The Court of Justice of the European Union as a fundamental rights tribunal: challenges for the effective delivery of fundamental rights in the area of freedom, security and justice. CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe No. 49, 29 August 2012

This paper reflects on the challenges facing the effective implementation of the new EU fundamental rights architecture that emerged from the Lisbon Treaty. Particular attention is paid to the role of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and its ability to function as a ‘fundamental rights tribunal’. The paper first analyses the praxis of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg and its long-standing experience in overseeing the practical implementation of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Against this analysis, it then examines the readiness of the CJEU to live up to its consolidated and strengthened mandate on fundamental rights as one of the prime guarantors of the effective implementation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. We specifically review the role of ‘third-party interventions’ by non-governmental organisations, international and regional human rights actors as well as ‘interim relief measures’ when ensuring effective judicial protection of vulnerable individuals in cases of alleged violations of fundamental human rights. To flesh out our arguments, we rely on examples within the scope of the relatively new and complex domain of EU legislation, the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), and its immigration, external border and asylum policies. In view of the fundamental rights-sensitive nature of these domains, which often encounter shifts of accountability and responsibility in their practical application, and the Lisbon Treaty’s expansion of the jurisdiction of the CJEU to interpret and review EU AFSJ legislation, this area can be seen as an excellent test case for the analyses at hand. The final section puts forth a set of policy suggestions that can assist the CJEU in the process of adjusting itself to the new fundamental rights context in a post-Lisbon Treaty setting.

European Criminal Law and General Principles of Union Law. Research Papers in Law, 5/2005

From the Introduction. The European Court of Justice, partly followed in this by the European legislator, has regulated Community law and policy through a set of general principles of law. For the Community legal order in the first pillar, general legal principles have developed from functional policy areas such as the internal market, the customs union, the monetary union, the common agricultural policy, the European competition policy, etc., which are of great importance for the quality and legitimacy of Community law. The principles in question are not so much general legal principles of an institutional character, such as the priority of Community law, direct effect or Community loyalty, but rather principles of law which shape the fundamental rights and basic rights of the citizen. I refer to the principle of legality, of nulla poena, the inviolability of the home, the nemo tenetur principle, due process, the rights of the defence, etc. Many of these legal principles have been elevated to primary Community law status by the European Court of Justice, often as a result of preliminary questions. Nevertheless, a considerable number of them have also been elaborated in the context of contentious proceedings before the Court of Justice, such as in the framework of European competition law and European public servants law.

Principles of a Two-Tier European Deposit (Re-)Insurance System. CEPS Policy Brief No. 287, 17 April 2013.

There is general agreement that banking supervision and resolution have to be organised at the same level. It is often argued, however, that there is no need to tackle deposit insurance because it is too politically sensitive. This note proposes to apply the principles of subsidiarity and re-insurance to deposit insurance: Existing national deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs) would continue to operate much as before (with only minimal standards set by an EU directive), but they would be required to take out re-insurance against risks that would be too large to be covered by them. A European Reinsurance Fund (EReIF) would provide this reinsurance financed by premia paid by the national DGSs, just as any reinsurance company does in the private sector. The European Fund would pay out only in case of large losses. This ‘deductible’ would provide the national authorities with the proper incentives, but the reinsurance cover would stabilize depositor confidence even in the case of large shocks. Ideally the national DGSs would be responsible also for resolution. Experience has shown banking systems are more stable if deposit insurers are also responsible for resolution. The approach proposed here could thus be also used to design the ‘Single Resolution Mechanism’ (SRM) which is being discussed as a complement to the ‘Single Supervisory Mechanism’ (SSM). It will of course take time to build up the funding for such a reinsurance fund. This approach is thus not meant to deal with legacy problems from the current crisis.

The Strasbourg View on the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Research Paper in Law (Cooperative Research Paper) 03/2013

From the Introduction. May I say how delighted I am at this opportunity of talking to you today about the perspective of a Strasbourg judge on the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. It goes without saying that the views I here express are not to be attributed to the Court itself; yet they may be taken as reflecting, in a general sense, what I regard to be the Strasbourg approach.

Decentralisation of EC Competition Law Enforcement and General Principles of Community Law. Research Papers in Law, 4/2004

From the Introduction. By virtue of Council Regulation No. 1/2003, as of 1st May 2004 the full application of EC competition law will be entrusted to national competition authorities (hereinafter NCAs) and national courts. The bold reform of EC competition law enforcement adheres to the system of executive federalism1 which characterises the EC legal system. The repartition of competences within the Community allocates implementation of Community law mainly at Member States level. Pursuant to Article 10 EC, they are responsible for the implementation of the measures which have been adopted at Community level for the achievement of the objectives specified in the EC Treaty. Consequently, the attainment of the Community objectives depends very much upon the cooperation of national authorities, which act in accordance with their own national procedural rules.2 The various national procedural rules present themselves as conduits through which Community law is implemented and enforced. While as a rule Community law is not designed to alter national procedural rules, the Community legal order cannot afford to leave national procedural rules untouched when they are liable to hamper the effective application of Community law....For reason of space, this contribution intends only to highlight some aspects of Regulation No. 1/2003 with regard to which general principles of Community law are able to condition national procedural rules.