Do Changes in Regulation Affect Employment Duration in Temporary Work Agencies? CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 07.1, 2007

Over the past three decades Germany has repeatedly deregulated the law on temporary agency work by stepwise increasing the maximum period for hiring-out employees and allowing temporary work agencies to conclude fixed-term contracts. These reforms should have had an effect on employment duration within temporary work agencies. Based on an informative administrative data set we use a mixed proportional hazard rate model to examine whether employment duration has changed in response to these reforms. We find that the repeated prolongation of the maximum period for hiring-out employees significantly increased average employment duration while the authorization of fixed-term contracts reduced employment tenure.

The distribution of debt across euro area countries : The role of individual characteristics, institutions and credit conditions. National Bank of Belgium Working Paper No. 252, December 2013

The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we present an up-to-date assessment of the differences across euro area countries in the distributions of various measures of debt conditional on household characteristics. We consider three different outcomes: the probability of holding debt, the amount of debt held and, in the case of secured debt, the interest rate paid on the main mortgage. Second, we examine the role of legal and economic institutions in accounting for these differences. We use data from the first wave of a new survey of household finances, the Household Finance and Consumption Survey, to achieve these aims. We find that the patterns of secured and unsecured debt outcomes vary markedly across countries. Among all the institutions considered, the length of asset repossession periods best accounts for the features of the distribution of secured debt. In countries with longer repossession periods, the fraction of people who borrow is smaller, the youngest group of households borrow lower amounts (conditional on borrowing), and the mortgage interest rates paid by low-income households are higher. Regulatory loan-to-value ratios, the taxation of mortgages and the prevalence of interest-only or fixed-rate mortgages deliver less robust results.