Reforming the Market Design of EU Electricity Markets: Addressing the Challenges of a Low-Carbon Power Sector. CEPS Task Force Report, 27 July 2015

This CEPS Task Force Report focuses on whether there is a need to adapt the EU’s electricity market design and if so, the options for doing so. In a first step, it analyses the current market trends by distinguishing between their causes and their consequences. Then, the current blueprint of EU power market design – the target model – is briefly introduced, followed by a discussion of the shortcomings of the current approach and the challenges in finding suitable solutions. The final chapter offers an inventory of solutions differentiating between recommendations shared among Task Force members and non-consensual options.

Saving the Monopsony: Exclusivity, Innovation and Market Power in the Media Sector. Research Papers in Law, 7/2006

From the Introduction. The Media Sector has experienced a technological revolution in the last 15 years. Digital encoding of television signals made possible a more efficient use of the radiospectrum. Digital terrestrial television (hereinafter, “DTT”) allows now for the reception of a significant number of free-to-air channels.1 Moreover, the use of new transmission platforms (hereinafter,“platforms”), namely cable and direct-to-home satellite (hereinafter, “DTH”) paved the way for the arrival in Europe of pay-TV operators, which finance their activities mainly via subscription fees. This changing technological landscape is subject to further evolution in the near future, as incumbent telecommunications operators become increasingly interested in making available broadcasting content2 as part of their broadband offer and 3G mobile handsets can be used for the reception of TV signals....The present paper seeks to ascertain whether the Commission “regulatory approach” towards the exclusive sale of premium content is a sound one, in particular in view of the constant technological evolution outlined above. The assumptions underlying landmark Commission decisions will be compared with recent developments of the media sector in Italy. In the NewsCorp./Telepiù case, decided in 2003, the Commission imposed very strict conditions to allow the merger giving birth to Sky Italia, on the assumption that the operation created a lasting near-monopsony in the different upstream markets for the acquisition of premium intervened against the media conglomerate Mediaset (which controls, inter alia, the main three private free-to-air channels in Italy) for an alleged abuse of dominant position.17 In fact, and contrary to the forecasts made by the Commission, Mediaset was in a position to acquire the broadcasting rights of the main Italian football teams, thereby excluding the incumbent (and near-monopolist) pay-TV operator, Sky Italia. This may go to show that the reality of the sector is more complex and evolves faster than one may infer from the Commission practice, thus putting into question its stance regarding exclusivity. The experience of the evolution of the Italian media sector will be used as the starting point for the evaluation of alternative regulatory options.

Innovative Capabilities and Market Performance: The European Union in International Comparison. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 12, No. 7, September 2012

This paper investigates the EU’s international positioning in terms of innovative capabilities and global market performance by using most recent quantitative data on a wide branch of indicators. The EU’s performance is compared to the standings of its most important economic competitors and emerging economic powerhouses: the USA, Japan, China, Brazil, India, Russia and South Africa. By doing so, this paper offer insightful and deep information about the EU’s power to compete and rank in international economic affairs. It will be proofed that the European Union ranks in many of the indicators related to innovative capabilities in good position and the EU’s overall global market performance is excellent, whereas the BRICS are underachieving.

Forerunners or scaremongers? Germany to abandon nuclear power. OSW Commentary No. 58, 2011-07-21

The German government’s final decision to abandon nuclear power as of 2022 has been expected for months. However, instead of calming the waters, providing solutions and answering the question ‘What next?’, it has only fanned the flames. Even the adoption of legal amendments enforcing the government’s decision by the German parliament (both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat) in late June and early July has not calmed the situation. It is more than apparent that these decisions have been made under emotional pressure: there was not enough time for accurate calculations to be made and consideration to be given to the consequences of Germany abandoning nuclear power. Chancellor Angela Merkel has so far been unable to fully convince the public that the ‘energy shift is a huge opportunity’ and that this process will be carried out on condition that ‘the supplies remain secure, the climate protected and the whole process economically efficient’1. German economic associations have warned against a politically motivated, ill-judged and irreversible abandonment of nuclear energy. They are anxious about an increase in electricity prices, the instability of supplies and environmental damage. The government believes, however, that green technologies will become a new driving force for the German economy and its main export commodity. Before that happens the industry will have to increase its use of electricity produced from fossil fuels, mainly natural gas imported from Russia. This may be exploited by Gazprom which will try to strengthen its position on the German market, and thus in the entire EU.

Gazprom's position on the Russian gas market weakening. OSW Commentary No. 70, 2012-02-23

As the difficulties Gazprom has faced in recent years on the European market have multiplied1, so more and more symptoms have appeared which may suggest that the company’s dominant position is deteriorating. The decision made by the Russian government in June 2011 to double the tax Gazprom has to pay on the extraction of gas, which was later approved by parliament, was the first time in many years when the company’s fiscal privileges were withdrawn. The process of Gazprom’s assets being taken over by private companies and business partners from within Vladimir Putin’s closest circle is underway. More and more frequently attempts are being made to challenge the company’s monopoly in areas of key importance for the functioning of the entire gas sector, such as Gazprom’s exclusive right to dispose of the Russian gas transportation system and its exports monopoly. Competition from independent gas producers on the domestic market is growing, and Gazprom is gradually being pushed out of some of that market’s most profitable segments (industrial clients). The emerging tendencies in the Russian gas sector derive from a number of factors – from the situation on the European gas market, through difficulties hampering the development of the sector in Russia itself, to the private interests of the current ruling class and its business partners. The plans for a structural reform of the monopoly (including isolating gas transportation system from Gazprom), presented since 2000 by the Ministry for Economic Development and since 2003 by the Russian Association of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RSPP), suggest a direction for the changes necessary to stimulate the sector’s development and improve the efficiency of Gazprom itself. However, the monopolist’s current business model gives the government full control over this strategic enterprise, which is a core of Putin’s concept for developing Russia as a global energy power. Despite Putin’s recent statement that he “does not rule out privatising Gazprom in the future” (made at a meeting with political scientists in Moscow on 6 February this year), any structural reform of Gazprom (and consequently, a weakening of the state’s control over it) seems unlikely in the foreseeable future. Still, the developments on the domestic market – growing pressure from other gas companies (oil corporations and independent producers) and changes on the European market2 – may result in the weakening of Gazprom’s monopoly privileges and a gradual deterioration of its special status within Russia.

The Market for Tractors in the EU: Price Differences and Convergence. Factor Markets Working Documents No. 35, February 2013

This study evaluates the degree of segmentation of the market for agricultural machinery and equipment in the EU. We focus on agricultural tractors, the most common and biggest investment in machinery and equipment in the agricultural sector. By using country price data for individual tractor models, we test the law of one price, i.e. the existence of a common price for tractors across EU member states. We find that significant price differences exist, yet unlike most other studies we find that large price deviations are penalised within a short time. The study also shows that transport costs are an important source of price differences, as domestic production leads to lower prices on the domestic market and as price convergence is negatively correlated with distance. Finally, price differences should not solely be understood from a geographical perspective, as evidence supports the idea that farmers’ buying power is significant in explaining price differences within countries.

Energy Transition in Europe’s Power House. Alleingang, avant-garde or blackout? IES Policy Brief Issue 2012/03/October 2012

Summary. The transformation of Germany’s energy sector will further exacerbate current network fluctuations and intensify the need for modifications in Europe’s power system. Cross-border power transfers will have to increase in order to overcome national limitations for absorbing large volumes of intermittent renewables like wind and solar power. In order to establish such an infrastructure on a European scale, the energy transition needs to be guided by an economic approach designed to prevent further fractures in the Internal Electricity Market. Moreover, constructive negotiations with neighbouring countries on market designs and price signals will be important preconditions for a successful energy transition in Europe.

The EU power sector needs long-term price signals. CEPS Special Report No. 135/April 2016

By 2030, half of the EU’s electricity demand will be covered by renewables and will need to be accompanied by flexible conventional back-up resources. Due to the high upfront costs inherent to renewables and the progressively lower running times associated with back-up capacity, the cost of capital will have a proportionately greater impact on total costs than today. This report examines how electricity markets can be designed to provide long-term price signals, thereby reducing the cost of capital for these technologies and allowing for a more efficient transition. It finds that current market arrangements are unable to provide long-term price signals. To address this issue, we argue that a system for long-term contracts with a regulated counterparty could be implemented. A centralised system where capacity or energy or a combination of both is contracted, could be introduced for conventional and renewable capacity, based on a regional adequacy assessment and with a competitive bidding system in place to ensure cost-effectiveness. Member states face a number of legislative barriers while implementing these types of systems, however, which could be reduced by merging legislation and setting EU framework rules for the design of these contractual agreements.