Climate Conundrums at High Altitude. EU Diplomacy Paper 01/2014, January 2014

The European Union (EU) was the frontrunner for the establishment of the world’s first multinational emissions trading scheme (ETS). Committed to combating climate change, the EU sought to overcome the multilateral paralysis within the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to mitigate aviation emissions. Unsuccessful in pushing for a global market-based measure (MBM) within the organisation, the EU was ready for take-off to include the sector in the EU emissions trading system (EU ETS). The geographical scope, however, including all flights from and to Europe in their entire trajectory, caused frictions with the international community about sovereignty issues. Ultimately, Climate Commissioner Connie Hedegaard announced a ‘stop-the-clock’ for international flights, a temporary derogation until the 2013 ICAO Assembly in order to find a global agreement. The ’stop-the-clock’ initiative provides ample opportunity to analyse EU leadership in curbing aviation emissions based on an analytical framework specifying different types of leadership. Its shows the global challenge to the EU’s claim of structural leadership on various levels in and beyond ICAO. The paper aims to analyse to what extent the EU is a global leader in mitigating aviation emissions and to identify the kind of EU leadership according to a threefold analytical framework. In addition, it will factor in the 'stop-the-clock' initiative and to what extent it altered the perception of EU leadership in the field. The paper comes to the conclusion that EU leadership in mitigating aviation emissions is not stalling. On the contrary, the EU, by pursuing the extension of the EU ETS, has put aviation emissions on everybody’s radar – and thus showed idea-based leadership. Proving the scheme’s feasibility further underlined EU leadership, in the form of directional leadership. The 'stop-the-clock' decision, however, already indicated what was later on confirmed in the 38th ICAO Assembly: Unilateral structural leadership of the EU in the field of aviation emissions is not credible at the moment.

Debating the European debt crisis: Government leadership, party ideology and supranational integration as focal points of parliamentary debates in Austria, Germany and the United Kingdom. ACES Cases No. 2012.3

Parliamentary debates about the resolution of the EU debt crisis seem to provide a good example for the frequently assumed “politicizationˮ of European governance. Against this background, the paper argues that in order to make sense of this assumption, a clearer differentiation of three thematic focal points of controversies – with regard to the assessment of government leadership, concerning the debate between competing party ideologies within the left/right dimension, and with regard to the assessment of supranational integration – is needed. Applying this threefold distinction, the paper uses a theory of differential Europeanization to explain differences in the thematic structure of debates in the Austrian Nationalrat, the British House of Commons, and the German Bundestag. Empirically, the paper is based on data gained from the computer-based coding of plenary debates about the resolution of the European debt crisis between 2010 and 2011.

A ship run aground Deepening problems in the Ukrainian economy. OSW Commentary Number 173, 16 June 2015

The drop in Ukraine’s GDP by nearly 18% in the first three months of 2015 (versus the corresponding period in 2014) has confirmed the decline of the country’s economy. Over the last 14 months, the Ukrainian currency was subject to an almost threefold devaluation against the US dollar, and in April 2015 the inflation rate was 61% (year-on-year), which exacerbated the impoverishment of the general public and weakened domestic demand. The main reason behind the crisis has been the destruction of heavy industry and infrastructure in the war-torn Donbas region, over which Kyiv no longer has control, as well as a sharp decline in foreign trade (by 24% in 2014 and by 34% in the first quarter of 2015), recorded primarily in trading volume with Ukraine’s major trade partner, i.e. Russia (a drop of 43%). The conflict has also had a negative impact on the production figures for the two key sectors of the Ukrainian economy: agriculture and metallurgy, which account for approximately 50% of Ukrainian exports. The government’s response to the crisis has primarily been a reduction in the costs of financing the Donbas and an increase in the financial burden placed on the citizens and companies of Ukraine. No radical reforms which would encompass the entire system, including anti-corruption reforms, have been carried out to stop the embezzlement of state funds and to facilitate business activity. The reasons for not initiating reforms have included the lack of will to launch them, Ukraine’s traditionally slow pace of bureaucratic action and growing dissonance among the parties making up the parliamentary coalition. The few positive changes, including marketisation of energy prices and sustaining budgetary discipline (in the first quarter of 2015, budgetary revenues grew by 25%, though partly as a result of currency devaluation), are being carried out under pressure from the International Monetary Fund, which is making the payment of further loan instalments to the tune of US$ 17.5 billion conditional upon reforms. Despite assistance granted by Western institutional donors and by individual states, the risk of Ukraine going bankrupt remains real. The issue of restructuring foreign debt worth US$ 15 billion has not been resolved, as foreign creditors who hold Ukrainian bonds have not consented to any partial cancellation of the debt. Whether Ukraine’s public finances can be stabilised will depend mainly on the situation in the east of the country and on the possible renewal of military action. It seems that the only way to rescue Ukraine’s public finances from deteriorating further is to continue to ‘freeze’ the conflict, to gradually implement wide-ranging reforms and to reach a consensus in negotiations with lenders.

Reform #1. Why Ukraine has to reform its gas sector. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 181/01.09.2015

In April 2015, the Ukrainian parliament passed a long-awaited law on the gas sector which paves the way for the extremely difficult process of reforming and de-monopolising the Ukrainian gas sector. The law will come into force on 1 October 2015 and involves the break-up of the state-owned company Naftogaz, the current monopolist, and the gradual creation of a competitive gas market in line with the so-called Third Energy Package. At the same time, a threefold increase in the price of gas paid by individual customers and the public sector was introduced. The price had been subsidised for years and no previous government had ever decided to raise it.