Factor Markets in Applied Equilibrium Models: The current state and planned extensions towards an improved presentation of factor markets in agriculture. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 23, February 2012

This paper describes how factor markets are presented in applied equilibrium models and how we plan to improve and to extend the presentation of factor markets in two specific models: MAGNET and ESIM. We do not argue that partial equilibrium models should become more ‘general’ in the sense of integrating all factor markets, but that the shift of agricultural income policies to decoupled payments linked to land in the EU necessitates the inclusion of land markets in policy-relevant modelling tools. To this end, this paper outlines options to integrate land markets in partial equilibrium models. A special feature of general equilibrium models is the inclusion of fully integrated factor markets in the system of equations to describe the functionality of a single country or a group of countries. Thus, this paper focuses on the implementation and improved representation of agricultural factor markets (land, labour and capital) in computable general equilibrium (CGE) models. This paper outlines the presentation of factor markets with an overview of currently applied CGE models and describes selected options to improve and extend the current factor market modelling in the MAGNET model, which also uses the results and empirical findings of our partners in this FP project.

Eurodéputé: «Seconde chance» ou «Tremplin» – Comparaisons des trajectoires politiques de candidats PSE et PPE aux élections européennes de 2014 en France et en Suède. = MEP: "Second Chance" or "Jump" - comparisons of PSE candidates and political trajectories EPP in European elections 2014 in France and Sweden. Bruges Political Research Paper No. 40, February 2015

Le mandat d’eurodéputé est conçu différemment dans chaque état membre. Cet article teste la validité des cultures politiques inclusive et exclusive, créées pour l’analyse des sélections des candidats français et suédois et leur conception du mandat européen. Leur sélection demeure un monopole partisan national où l’adhésion à un parti et la professionnalisation politique priment. La distinction apparait dans le degré d’ouverture de la sélection et la conception de la fonction d’eurodéputé et du Parlement européen. Les conclusions valident l’approche créée, montrant un déplacement du curseur le long des continuums formés par les cultures inclusive et exclusive. La France, «exclusive», reste centrée sur Paris et des élections ayant des conséquences sur le pouvoir exécutif. La Suède est plus inclusive tant dans les profils des candidats que dans les processus qui les intègrent aux listes et dans la façon de concevoir le rôle des MEP et du Parlement européen. Cet article se fonde sur un mémoire de Master: E. Cazenave, Eurodéputé: «Seconde chance» ou «Tremplin»? Comparaison des trajectoires politiques de candidats PPE et PSE aux élections européennes de 2014 en France et en Suède, Bruges, Collège d’Europe, 2014

In sickness and in health: protecting and supporting public investment in Europe. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2014/02, February 2014

The long-term decline in gross public investment in European Union countries mirrors the trend in other advanced economies, but recent developments have been different: public investment has increased elsewhere, but in the EU it has declined and even collapsed in the most vulnerable countries, exaggerating the output fall. The provisions in the EU fiscal framework to support public investment are very weak.The recently inserted ‘investment clause’ is almost no help. In the short term, exclusion of national co-funding of EU-supported investments from the fiscal indicators considered in the Stability and Growth Pact would be sensible. In the medium term, the EU fiscal framework should be extended with an asymmetric ‘golden rule’ to further protect public investment in bad times, while limiting adverse incentives in good times. During a downturn, a European investment programme is needed and the European Semester should encourage greater investment by member states with healthy public finances and low public investment rates. Reform and harmonisation of budgeting, accounting, transparency and project assessment is also needed to improve the quality of public investment.

In a state of necessity. How has Orban changed Hungary. OSW Point of View Number 41, April 2014

Viktor Orban’s sweeping victory in the 2010 election ensured his party, Fidesz, a constitutional two-thirds majority in parliament. The party took over the rule of the country from the discredited political left when Hungary was plunged in political and economic crisis. Claiming that the circumstances were unusual and that it had a strong electoral mandate, Fidesz introduced radical changes in the country and thus challenged the previous economic and political order. These changes have led to an unprecedented concentration of power and provoked a discussion on the limits of democracy and the rule of law in the European Union. The state’s economic role has strengthened. The Orban government has been unable to overcome economic stagnation but it has managed to stabilise Hungary’s budget situation, which needs to deal with the high debt. Hungary’s relations with most partners in the EU and NATO have cooled due to controversial moves made by its government. As regards foreign policy and economic co-operation, Orban has granted high priority to the ‘Eastern opening’, where Russia has assumed the leading role.

In Pursuit of Peace, Prosperity and Power – What ASEAN and EU can learn from each other? EU Centre Singapore Policy Brief No. 7, May 2014

The EU and ASEAN are often compared and seen as relatively successful regional organisations in their respective regions. Yet of late, both regional organisations are under intense scrutiny as they confront challenges posed by the financial crisis and rising geopolitical tensions. Their inability to respond effectively to these challenges has brought about a chorus of criticisms. Noting the current tensions face by both the EU and ASEAN in their respective regions, one could not help but wonder how and if they would be able to deal with the increasing complex security landscape because of a weakened US, and the rise of the rest. This article will compare and contrast the approaches taken by the EU and ASEAN thus far in trying to build peace and prosperity, and how they manage the demands of power politics to distill some lessons on what they can learn from each other in order to navigate an increasingly paradoxical world of economic interdependence but political fragmentation.

Relative direct democratic legitimacy. CEPS Commentary, 26 June 2014

As the European Council convenes today and tomorrow (June 26-27th) to confirm Jean-Claude Juncker as the candidate for President of the European Commission, CEPS Director Daniel Gros shows in this Commentary that the Council should de facto also be considered more a 'mini parliament' than an assembly of states and that the European Parliament cannot claim the monopoly on democratic legitimacy. For a practical application of the principles Gros presents in this commentary, see his column in Project Syndicate, 17 June 2014, in which he rejects the view that Jean-Claude Juncker has a democratic mandate to lead the European Parliament (www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/daniel-gros-rejects-the-view-that-j...

Could an independent Scotland join the European Union? EPC Policy Brief, 28 May, 2014

The people of Scotland vote on 18 September 2014 in a referendum on the question "Should Scotland be an independent country?" The Scottish Government aims, if the result is 'yes', for Scotland to become independent in March 2016 and to join the main international organisations including the European Union. Would that be possible? How could Scotland join the EU? What is the link between Scotland's referendum on independence and a British referendum on EU membership?

The eastern ‘partnership’ of gas. Gazprom and CNPC strike a deal on gas supplies to China. OSW COMMENTARY No. 139, 2014-06-16

The CEOs of Gazprom and China’s CNPC signed a contract concerning Russian gas supplies to China on 21 May 2014 in Shanghai. The contract had been under negotiation for many years and was signed in the presence of the two countries’ presidents. Under this 30-year deal, ultimately 38 billion m3 of natural gas will be exported annually from eastern Siberian fields (Chayandinskoye and Kovyktinskoye) via the Power of Siberia pipeline planned for construction in 2015–2019. The lengthy negotiation process (initial talks regarding this issue began back in the 1990s), the circumstances surrounding the signing of the contract (it was signed only on the second day of Vladimir Putin’s visit to Shanghai, and the Russian president’s personal engagement in the final phase of the talks turned out to be a key element) and information concerning the provisions of the contract (the clause determining the contract price has not been revealed) all indicate that the terms of the compromise are more favourable for China than for Russia. This contract is at present important to Russia mainly for political reasons (it will use the future diversification of gas export routes as an instrument in negotiations with the EU). However, the impact of this instrument seems to be limited since supplies cannot be redirected from Europe to Asia. It is unclear whether the contract will bring the anticipated long-term economic benefits to Gazprom. The gas price is likely to remain at a level of between US$350 and US$390 per 1000 m3. Given the high costs of gas field operation and production and transport infrastructure development, this may mean that supplies will be carried out at the margin of profitability. The Shanghai contract does not conclude the negotiation process since a legally binding agreement on gas pipeline construction has not been signed and not all of the financial aspects of the project have been agreed upon as yet (such as the issue of possible Chinese prepayments for gas supplies).

Gibt es eine politische Philosophie der Europäischen Union? = Is there a political philosophy of the European Union?. ZEI Discussion Paper C223, 2014

In a theoretical context, the European Union is generally interpreted through the prism of integration theories, which in turn reflect the ever changing empirical reality of the integration process. ZEI Director Ludger Kühnhardt asks if and to what extent the process of European integration has begun to generate a specific political philosophy which uses the EU - and not the classical notion of the state – as the starting and reference point for its reasoning. Kühnhardt examines examples – such as the European notion of civil rights and the notion of the Union itself, but also critical categories such as euroskepticism – which indicate that the EU itself is beginning to be the starting point and frame of reference for a reflection on the common good. For now, a political philosophy in the context of the European Union exists only in an embryonic stage, but the topic may generate intellectual insights through further and deeper research.

The devil is in the details. Information warfare in the light of Russia's military doctrine. OSW Point of View 50, May 2015

By highlighting informational threats and giving them a military dimension, the authors of the Russian Federation's military doctrine have outlined the concept of information warfare. It is a kind of combat conducted by both conventional and indirect methods, open and concealed, using military and civilian structures. It has two dimensions: broader ("non-nuclear containment", i.e. combat waged on various levels - political, economic, diplomatic, humanitarian, military) and narrower (as an element supporting of action). An analysis of these issues enables us to identify several rising trends over the period 2000-2014 in Russian security policy. These boil down to a blurring of the boundaries between internal and external threats, introducing non-military methods and organisational structures to armed combat, and conferring an ideological character on this combat. This leads to a blurring of the contours of inter-state conflicts, which allows Russia to take part in armed conflicts in which it is not officially a party.

EEAS 2.0: Recommendations for the amendment of Council Decision 2010/427/EU on the European External Action Service. CEPS Special Report No. 78, 13 November 2013

This Special Report offers recommendations for the amendment of the Council Decision 2010/427/EU establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service. Its purpose is to contribute, in practical legal terms, to the ongoing review of the Decision in 2013, as well as to the possible discussion on its revision that may take place in 2014. In particular, it sheds light on possible adjustments in the application of the Decision ‘à droit constant’, but also suggests potential alteration of its formulation.