Talking with the “pouvoir constituant” in times of constitutional reform: The European Court of Justice on Private Applicants’ Access to Justice. Research Paper in Law 3/2003

[From the Introduction]. European lawyers, at least those dealing predominantly with institutional matters, are living particularly interesting times since the setting-up of the “European Convention on the Future of Europe” in December 2001.1 As the Convention’s mandate, spelled out in rather broad terms in the European Council’s declaration of Laeken,2 is potentially unlimited, and as the future constitution of the European Union (EU) will be ultimately adopted by the subsequent Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), there appears to be a great possibility to clarify, to simplify and also to reform many of the more controversial elements in the European legal construction. The present debate on the future of the European constitution also highlights the relationship between the pouvoir constituant3 and the European Courts, the Court of Justice (ECJ) and its Court of First Instance (CFI), who have to interpret the basic rules and principles of the EU.4 In that light, the present article will focus on a classic theme of the Court’s case law: the relationship between judges and pouvoir constituant. In the EU, this relationship has traditionally been marked by the ECJ’s role as driving force in the “constitutionalisation” of the EC Treaties – which has, to a large extent, been accepted and even codified by the Member States in subsequent treaty revisions. However, since 1994, the ECJ appears to be more reluctant to act as a “law-maker.”5 The recent judgment in Unión de Pequeños Agricultores (UPA)6 – an important decision by which the ECJ refused to liberalize individuals’ access to the Community Courts – is also interesting in this context. UPA may be seen as another proof of judicial restraint - or even as indicator of the beginning of a new phase in the “constitutional dialogue” between the ECJ and the “Masters of the Treaties.”

Le Parlement européen et les actes délégués: De la conquête d’un pouvoir à son exercice = The European Parliament and the delegated acts: From the conquest of power to its exercise. Brugges Political Research Paper No. 34, February 2014

Résumé. Le traité de Lisbonne a procédé à une importante réforme de la comitologie, en établissant deux catégories d’instruments: les actes d’exécution et les actes délégués. Pour ces derniers, le Parlement européen a obtenu des pouvoirs importants et est pour la première fois sur un strict pied d’égalité avec le Conseil dans le système exécutif. En vertu d’une approche institutionnaliste rationnelle, cet article analyse comment le Parlement, à l’origine exclu du système, est parvenu à acquérir les pouvoirs qui sont formellement les siens aujourd’hui. Ensuite, l’action du Parlement face à ses nouveaux pouvoirs dans le cadre des actes délégués est abordée. Il s’agit d’étudier comment le Parlement défend ses prérogatives dans les relations interinstitutionnelles et agit après l’acquisition de nouvelles prérogatives. Cette analyse permet plus globalement d’aborder des aspects essentiels du fonctionnement du Parlement européen, de l’Union européenne ainsi que ses dynamiques (inter)institutionnelles.