The EU essential facilities doctrine. Research Papers in Law, 6/2006

Introduction. The essential facilities doctrine may be seen as the ‘extra weight’ which is put onto the balance, in order to give precedence to the maintenance of competition over the complete contractual freedom of undertakings controlling an important and unique facility. The main purpose of the doctrine is to impose upon such ‘dominant’ undertakings the duty to negotiate and/or give access to the facility, against a reasonable fee, to other undertakings, which cannot pursue their own activity (and therefore will perish) without access to such a facility. This very simple description of the content of the doctrine underlines its limitations: through the imposition of a duty to negotiate or contractual obligations, the rule tends to compensate for the weaknesses of the competitive structure of a market, which are due to the existence of some essential facility. In other words, the doctrine does not by itself provide a definitive solution to the lack of competition, but tends to contractually maintain or even create some competition.1 The doctrine of essential facilities originates in the US antitrust case law of the Circuit and District Courts, but has never been officially acknowledged by the Supreme Court. It has been further developed and hotly debated by scholars in the US, both from a legal and from an economic viewpoint. In the EU, the essential facilities doctrine was openly introduced by the Commission during the early 1990s, but has received only limited and indirect support by the Court of First Instance (the CFI) and the European Court of Justice (the ECJ). It also indirectly inspired the legislation concerning the deregulation of traditional ‘natural’ monopolies. The judicial origin of the doctrine, combined with the hesitant application by the appeal courts, both in the US and the EU, cast uncertainty not only on the precise scope of the doctrine, but also on the issue of its very existence. These questions receive a particular light within the EU context, where the doctrine is called upon to play a different role from its US counterpart. In order to address the above issues, we will first pretend that an EU essential facility doctrine does indeed exist and we shall try to identify the scope and content thereof, through its main applications (Section 1). Subsequently, we will try to answer the question whether such a doctrine should exist at all in the EU (Section 2).

The EU and Syria – Time to Play behind Closed Doors. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Special Issue, September 13, 2013

From the Introduction. Since the – presumed – utilization of chemical weapons against civilians by the Assad regime late August, the members of the Euro-Atlantic community have been building the case for a military intervention, a punishing mission against Bashar al-Assad. Despite evidences that sarin gas was used, the UK and Germany seem to be out of the race – for a similar reason: domestic politics –, leaving the US and France in the starting blocks. French President Hollande has expressed his commitment to go to war. The world is now on hold waiting for the US as President Obama, after asking US Congress to postpone a vote on a military intervention, is working on a possible diplomatic solution with Russian President Putin. Since Kerry’s comments in London earlier this week, Russian President Putin has been seeking for a diplomatic solution that would put all Syrian chemical arsenals under international supervision.

Implementation of the Macroeconomic Adjustment Programmes in the Euro Area: State-of-Play. CEPS E-Book, 11 March 2014

Two of the four macroeconomic adjustment programmes – in Portugal and Ireland – can be considered a success in the sense that the initial expectations in terms of adjustment, both fiscal and external, were broadly fulfilled. A rebound based on exports has taken hold in these two countries, but a full recovery will take years. In Greece the initial plans were insufficient. While the strong impact of the fiscal adjustment on demand could have been partially anticipated at the time, the resistance to structural reforms was more surprising and remains difficult to cure. The fiscal adjustment is now almost completed, but the external adjustment has not proceeded well. Exports are stagnating despite impressive falls in wage costs. In Cyprus, the outcome has so far been less severe than initially feared. It is still too early to find robust evidence in any country that the programmes have increased the long-term growth potential. Survey-based evidence suggests that structural reforms have not yet taken hold. The EU-led macroeconomic adjustment programmes outside the euro area (e.g. Latvia) seem to have been much stricter, but the adjustment was quicker and followed by a stronger rebound.

The TTIP negotiations: a Pirandello play

Notre Europe – Jacques Delors Institute and the European Policy Centre during which experts, including Pascal Lamy, honorary president of Notre Europe – Jacques Delors Institute and former Director of the WTO explored the key issues of the current Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations. What are the geoeconomic and geostrategic goals of the negotiations? What are the rules of the negotiations? Who are the main players? What impact might TTIP have on world trade?

TTIP: une negociation a la pirandello = The TTIP: A Pirandello play

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Turkey and the EU: A play in search of a script. EuropEos Commentary No. 5, 28 September 2010

This Commentary warns that by continuing to act as if Turkey’s membership of the EU was still a credible prospect, the EU is dodging the critical issue of how to establish friendly and constructive relations with an independent, self-confident Turkey. More importantly, this approach prevents the EU from at last accepting that enlargement is not the only – nor necessarily the best – policy option available to deal effectively with a strategically important country on its borders.

The European Semester in Belgium: A state of play. European Policy Brief No. 32, October 2014

After four rounds of the European Semester process of EU economic coordination, Belgium has done relatively little to comply with EU recommendations. This brief substantiates and confirms this claim after clarifying the meaning of these recommendations. While the challenges underlined by the European Commission still lie ahead, Belgium’s ownership of the recommendations for reforms has been low. Not only do coordination processes remain bureaucratic and technocratic, but many of the recommendations’ concerns – external competitiveness, social security reforms, market reforms – are not traditionally defended by the political left in Belgium. The controversy surrounding the recommendations for national structural reforms owes much to their supply-side orientation, which contrasts with the inability of the EU to pursue demand-side policies. But despite this disequilibrium, the recommendations highlight relevant issues that ought to be addressed, and indicate where scope for national debate exists.

Con la estabilidad económica no se juega = With economic stability one does not play. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 11, June 2014

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Wage inequality in Germany – What role does global trade play? Policy Brief #2015/03

Wage inequality in Germany has increased significantly since the mid-1990s. The intensification of international trade relations is a frequently cited cause for this issue. However, an empirical study revealed that global trade can only directly explain around 15 percent of the increase in wage inequality in Germany. Primarily, the growing heterogeneity among companies in Germany plays a greater role – especially within industries. The decline in collective bargaining is the primary company-specific driver of wage inequality. Nevertheless, protectionist measures would not be effective for achieving greater wage equality.