Shale gas in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Romania. Political context - legal status - outlook. OSW Report, September 2012

Despite their initial interest in shale gas exploration, over the past year Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Romania have become increasingly sceptical about the development of unconventional gas resources. In January of this year Bulgaria introduced an indefinite ban on the exploration and production of shale gas and Romania followed suit in May by introducing a six-month moratorium on exploration work, which it plans to extend by another two years following the country’s parliamentary elections scheduled for December. Similar measures are being planned by the government in Prague. The aim of this report is to explore the reasons why countries which claim to want to improve their energy security have been showing increasing scepticism towards shale gas.

The Legal Status and Influence of Decisions of International Organizations and other Bodies in the European Union. College of Europe Research Paper in Law 01/2014

Introduction. The European Union’s external action is not only defined by its influence on international developments, but also by its ability and the need to respond to those developments. While traditionally many have stressed the EU’s ‘autonomy’, over the years its ‘dependence’ on global developments has become more clear.2 International law has continued to play a key role in, not only in the EU’s external relations, but also in the Union’s own legal order.3 The purpose of this paper is not to assess the role or performance of the EU in international institutions.4 Rather it purports to reverse the picture and focus on a somewhat under-researched topic: the legal status of decisions of international organizations in the EU’s legal order.5 While parts of the status of these decisions relate to the status of international agreements and international customary law, it can be argued that decisions of international organizations and other international bodies form a distinct category. In fact, it has been observed that “this phenomenon has added a new layer of complexity to the already complex law of external relations of the European Union”.6 Emerging questions relate to the possible difference between decisions of international organizations of which the EU is a member (such as the FAO) and decisions of organizations where it is not (irrespective of existing competences in that area – such as in the ILO). Questions also relate to the hierarchical status of these decisions in the EU’s legal order and to the possibility of them being invoked in direct or indirect actions before the Court of Justice. This contribution takes a broad perspective on decisions of international organizations by including decisions taken in other international institutions which do not necessarily comply with the standard definition of international organizations,7 be it bodies set-up by multilateral conventions or informal (transnational / regulatory) bodies. Some of these bodies are relatively close to the EU (such as the Councils established by Association Agreements – see further Section 5 below); others operate at a certain distance. Limiting the analysis to formal international organizations will not do justice to the manifold relationships between the European Union and various international bodies and to the effects of the norms produced by these bodies. The term ‘international decisions’ is therefore used to refer to any normative output of international institutional arrangements.

Citizenship in the discourse of Egyptian political parties. EUSpring Working Paper No. 6, June 2015 [also Citizenship Report no. 3]

The concept of citizenship is one of the most complicated in political and social sciences. Its long process of historical development makes dealing with it particularly complicated. Citizenship is by nature a multi-dimensional concept: there is a legal citizenship, referring first to the equal legal status of individuals, for instance the equality between men and women. Legal citizenship also refers to a political dimension, the right to start and/or join political parties, or political participation more broadly. Thirdly, it has a religious dimension relating to the right of all religious groups to equally and freely practice their religious customs and rituals. Finally, legal citizenship possesses a socio-economic dimension related to the non-marginalisation of different social categories, for instance women. All of these dimensions, far from being purely objects of legal texts and codifications, are emerging as an arena of political struggle within the Egyptian society. Citizenship as a concept has its roots in European history and, more specifically, the emergence of the nation state in Europe and the ensuing economic and social developments in these societies. These social developments and the rise of the nation state have worked in parallel, fostering the notion of an individual citizen bestowed with rights and obligations. This gradual interaction was very different from what happened in the context of the Arab world. The emerging of the nation state in Egypt was an outcome of modernisation efforts from the top-down; it coercively redesigned the social structure, by eliminating or weakening some social classes in favour of others. These efforts have had an impact on the state-society relation at least in two respects. First, on the overlapping relation between some social classes and the state, and second, on the ability of some social groups to self-organise, define and raise their demands. This study identifies how different political parties in Egypt envision the multi-dimensional concept of citizenship. We focus on the following elements: Nature of the state (identity, nature of the regime) Liberties and rights (election laws, political party laws, etc.) Right to gather and organise (syndicates, associations, etc.) Freedom of expression and speech (right to protest, sit in, strike, etc.) Public and individual liberties (freedom of belief, personal issues, etc.) Rights of marginalised groups (women, minorities, etc.)

Frontex and the respect of fundamental rights: from better protection to full responsibility. EPC Policy Brief, 3 June 2014

The European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex) was created to improve border management cooperation between Member States. Seen from its inception as a security-oriented body, tools and rules have been gradually developed to enhance the human rights dimension and protection regarding Frontex activities. However, this step has not been accompanied with the explicit recognition of Frontex’s legal responsibility regarding violations of human rights occurring during joint operations it coordinates. Despite Frontex position rejecting such a responsibility, it is no longer clear whether this position can be maintained, as Yves Pascouau and Pascal Schumacher demonstrate in this Policy Brief.

A bottomless pit: the costs of Crimea’s annexation by Russia. OSW Commentary No. 143, 29.07.2014

The annexation of Crimea has brought the Russian authorities significant dividends, in particular on the domestic stage: it has resulted in an unprecedented social and political consolidation, and strengthened Vladimir Putin’s position after several years of decline in social support for him. It has provided Russia with strategic benefits, giving it broad access to the Black Sea and the military infrastructure on the peninsula, as well as access to natural gas and crude oil reserves. Russia has also taken over numerous assets (including the tourist infrastructure) previously owned by the Ukrainian state. However, the decision itself concerning Moscow’s annexation of Crimea was taken off the cuff, with no calculation of the costs of integrating it with the Russian legal, political and socio-economic space. Russia took over a region that required subsidies from the Ukrainian budget; moreover, the annexation struck at the most important industry of the Crimean economy – tourism. Crimea’s integration with Russia will be a complex process that entails high costs, financial, organisational and social, including multi-billion dollar investments in the modernisation and development of infrastructure, covering the region’s budget deficit, and paying out social benefits. For reasons of prestige and political significance, Moscow is treating Crimea as a showcase region. Russia is determined to prove that the Crimean incorporation will be beneficial for the region’s economy and will raise people’s living standards. However, the expenses triggered by Crimea’s integration will coincide with a deteriorating economic situation in Russia, aggravated by US and EU sanctions, and this may force Russia to postpone or even give up some of its ambitious investments in the peninsula. Some of the integration costs will have to be borne by other Russian regions, even though they already face serious financial problems that have forced them to reduce their own investment programs. Another issue that has come into question is the fulfilment of the Crimean people’s’ expectations concerning the improvement of their living standards, due to the tourist sector’s problems (small-scale tourist services used to be one of the local people’s main sources of income), the rising costs of maintenance, and finally, restrictions of civil rights after the introduction of the more restrictive Russian legislation.

One year of Ukraine’s De-communisation. A change in the historical narrative. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 211/16.05.2016

A year ago, the Parliament of Ukraine adopted four bills on the policy of national memory: on granting access to the archives of the repressive organs of the Communist totalitarian regime in the years 1917–1991, on the legal status and commemoration of Ukrainian independence fighters in the twentieth century, on the immortalisation of the victory over Nazism in the Second World War, 1939–1945, and on the condemnation of the Communist and National Socialist (Nazi) totalitarian regimes and the forbidding of their symbolism from being promoted. The laws came into force on 21 May 2015. After a year, it can be stated that only the latter two are being observed – the official narrative regarding World War II has been changed, mainly due to the activity of the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance (UINR), but also as a result of public statements by President Petro Poroshenko. The process of removing from public places the names and commemorations referring to the Soviet era is underway, and the fears that this may trigger serious conflicts have not proved true. From roughly a thousand placenames subject to de-communisation some two thirds have been changed so far (parliamentary bills regarding the remaining ones are awaiting approval) and most statues of Communist leaders have been removed. However, the law concerning independence fighters, which raised the most serious controversies, did not have any practical consequences. Moreover, nothing suggests that this could change. The implementation of the de-communisation laws is associated with a significant change in Ukrainian patriotic narrative: it is no longer focused on national martyrdom and it is beginning to emphasize heroic motives, which is in line with wartime needs. The fact that some of these motives are likely to trigger problems in Ukraine’s relations with Poland seems to be viewed as a marginal ‘by-product’.

Gibt es eine politische Philosophie der Europäischen Union? = Is there a political philosophy of the European Union?. ZEI Discussion Paper C223, 2014

In a theoretical context, the European Union is generally interpreted through the prism of integration theories, which in turn reflect the ever changing empirical reality of the integration process. ZEI Director Ludger Kühnhardt asks if and to what extent the process of European integration has begun to generate a specific political philosophy which uses the EU - and not the classical notion of the state – as the starting and reference point for its reasoning. Kühnhardt examines examples – such as the European notion of civil rights and the notion of the Union itself, but also critical categories such as euroskepticism – which indicate that the EU itself is beginning to be the starting point and frame of reference for a reflection on the common good. For now, a political philosophy in the context of the European Union exists only in an embryonic stage, but the topic may generate intellectual insights through further and deeper research.

The European Union’s Democratic Deficit and Options for EU Democracy in the 21st Century. EU Centre Singapore Working Paper No. 22, August 2014

The European Union (EU) is widely acknowledged as a successful example of economic and political integration of nation states today – a slate of democratic institutions such as the European Parliament have also been developed and European citizens now possess extensive political and civil rights by virtue of the introduction of European citizenship. Nevertheless, the EU is said to suffer from a so called “democratic deficit” even as it seeks deeper and closer integration. Decades of institutional design and elite closed-door decisions has taken its toll on the inclusion and integration of European citizens in social and political life, with widening socio-economic inequalities and the resurgence of extreme-right parties during in the wake of the debt crisis in the Eurozone. This paper attempts to evaluate the democratic development of the EU through the use of a process-oriented approach, and concludes at the end with discussions on the various options that the EU and its citizens can take to reform democratic processes and institutions in Europe.

Strangers among us. Non-governmental organisations in Russia. OSW COMMENTARY 2015-09-29

The situation of the third sector in Russia, i.e. the civil society structures independent from the state, is worsening on a regular basis. The Kremlin’s actions aimed at paralysing and destroying the independent non-governmental sector seen over the past four years have been presented as part of a struggle for the country’s sovereignty. This is above all a consequence of the Russian government’s efforts to take full control of the socio-political situation in the country while it also needs to deal with the geopolitical confrontation with the West and the worsening economic crisis. The policy aimed against non-governmental organisations is depriving the public of structures for self-organisation, protection of civil rights and the means of controlling the ever more authoritarian government. At the same time, the Kremlin has been depriving itself of channels of co-operation and communication with the public and antagonising the most active citizens. The restrictive measures the Kremlin has taken over the past few years with regard to NGOs prove that Russian decision-makers believe that any social initiative independent of the government may give rise to unrest, which is dangerous for the regime, and – given the economic slump – any unrest brings unnecessary political risk.