Joining up or falling apart: towards a networked communications model for EU foreign policy. EPC Policy Brief, 1 October 2015

Communication is a key element of diplomatic activity. In the 21st century, the shift from the traditional model of state diplomacy to a post-Westphalian, multi-stakeholder diplomacy has also had an impact on communication within diplomatic systems. In this Policy Brief, Juliane Schmidt (EPC Programme Assistant) argues that the EU should work on developing a more networked communications model so that the European External Action Service (EEAS) can communicate more effectively with all stakeholders of EU external action. Only then can the EEAS shape comprehensive foreign policy strategies and unlock its true potential as a central coordinator for EU external action.

Shifting Between Hegemony and Dominance? A Neo-Gramscian Analysis of the EU as a Structural Foreign Policy Actor: The Singular Case of the Cariforum-EU Economic Partnership Agreement. Bruges Regional Integration & Global Governance Paper 01/2014

The groundbreaking scope of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between the European Union (EU) and Cariforum (CF) irrefutably marks a substantive shift in trade relations between the regions and also has far-reaching implications across several sectors and levels. Supplementing the framework of analysis of Structural Foreign Policy (SFP) with neo-Gramscian theory allows for a thorough investigation into the details of structural embeddedness based on the EU's historic directionality towards the Caribbean region; notably, encouraging integration into the global capitalist economy by adapting to and adopting the ideals of neoliberal economics. Whilst the Caribbean – as the first and only signatory of a ‘full’ EPA – may be considered the case par excellence of the success of the EPAs, this paper demonstrates that there is no cause-effect relationship between the singular case of the ‘full’ CF-EU EPA and the success of the EPA policy towards the ACP in general. The research detailed throughout this paper responds to two SFP-based questions: (1) To what extent is the EPA a SFP tool aimed at influencing and shaping the structures in the Caribbean? (2) To what extent is the internalisation of this process reflective of the EU as a hegemonic SFP actor vis-à-vis the Caribbean? This paper affirms both the role of the EU as a hegemonic SFP actor and the EPA as a hegemonic SFP tool. Research into the negotiation, agreement and controversy that surrounds every stage of the EPA confirmed that through modern diplomacy and an evolution in relations, consensus is at the fore of contemporary EU-Caribbean relations. Whilst at once dealing with the singular case of the Caribbean, the author offers a nuanced approach beyond 'EU navel-gazing' by incorporating an ‘outside-in’ perspective, which thereafter could be applied to EU-ACP relations and the North-South dialogue in general.

DEMOCRACY AND CITIZENSHIP IN NORTH AFRICA AFTER THE ARAB AWAKENING: CHALLENGES FOR EU AND US FOREIGN POLICY (EUSPRING). Arab Citizenship Review No. 6, October 2014. EGYPT. The Return to Authoritarianism and the Crisis of Citizenship Rights

Citizenship and democratic rights have been shrinking in Egypt with the rise of president Abd El Fattah El Sisi, widely popular among Egyptians who fear more violence and unrest in an increasingly volatile region. In this EU Spring Policy Brief, Moataz El Fegiery examines the political landscape in the run-up of parliamentary elections, arguing that the short term is likely to see further curtailment of acquired rights, further crackdown on the opposition and consolidation of military power. In the longer term, however, it is in the interest of Egyptian society and institutions as well as of Europe to reverse the politics of exclusion and ensure that freedoms, pluralism and participation prevent the rise of extremism and political violence.

Renewal through international action? Options for EU foreign policy. CHALLENGE EUROPE Issue 22 - Challenges and new beginnings: Priorities for the EU’s new leadership. September 2014

The time has come for the EU to become more curious of the world around it, open and receptive to different ideas, and more articulate and thoughtful about its own. This is a somewhat anthropomorphic description of what would be needed to 'mature' into a global actor. The EU has promoted and managed globalisation while pretending that its political dimension would not require attention. This has led to it punching below its weight globally. Now it is abundantly clear that the systemic weaknesses of globalisation require international action and that the management of internal affairs cannot be divorced from the external context: decision time has come.

Alone in virtue. The "New Turkish" ideology in Turkey's foreign policy. OSW Point of View Number 49, April 2015

Once the West’s ally, Turkey has been an ever more problematic partner in recent years. The Turkish leadership no longer views the alliance with the European Union and membership in NATO as based on shared values; rather, it is now merely a cherry-picked and shaky community of interests. Turkey is also increasingly alienated politically in the Middle East. In the aftermath of the Arab Spring and the regional developments which followed, Ankara has lost much of the influence it had built in region in previous years. Turkey’s growing international isolation is a consequence of the country ever more fully subordinating its foreign policy to the ideology of the ruling AKP. The world vision offered by that ideology does not square with the diagnoses of Turkey’s partners. The objectives it sets for Turkish foreign policy are incompatible with its partners’ expectations. Moreover, a foreign policy rooted in ideology is less flexible and less capable of adjusting to current international dynamics.

Regional health governance: a comparative perspective on EU and ASEAN. EU Centre in Singapore Policy Brief No. 4, June 2012

Globalisation has led to new health challenges for the 21st Century. These challenges have transnational implications and involve a large range of actors and stakeholders. National governments no longer hold the sole responsibility for the health of their people. These changes in health trends have led to the rise of Global Health Governance as a theoretical notion for health policy-making. The Southeast Asian region is particularly prone to public health threats and it is for this reason that this brief looks at the potential of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a regional organisation to take a lead in health cooperation. Through a comparative study between the regional mechanisms for health cooperation of the European Union (EU) and ASEAN, we look at how ASEAN could maximise its potential as a global health actor. Regional institutions and a network of civil society organisations are crucial in relaying global initiatives for health, and ensuring their effective implementation at the national level. While the EU benefits from higher degrees of integration and involvement in the sector of health policy making, ASEAN’s role as a regional body for health governance will depend both on greater horizontal and vertical regional integration through enhanced regional mechanisms and a wider matrix of cooperation.

An Arab Springboard for EU Foreign Policy? CEPS Paperbacks. January 2012

The EU has not been perceived as reacting very rapidly or effectively to the so-called Arab Spring. Events do appear to validate the idea underpinning the European Security Strategy (ESS) and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP): only where governments guarantee to their citizens security, prosperity, freedom and equality, can peace and stability last – otherwise, people will revolt. But in practice, in its southern neighbourhood the EU has acted in precisely the opposite manner, so the Arab Spring is occurring in spite of rather than thanks to EU policy. The ENP stands at a crossroads therefore: Can a new start be made? Which instruments and, in times of austerity, which means can the EU apply to consolidate democratization? And, finally, can the EU continue to wage an ENP without addressing the hard security dimension, especially as the US seem to be withdrawing from crisis management in the region – or shall it continue to leave that to others?

Ukraine, Russia and the need for more flexibility in EU foreign policy-making. CEPS Policy Brief No. 320, 25 July 2014

After the illegal annexation of Crimea and Russia’s indirect responsibility for the downing of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 in eastern Ukraine, Steven Blockmans asks what it will take before the EU is able to confront a conflict on its borders and prove to both its own citizens and third countries that it has a meaningful role to play in foreign policy. With numerous competing national interests and some member states unwilling to pay different prices for collective action, any sector-wide EU sanctions are likely to lack serious bite. In an effort to paper over the cracks, the author makes a number of recommendations for policy-makers.

DEMOCRACY AND CITIZENSHIP IN NORTH AFRICA AFTER THE ARAB AWAKENING: CHALLENGES FOR EU AND US FOREIGN POLICY (EUSPRING). Arab Citizenship Review No. 1, Egypt, August 2013

This series of policy briefs provides a regular update of debates concerning key rights issues in three Arab states, Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia. In a first round of briefs on the three countries, we provide background on these debates since the beginning of the Arab spring

DEMOCRACY AND CITIZENSHIP IN NORTH AFRICA AFTER THE ARAB AWAKENING: CHALLENGES FOR EU AND US FOREIGN POLICY (EUSPRING). Arab Citizenship Review No. 2, Morocco, August 2013

This series of policy briefs provides a regular update of debates concerning key rights issues in three Arab states, Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia. In a first round of briefs on the three countries, we provide background on these debates since the beginning of the Arab spring.

DEMOCRACY AND CITIZENSHIP IN NORTH AFRICA AFTER THE ARAB AWAKENING: CHALLENGES FOR EU AND US FOREIGN POLICY (EUSPRING). Arab Citizenship Review No. 3, Tunisia, August 2013

This series of policy briefs provides a regular update of debates concerning key rights issues in three Arab states, Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia. In a first round of briefs on the three countries, we provide background on these debates since the beginning of the Arab spring.

DEMOCRACY AND CITIZENSHIP IN NORTH AFRICA AFTER THE ARAB AWAKENING: CHALLENGES FOR EU AND US FOREIGN POLICY (EUSPRING). Arab Citizenship Review No. 4, April 2014. Egypt. Egypt’s Transition in Crisis: The Decline of Citizenship Rights

This series of policy briefs provides a regular update of debates concerning key rights issues in three Arab states, Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia. In a first round of briefs on the three countries, we provide background on these debates since the beginning of the Arab spring.

DEMOCRACY AND CITIZENSHIP IN NORTH AFRICA AFTER THE ARAB AWAKENING: CHALLENGES FOR EU AND US FOREIGN POLICY (EUSPRING). Arab Citizenship Review No. 5, May 2014. TUNISIA. The New Tunisian Constitution and Citizenship Rights

This series of policy briefs provides a regular update of debates concerning key rights issues in three Arab states, Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia. In a first round of briefs on the three countries, we provide background on these debates since the beginning of the Arab spring.

The Pro-Western Turn in Russia's Foreign Policy: Causes, Consequences and Prospects. OSW Point of View, September 2002

From Europe and Poland's point of view, one of the most important recent developments in international politics was the re-orientation of Russia's foreign policy. This paper aims to answer three important questions relating to this issue: 4. When and why did the "pro-Western turn" in the Russian Federation's policy take place? 5. Has it been profitable for Russia? 6. What goals will the Russian policy pursue in the future? An analysis of the last two years in Russia's foreign policy leads to the several conclusions, including those: 5. Clearly, the Russian leaders realise that in the longer term, Russia - in its desire for more influence in the world - will not be able to survive as an independent pole of power in international politics and it will have to join forces with the West (most likely, the European Union). 6. September 11 was not the cause of Russia's pro-Western turn, but rather a catalyst that put the process which started when Vladimir Putin took his office in sharp focus. 7. In the nearest future, this new direction of Russia's foreign policy seems not be challenged by internal opposition in Russia. 8. The "pro-Western turn" proved to be beneficial for Russia, although: d. Russia has not become a strategic ally of the US e. There has been no breakthrough in the relations between Russia and the European Union, and Moscow has not gained any real influence on NATO's important decisions. f. Russia has not become a major decision-maker of international politics. 5. Russia's closing to the West is in Poland's and Europe's interest.

The "Pro-Western Turn" in Russia's Foreign Policy: Causes, Consequences and Prospects. OSW Point of View (unspecified), September 2002

From Europe and Poland's point of view, one of the most important recent developments in international politics was the re-orientation of Russia's foreign policy. This paper aims to answer three important questions relating to this issue: 1. When and why did the "pro-Western turn" in the Russian Federation's policy take place? 2. Has it been profitable for Russia? 3. What goals will the Russian policy pursue in the future? An analysis of the last two years in Russia's foreign policy leads to the several conclusions, including those: a. Clearly, the Russian leaders realise that in the longer term, Russia - in its desire for more influence in the world - will not be able to survive as an independent pole of power in international politics and it will have to join forces with the West (most likely, the European Union). b. September 11 was not the cause of Russia's pro-Western turn, but rather a catalyst that put the process which started when Vladimir Putin took his office in sharp focus. 7. In the nearest future, this new direction of Russia's foreign policy seems not be challenged by internal opposition in Russia. c. The "pro-Western turn" proved to be beneficial for Russia, although: d. Russia has not become a strategic ally of the US e. There has been no breakthrough in the relations between Russia and the European Union, and Moscow has not gained any real influence on NATO's important decisions. f. Russia has not become a major decision-maker of international politics. g. Russia's closing to the West is in Poland's and Europe's interest.