Testing for Subsidiarity. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 13/2006

In the EU circuit (especially the European Parliament, the Council and Coreper) as well as in national parliaments of the EU Member States, one observes a powerful tendency to regard 'subsidiarity' as a 'political' issue. Moreover, subsidiarity is frequently seen as a one-way street : powers going 'back to' Member States. Both interpretations are at least partly flawed and less than helpful when looking for practical ways to deal with subsidiarity at both EU and Member states' levels. The present paper shows that subsidiarity as a principle is profoundly 'functional' in nature and, hence, is and must be a two-way principle. A functional subsidiarity test is developed and its application is illustrated for a range of policy issues in the internal market in its widest sense, for equity and for macro-economic stabilisation questions in European integration. Misapplications of 'subsidiarity' are also demonstrated. For a good understanding, subsidiarity being a functional, two-way principle neither means that elected politicians should not have the final (political!) say (for which they are accountable), nor that subsidiarity tests, even if properly conducted, cannot and will not be politicised once the results enter the policy debate. Such politicisation forms a natural run-up to the decision-making by those elected for it. But the quality and reasoning of the test as well as structuring the information in a logical sequence ( in accordance with the current protocol and with the one in the constitutional treaty) is likely to be directly helpful for decisionmakers, confronted with complicated and often specialised proposals. EU debates and decision-making is therefore best served by separating the functional subsidiarity test (prepared by independent professionals) from the final political decision itself. If the test were accepted Union-wide, it would also assist national parliaments in conducting comparable tests in a relatively short period, as the basis for possible joint action (as suggested by the constitutional treaty). The core of the paper explains how the test is formulated and applied. A functional approach to subsidiarity in the framework of European representative democracy seeks to find the optimal assignment of regulatory or policy competences to the various tiers of government. In the final analysis, this is about structures facilitating the highest possible welfare in the Union, in the fundamental sense that preferences and needs are best satisfied. What is required for such an analysis is no less than a systematic cost/benefit framework to assess the (de)merits of (de)centralisation in the EU.

Moving the EU from a Laggard to a Leader in Democracy Assistance: The Potential Role of the European Endowment for Democracy. CEPS Policy Brief No. 273, 15 June 2012

In their assessment of the proposed European Endowment for Democracy (EED), Hrant Kostanyan and Magdalena Nasieniak conclude that an instrument along the lines currently envisaged could and should take on the challenge to make the EU a truly committed, pro-active and effective leader of democracy assistance. A flexible and fast-track path of assessing needs and granting funds could become the most visible results of the EU’s assistance in this area, delivering almost immediate tangible results. They argue that the EED therefore needs to become an instrument free of nationally-driven decisions, European ‘turf wars’ and cumbersome bureaucracy.

Romanian politics: struggling with the grass roots and digging for democracy. EPIN Commentary No. 11, 29 August 2012

Romania was on a good trajectory to meet the European standards in democracy. This process began before the country’s accession to the EU in 2007 and has continued since thanks to the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM). The recent political turmoil has put in danger this trajectory. 2012 will continue to remain a very difficult year for Romania, economically and politically, especially in light of the referendum’s result invalidating the suspension of the President and the upcoming parliamentary elections due to take place at the end of this year. Now is time to restore the process of strengthening Romania’s democratic institutions and rule of law. There are important roles to be played in this process both by the Romanian political class and the European institutions.

The EU's Promotion of External Democracy: In search of the plot. CEPS Policy Brief No. 281, 13 September 2012

This policy brief illustrates that both the conceptualisation of democracy and the means to achieve it remain vague, and explains why this is problematic. It points out the risks that stem from a lack of clear understanding about how human rights, governance, civil society and socio-economic development relate to democratisation. It concludes that the EU should reflect on the substance of its external democracy promotion policies and conceptualise the relationship between the different elements of democracy promotion cited above and democratisation. While ongoing reforms of international democracy promotion should continue, a wider debate on substance could help identify what the EU should support in the future. The EU should also establish a reflective external democracy promotion policy where the assessment of actions on democratic development becomes systematic and is institutionalised.