typical market interest rates in East Germany, Italy and Spain. In the latter countries and in Denmark it also increased towards the end of the observed period. This finding is consistent with a perception of tightening funding access, possibly induced or reinforced by the unfolding financial crisis. Marginal returns to land, labour and fixed capital are generally low. We conclude that the functioning of factor markets plays a crucial role for productivity growth, but that factor market operations display considerable heterogeneity across EU member states.

Interconnector Investment for a Well-Functioning Internal Market: What EU regime of regulatory incentives? Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 18/October 2010

Sufficient cross‐border electricity transmission infrastructure is a pre‐requisite for a functioning European internal market for electricity. Also, the achievement of the EU’s energy policy objectives – sustainability, competitiveness and security of supply – critically depends on adequate investment in physical interconnections between the member states. Mainly focusing on the “regulatory path”, this paper assesses different ways to achieve a sufficient level of interconnector investment. In a first step, economic analysis identifies numerous impediments to interconnector investment adding up to an “interconnector investment failure”. Reflecting on the proper regulatory design of an EU framework able to overcome the interconnector investment failure, a number of recommendations are put forward:  All congestion rents should be channeled into interconnector building. Unused rents should be transferred to a European interconnector fund supervised by an EU agency.  Even though inherently sub‐optimal, merchant transmission investment can be used as a means to put pressure on regulated transmission system operators (TSO) that do not deliver. An EU agency should have exclusive competence on merchant interconnector exemptions.  A European TSO organization should be entrusted with supra‐national network planning, supervised by an EU agency.  The agency should decide on investment cost reallocation for interconnector projects that yield strong externalities. Payments could be settled via a European interconnector fund.  In case of non‐compliance with the supra‐national network plan, the EU agency should have the right to organize a tender – financed by the European interconnector fund – in order to get the “missing link” built. Assessing the existing EU regulatory framework, the efforts of the 2009 “third energy package” to fill the “regulatory gap” with new EU bodies – ACER and ENTSO‐E – are acknowledged. However, striking holes in regulatory framework are spotted, notably with regard to the use of congestion rents, interconnector cost allocation, and the distribution of decision making powers on new infrastructure exemptions A discussion of the TEN‐E interconnector funding scheme shows that massive funding can be an interim solution to the problem of insufficient interconnection capacities while overcoming the political deadlock on sensible regulatory topics such as interconnector cost allocation. The paper ends with policy recommendations.

The United States dominates global investment banking: does it matter for Europe? Bruegel Policy Contribution 2016/06, March 2016

In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the market share of US investment banks is increasing, while that of their European counterparts is declining. We present evidence that US investment banks are on the verge of taking over pole position in European investment banking. Meanwhile, since 2015, Chinese investment banks have overtaken American and European investment banks in the Asia-Pacific market. Credit rating agencies and investment banks are the gatekeepers of the capital markets. The European supervisory institutions can effectively supervise the European operations of these US-managed players. On the political side, we suggest that the European Commission should continue to view its, albeit declining, banking industry as a strategic sector. The Commission, the European Central Bank and the Bank of England should jointly develop a strategic agenda for the EU-US Regulatory Dialogue. Finally, corporates rely on investment banks to issue new securities. We recommend that the big European corporates should cherish the (few) remaining European investment banks, by giving them at least one place in otherwise US- dominated banking syndicates. That could help to avoid complete dependence on US investment banks.

Drivers of agricultural capital productivity in selected EU member states. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 30, September 2012

The aim of this Working Paper is to provide an empirical analysis of the marginal return on working capital and fixed capital in agriculture, based on data gathered by the Farm Accountancy Data Network from seven EU member states. Particular emphasis is placed on the detection of credit market imperfections. The key idea is to provide farm group-specific estimates of the shadow price of capital, and to use these to analyse the drivers of on-farm capital use in European agriculture. Based on Cobb Douglas estimates of farm-type specific production functions, we find that working capital is typically used in more than economically optimal quantities and often displays negative marginal returns across countries and farm types. This is less often the case with regard to fixed capital, but it is only in a small set of sectors where access to fixed capital appears severely constrained. These sectors include field crop and mixed farms in Denmark, dairy farms in East Germany, as well as mixed farms in Italy and the UK. The relationship between farm financial indicators and the estimated shadow prices of capital varies considerably across countries and sectors. Among the farms with a high shadow price for fixed capital in Denmark, high debt levels and little owned land tended to induce more intensive capital use, which may reflect the liberal Danish banking system. In East Germany, Italy and the UK, high debt levels made farmers more tightly capital constrained. Hence, in the latter group of countries, more traditional mechanisms of capital allocation based on debt capacity seemed to be at work. As a general conclusion, EU agriculture appears to be characterised by overcapitalisation rather than by credit constraints.

Brexit – potential economic consequences if the UK exits the EU. Policy Brief #2015/05

If the United Kingdom (UK) exits the EU in 2018, it would reduce that country’s exports and make imports more ex-pensive. Depending on the extent of trade policy isolation, the UK’s real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita would be between 0.6 and 3.0 percent lower in the year 2030 than if the country remained in the EU. If we take into ac-count the dynamic effects that economic integration has on investment and innovation behavior, the GDP losses could rise to 14 percent. In addition, it will bring unforeseeable political disadvantages for the EU – so from our perspective, we must avoid a Brexit.