Turkey votes: Part I - The storm before the election. EPC Commentary, 26 March 2014

At an election rally on 20 March 2014, Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, declared he wanted to “root out Twitter, no matter what the international community thought”. A few hours later Twitter was shut down. The decision backfired. Turkey’s some 12 million Twitter users immediately found ways to circumnavigate the ban; it highlighted the increasingly authoritarian trend of Erdoğan; and it brought immediate condemnation from numerous foreign leaders. The move has been viewed by many Turks as part of an operation to cover up a corruption probe that has consumed Turkey since 17 December, before key local elections on 30 March. The elections, which will be followed by Presidential election in August and political ones expected in 2015, have become a referendum on Erdoğan’s popularity, and are set to shape Turkey’s political landscape. A lot is at stake as a big win for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) may not only be used by Erdoğan to justify his response to the corruption scandal but also risks consolidating his increasingly authoritarian style of governance.

A Critique of Kosovo’s Internationalized Constitutional Court. EDAP 2014/02

The quality and the sustainability of the democratic institutions established in post-independence Kosovo under the guidance of the international community depend to a large extent on the performance of its constitutional court. The considerable international investment in that court reflects this assessment. One of the reasons why Kosovo’s international supervision has recently been terminated is that such court has been deemed to be functioning well. But its performance has not yet adequately been scrutinized. This essay reviews its most significant judgments, including decisions that deposed a president, annulled a presidential election, prevented a general election, and abolished the inviolability of parliament. The analysis of the reasons and effects of such rulings leads to the conclusion that the court gravely lacks independence and is subject to heavy political interference, which also the international judges do not seem immune from. The performance of the court is both a manifestation and a cause of Kosovo’s acute governance problems, which its international supervision has failed to remedy. The international community’s approach towards the court is also an illustration of the reasons why statebuilding in Kosovo led to unsatisfactory results, despite unprecedented investment.

The parliamentary elections in Ukraine: new hope? EPC Policy Brief, 21 October 2014

Ukraine’s parliamentary elections on 26 October 2014 seem set to be the most important and most challenging the country has ever held. For the first time in Ukraine’s history, the presidential election of Petro Poroshenko in May gave many Ukrainians new hope. His victory seemed to unite the country, being the first president to have won in most of the regions despite the ongoing conflict in the East. However, with many corrupt elites still in power, reforms have become hostage to vested interests and in-fighting which has raised fears of ‘business as usual’. This has made this election campaign set against a backdrop of serious challenges dominating the agenda for the foreseeable future. In this policy brief, Amanda Paul and Svitlana Kobzar explore the status of the reform agenda needed for a stable and democratic Ukraine as well as the challenges in the run up to the election including corruption, energy and EU relations.

Big business in Belarus - its genesis, conditions and prospects. OSW Commentary No. 113, 2013-09-09

Over the past ten to twenty years, Belarus has seen a steep rise in the number of local dollar millionaires. This has somewhat undermined the myth of an egalitarian model of society promoted through the Belarusian state propaganda. There is a small group of businessmen among the top earners who, in exchange for their political loyalty and their consent to share profits with those in power, have enjoyed a number of privileges that allow them to safely conduct business in an environment typically hostile to private enterprise. The favourable conditions under which they are operating have enabled them not only to accumulate substantial capital, but also to invest it abroad. However, since such businesses are seen as providing a financial safety net for the regime, in 2011 and 2012 some of their directors received an EU travel ban, while their companies were subjected to economic sanctions by Brussels. At the same time, fearing that Belarus’s big business could become powerful enough to influence the country’s political scene (as has been the case in Russia and Ukraine), Alexander Lukashenka has actively prevented such players from becoming too independent. Consequently, Belarus has so far not developed its own elite class of oligarchs who would be able to actively influence government policy. The current informal agreement between the government in Minsk and big business has proved stable and is unlikely to change in the near future. Nonetheless, a reordering of state power giving Belarus’s big business significant political influence would be possible should Mr Lukashenka lose power in the next presidential election.

Under the veneer of decentralisation. Ukraine's modernisation efforts stall due to lack of local government reform. OSW Commentary No. 102, 2013-02-12

President Viktor Yanukovych and his Party of Regions have been repeating the pledge to decentralise power in Ukraine and to give local government a greater decision-making role ever since the party appeared on the Ukrainian political scene. The implementation of this reform is crucial both for the economic recovery of Ukraine’s regions and the overall modernisation efforts of the Ukrainian state. At present relations between central government and the regions are regulated by Soviet-era legislation that fails to address the modern-day challenges facing Ukraine. The political elite in the country, including the opposition, appear to have reached consensus on the importance of the decentralisation reform. The first attempts to implement changes in this area were made in the late 1990s, followed by a comprehensive reform programme developed between 2007 and 2009 by Yulia Tymoshenko’s government. In 2012, the Constitutional Assembly under the President of Ukraine appointed a team of experts who drafted a document detailing the reform of local government and the territorial organisation of power1. The document envisages the implementation of what effectively are two major reforms: (1) an administrative-territorial reform, which would help consolidate the fragmented administrative structure, creating larger and more economically self-sufficient administrative units, and (2) local government reform, focusing on creating clearly defined powers for local authorities with a view to securing government funding for specific tasks delegated from central government. Nonetheless, despite these measures, and in spite of the rhetoric coming from President Yanukovych and other members of the Party of Regions, it seems unlikely that the reform will be implemented in the foreseeable future. A series of concrete political decisions taken by the president over the past three years indicate that Yanukovych has not abandoned his plan to build a highly centralised political system. This in turn limits the capacity to govern of local authorities and further restricts the sources of funding for Ukraine’s regions. This apparent resistance to change stems from the fact that by implementing the proposed reforms, the president and his political allies would be forced to relinquish much of their control over the political processes taking place in the country and would have to free up the distribution of budgetary resources between Kyiv and the regions. The implementation of the reform within the specified timeframe (i.e. by 2015) is also unlikely due to the upcoming presidential election and the deteriorating economic situation in Ukraine. Without a comprehensive reform of local government, however, Ukraine will be unable to undertake effective modernisation measures, which are key for the socio-economic development of the country’s regions.

Belarus 2006. OSW Report, January 2007

The presidential election of 19 March 2006, which Alyaksandr Lukashenka won, played an important role in developing the dictatorial political regime in Belarus. In order to ensure Lukashenka's victory, the authorities employed repressive and undemocratic methods, which since then have become permanent elements of the political system in Belarus. They included legal and administrative measures to limit the citizens' freedom, arbitrary ways of applying these measures, actions by the state security institutions intended to intimidate the public, a large-scale state propaganda campaign, and restrictions on civil liberties and freedom of speech. The presidential election strengthened Alyaksandr Lukashenka's political position, as the president extended his rule by another five years to 2011. It also reinforced the repression apparatus, consolidated the ruling group and ensured that the democrats remained marginalised. This has ensured the stability of the Belarusian regime and preserved the country's specific political and economic system.This report aims to present the situation in Belarus since the presidential election in March 2006. Part I, devoted to the internal situation, is a description of the internal political scene, i.e. the ruling camp and the opposition. It also includes a section on the prevailing moods in Belarusian society. Another section presents the economic situation in Belarus and the government's economic policy.Part II examines the foreign relations of Belarus, and consists of two sections: the first describes the Belarusian government's relations with Russia, its single most important foreign partner, and the second its relations with Western countries, i.e. the EU member states and NATO countries. Finally, the last part contains predictions of future developments in Belarus.

From stabilisation to stagnation. Viktor Yanukovych's reforms. OSW Point of View Number 32, March 2013

After winning the 2010 presidential election, Viktor Yanukovych and his government developed an ambitious and comprehensive programme of reforms across key areas of social and political life. The return to a presidential system of government created the ideal conditions for the introduction of deep reforms: it allowed Viktor Yanukovych to consolidate more power than any other Ukrainian president before him.The authorities launched an overhaul of the tax and the pension systems, and of the Ukrainian gas sector. Kyiv also completed its negotiations on an Association Agreement with the EU and on a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area. However, the reformist zeal of Ukraine’s political elite progressively diminished as the parliamentary election approached, the economy slowed down, and the polls showed a decline in support for the ruling Party of Regions. Many of the reforms still remain in the planning stages, and in many areas the government has moved backwards. Viktor Yanukovych has proved unable to make systemic changes, and has increasingly used his powers to crush political opposition in Ukraine. The outcome of the latest parliamentary elections prevents the formation of a stable parliamentary majority, which in turn, removes any chance of reform before the 2015 presidential ballot.

The future of the Franco-German tandem. OSW Commentary No. 83, 2012-07-11

Following the victories of François Hollande in the presidential election and the Socialist Party in the parliamentary election, the existing model of relations between Germany and France as symbolised by the Merkel-Sarkozy duo is undergoing a transformation. Along with the defeat for Sarkozy, who had fostered close cooperation with the German Chancellor, we are witnessing a change in the German-French modus operandi, which was based on making confidential agreements concerning the anti-crisis measures in the eurozone and then presenting ready-made solutions to other EU members (as in the case of the successive versions of the document currently known as the fiscal pact). However, a conflict in bilateral relations, which would mean a total breakdown of the Franco-German engine, is rather unlikely. In fact, François Hollande’s proposals have diminished the appearance of the two states’ exceptional compatibility, and have restored the specific relationship affected by the natural rivalry between two states, who because of their economies’ different orientation have divergent interests. Nevertheless, both sides are destined to reach a compromise, as neither can attain its goals in the face of the other’s opposition. In the long term, Hollande is likely to maintain a common front with Germany in fighting the crisis, while at the same time trying (with his allies from the south of the EU) to limit Berlin’s political and economic superiority.

The Orange Revolution in Ukraine: An attempt to understand the reasons. OSW Study 18/2005

The Ukrainian society in the run-up to the 2004 presidential election was in a state which political science literature characterises as an almost "ideal" condition for an outbreak of social unrest. Growing expectations, both economic and political, seemed vain due to mounting impediments. The victory of Viktor Yanukovych was perceived by many opinion-makers as a nail in the coffin of such aspirations.

The oligarchic democracy: The influence of business groups on Ukrainian politics. OSW Study 42/2012

The Ukrainian oligarchic system, which developed into its ultimate shape during Leonid Kuchma’s second presidency, turned out to be very durable. The nature of close relations between the government and the oligarchs has not undergone any major changes either as a consequence of the Orange Revolution or following Victor Yanukovych’s victory in the presidential election of 2010. Although reshuffles have taken place inside the political and business elites, nothing seems to be able to change this system, at least in the medium term. This text is aimed at presenting the network of connections existing between big business and politics in Ukraine and at pointing to the key oligarchic groups and the political forces they support. A definite majority of papers concerning contemporary Ukrainian politics as a rule disregard or deal with this subject very superficially, while it is impossible to understand modern Ukraine without understanding a number of dependencies existing between the political and business elites there.

A game played according to Lukashenka’s rules: the political opposition in Belarus. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 176, 08.07.2015

The Belarusian opposition is currently experiencing its deepest crisis since Alyaksandr Lukashenka took power in 1994. Following many months of negotiations, opposition leaders failed to select a joint candidate for the presidential election scheduled for 11th October. The failure of this latest round of talks has proven that not only is the opposition unlikely to threaten Lukashenka’s rule; it will not even be able to demonstrate to society that it could provide a genuine alternative to the present government.