Commonalities and Differences in Labour Market Developments and Constraints in Different EU Regions. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 22, February 2012

This paper provides a detailed overview of the differences across EU member states’ labour markets, through the extensive use of descriptive statistics. The objective is two-fold: firstly, it identifies the commonalities and differences in rural labour markets across EU regions and their developments, with special regard to agriculture, and secondly it emphasises the constraints that may hinder the efficient functioning of labour markets. Therefore, the paper starts with a description of the main indicators in the general labour market theory, such as the structure of the population in terms of age and gender distribution, unemployment and activity rates, employment levels, quality of human capital, migration patterns, and so forth. Secondly, we focus on the differences among rural and urban areas to then look closely at the agricultural sector. The institutional framework in which labour market institutions operate is also included. Lastly, as an attempt to summarise the analysis and to classify the EU member states according to certain rural and specific agricultural indicators, cluster analysis is also employed. Policy implications include investment in human capital and vocational training, support to young farmers, promoting economic diversification and upgrading infrastructure, with special regard to the new member states and to the Southern parts of Europe.

Strategic Voting in Proportional Systems: The Case of Finland. IHS Political Science Series No. 138, September 2014

Voters try to avoid wasting their votes even in PR systems. In this paper we make a case that this type of strategic voting can be observed and predicted even in PR systems. Contrary to the literature we do not see weak institutional incentive structures as indicative of a hopeless endeavor for studying strategic voting. The crucial question for strategic voting is how institutional incentives constrain an individual’s decision-making process. Based on expected utility maximization we put forward a micro-logic of an individual’s expectation formation process driven by institutional and dispositional incentives. All well-known institutional incentives to vote strategically that get channelled through the district magnitude are moderated by dispositional factors in order to become relevant for voting decisions. Employing data from Finland – because of its electoral system a particularly hard testing ground - we find considerable evidence for observable implications of our theory.