Legal privilege for in-house lawyers in the light of AKZO: a matter of law or policy? Research Papers in Law, 05/2011

From introduction. This paper discusses the arguments in favour of extending legal privilege to in-house lawyers in the light of the CJEU‟s judgement in AKZO. The previous jurisprudence is unambiguous, as the Court clearly stated in AM & S that the confidentiality of written communications between an undertaking and its lawyer is protected under Union law only when two cumulative conditions are fulfilled: they must be connected to the exercise of the client‟s rights of defence and the lawyer must be independent, that is, “not bound to the client by a relationship of employment”.1 This protection also applies to internal notes confined to reporting the content of communications with independent lawyers containing legal advice.2

Conventions in comparative constitutional law. Research Paper in Law 4/2003

Introduction. “Convention” is an ambiguous term, not only for lawyers, containing a wide variety of different meanings. Even when restricted to denote an assembly it may be used for all sorts of gatherings. In the context of constitutional law a convention is a very specific instrument, and the question is to what extent it is actually known in European constitutional law and whether the “Convention on the Future of Europe” as called forth by the Declaration of Laeken conforms to what is understood in constitutional law by “convention”.1 Or did the Laeken Council pick up a term without any foundation in European constitutional law, rarely practiced and even less understood, the only precedents of which are supposed to be the American Federal Convention in Philadelphia in 1787 and the convention that drafted the European Charter on Fundamental Rights, as can be read time and again? 2 As it is the privilege of the constitutional historian to make aware the evolution of legal institutions and to analyze their conferred meaning so that they will be available in political discourse, I shall examine the meaning of “convention” in constitutional history and comparative constitutional law in a first part, while a second part will place the Convention on the Future of the European Union according to its composition and commission into the context of constitutional conventions as understood in law.

Ukraine: sovereign decentralisation or federalism without sovereignty? OSW Commentary No. 133, 18.04.2014

A key element of Russia’s policy towards the new government of Ukraine concerns demands for a constitutional reform that would transform the country from a unitary into a federal state in a way that would considerably privilege the eastern and southern regions. Such a change to Ukraine’s administrative system would enable Moscow to put pressure on Ukraine’s central government via the regions. In order to achieve its objectives, Russia has been pressuring Kyiv to establish a constitutional assembly in a form that would guarantee the endorsement of solutions dictated by Russia. In other words, Russia has been demanding, in what is practically an ultimatum, that Ukraine give up one of the fundamental sovereign rights of a state, the right to freely determine its system of government. Transforming Ukraine into a federal state is an unacceptable idea, primarily because the intention behind Russia’s demands is to undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty, both through the content of the proposed changes and the way in which they are to be implemented. However, keeping in place the current, centralist model of state governance is not a feasible alternative. Ukraine will have to grant its regions broad self-governance powers, including the power to hold local referendums, and to transfer a considerable portion of the prerogatives currently held by the state to the local self-governments, along with adequate financial resources. That is because decentralisation along these lines is the only way forward towards a modern democracy in Ukraine. Russia’s policy has forced Kyiv to undertake legislative work on constitutional reform as a matter of urgency, rather than waiting until a new parliament is elected in which the new, post-Maidan balance of political power will be reflected, as political logic would require. The first draft of the constitutional amendments (of which no details are known at this stage) is to be presented in mid-May, and is expected to come into force in early autumn. However, whether these plans can be put into practice depends on further developments in the eastern part of Ukraine, because (among other reasons) if a state of emergency is introduced, the constitutional amendment process will have to be suspended.

The single market and competitiveness - the challenges for the Juncker team. CHALLENGE EUROPE Issue 22 - Challenges and new beginnings: Priorities for the EU's new leadership, September 2014

The announcement of the new European Commission is encouraging for single market supporters, especially in terms of how internal co-ordination and cross functional working will be organised. It is particularly significant that the responsibility for the single market in both goods and services is to be combined under one Commissioner portfolio. There is much to be gained from a combined focus, especially on enforcing the existing rules. A unified Consumer focus is also much welcomed. The European Parliament's Internal Market and Consumer Protection Committee (IMCO), which I had the privilege to Chair over the last five years, was extremely critical of the fragmented approach to consumer policy and legislation adopted by the outgoing Commission. A strong consumer focus underpins a dynamic and well-functioning market place and encourages more competition.

Creating Stability: National Preferences and the Origins of European Monetary System. CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 00.9, December 2000

This essay compares the preferences of France, Italy, and Britain on the creation of the European Monetary System in 1978-1979, especially the Exchange Rate Mechanism, which stabilised nominal exchange rates. My claim is that the different conclusions reached by the governments (France and Italy in, Britain out) cannot be explained by economic circumstances or by interests, and I elaborate an intervening institutional variable which helps explain preferences. Deducing from spatial theory that where decisionmakers `sit' on the left-right spectrum matters to their position on the EMS, I argue that domestic constitutional power-. sharing mechanisms privilege certain actors over others in a predictable and consistent way. Where centrists were in power, the government's decision was to join. Where left or right extremists were privileged, the government's decision was negative. The article measures the centrism of the governments in place at the time, and also reviews the positions taken by the national political parties in and out of government. It is intended to contribute to the growing comparativist literature on the European Union, and to the burgeoning literature on EU-member-state relations.