Does the Stockholm Programme matter? The struggles over ownership of AFSJ multiannual programming. CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security No. 51/December 2012

Does the 2009 Stockholm Programme matter? This paper addresses the controversies experienced at EU institutional levels as to ‘who’ should have ownership of the contours of the EU’s policy and legislative multiannual programming in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) in a post-Lisbon Treaty landscape. It examines the struggles around the third multiannual programme on the AFSJ, i.e. the Stockholm Programme, and the dilemmas affecting its implementation. The latest affair to emerge relates to the lack of fulfilment by the European Commission of the commitment to provide a mid-term evaluation of the Stockholm Programme’s implementation by mid-2012, as requested by both the Council and the European Parliament. This paper shifts the focus to a broader perspective and raises the following questions: Is the Stockholm Programme actually relevant? What do the discussions behind its implementation tell us about the new institutional dynamics affecting European integration on the AFSJ? Does the EU actually need a new (post- Stockholm) multiannual programme for the period 2015–20? And last, what role should the EP play in legislative and policy programming in order to further strengthen the democratic accountability and legitimacy of the EU’s AFSJ?

Programming EU External Action Post-Lisbon: New Opportunities or Business as Usual?

Over 90% of the external relations budget of the EU is processed through its external financial instruments. With the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of the new European External Action Service (EEAS), the institutional architecture of these instruments was significantly reformed. This contribution analyses strategic programming both pre- and post-Lisbon, identifies ‘winners’ and ‘losers’, and examines the potential of the new provisions to increase the coherence of EU external action. The examination shows that the instruments can be categorised into three groupings: ‘the big three’ comprising the bulk of funding characterised by joint programming and responsibilities; the ‘Commission-only’ instruments where all powers remain with the Commission; and the ‘EEAS-led rest’ in which the High Representative and the EEAS play a strong role but only have limited financial resources available. The new system calls for strong coordination of all involved actors in order to make it work. Findings of a case study on the Instrument for Stability reveal, however, that so far the establishment of the EEAS has not made a substantial impact on strategic programming in its first two years.

EU-Turkey plan for handling refugees is fraught with legal and procedural challenges. CEPS Commentary, 10 March 2016

EU-Turkey relations in the scope of the ongoing refugee crisis were at the heart of the European Council meeting of 7 March 2016. Among the set of initiatives proposed, the following two have attracted the most attention: First, for every Syrian readmitted by Turkey from the Greek islands, another Syrian from Turkey would be resettled in an EU member state. This has come to be known as the ‘one for one’ resettlement approach. Second, all new irregular migrants and asylum-seekers crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands would be returned to Turkey without offering any guarantee of protection.

Procedural steps towards Brexit. CEPS Commentary, 13 July 2016

Introduction. With the dust barely settled on the Brexit referendum, a messy legal picture has emerged. Among the many challenges are what, when and how exactly the UK’s withdrawal from the EU should be negotiated. In truth, the way the divorce procedure has been regulated under Article 50 TEU leaves much to be desired. Gaps left by the EU legislator will have to be filled rather swiftly by political elites and lawyers. To the EU and its member states, only the rudimentary aspects of withdrawal are clear. In the UK, however, even the staunchest proponents of Vote Leave seem to have been caught off-guard, with no actionable plan for how to handle Brexit – only visions of alternatives to EU membership that are unlikely to be acceptable to the EU27. The fact that alternatives to membership had not been considered seriously prior to the referendum is perplexing, and underlines the impression that the entire exercise was a stroke of irresponsible political chutzpah.