Stigmatisation of EU mobile citizens: a ticking time bomb for the European project. EPC Commentary, 24 January 2014

The 2013 European Year of Citizens was profoundly marked by escalating attacks against one of the EU’s major achievement for EU citizens: freedom of movement. In April 2013, Home Affairs Ministers from Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK were party to a letter claiming that “a significant number of new immigrants draw social assistance in the host countries, frequently without genuine entitlement, burdening host societies’ social welfare systems”. This letter laid the groundwork for a “battle plan”, presented by David Cameron in November, which aimed to make the free movement of persons “less free” and put forward the idea of capping “EU migration”. Furthermore, in December, the German conservative Christian Social Union (CSU) took up a similar petty political discourse. After the end of the transitional period for Romania and Bulgaria on 1 January 2014, the debate continues with Chuka Umunna (British Labour Party) proposing to restrict the freedom of movement to highly skilled EU citizens and to citizens in possession of a firm job offer. Alongside this, the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel announced the formation of a committee to investigate “poverty migration” in Germany. This wave of resentment has been more recently followed by the UK Prime Minister David Cameron, expressing his intention to re-negotiate EU law in order to be able to withdraw child benefits from EU citizens working in the UK, citing Polish citizens working in the UK as an example. Seeing this as a stigmatisation of the Polish population, the Polish foreign minister, Radosław Sikorski, qualified Cameron’s discourse as “unacceptable”. The debate over limiting freedom of movement has continuously escalated and reached a worrying level. With the EP elections approaching in May 2014, this debate is likely to become worse.

The sense and nonsense of Eurozone level Democracy. Egmont Paper No. 70, October 2014

The democratic functioning of the EU is frequently called into question. Increasingly, the focus of this criticism is the perceived lack of legitimacy in eurozone policymaking. The eurozone has gained a firmer grip on national policymaking in recent years, but has not adapted its democratic structure to reflect this. To tackle this problem, European and national policymakers have committed to improving the eurozone’s legitimacy and accountability. One of the rare concrete proposals by policymakers is the institution of parliamentary control that deals specifically with eurozone matters. This Egmont Paper examines whether it would be beneficial to have eurozone level democracy. This is defined as parliamentary scrutiny of, by and for the eurozone. It would deal with issues that solely concern the eurozone, and decisions would be made solely by parliamentarians from the eurozone.

The New European Commission Presidency and the Advent of European Democracy. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 17, August 2014

On June 15, 2014, Jean-Claude Juncker, the lead candidate of the European People’s Party, was elected President of the European Commission, with the support of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, and some of the European Socialists and Greens. Amid unprecedented Euroscepticism, the media and many pundits predicted a record-low voter turnout and record-high results for Europhobic parties. The aforementioned parties then decided that the political outcome of these 2014 European elections would also be unprecedented. For the first time in EU history, the European political parties agreed to nominate candidates to chair the institution, which they justified by putting forward Article 17 of the Lisbon Treaty. The European Parliament has often characteristically used political discourse - the logos, to influence the EU’s institutional framework, even though it entails grappling with Member States. It took the form of reports and resolutions, like the official use of the phrase “European Parliament” in 1962, direct universal suffrage elections in 1975 and a European Union in 1984. Nominating contenders to chair the European Commission is no exception. It requires a specific political discourse whose origins can be traced back to the early years of the European Parliament, when it was still the “Common Assembly”. This political discourse is one of the elements thanks to which the European Parliament acquired visibility and new prerogatives, in pursuit of its legitimacy. However, the executive branch in all member states is not intent on yielding such prerogatives to the European Parliament. As a matter of fact, the European Parliament has often ended up strengthening the heads of state and governments, since MEPs are forced to resort to self-discipline. The symbolic significance of its logos and, consequently, its own politicisation as a source of legitimacy, is thus undermined. For instance, in 2014, Jean-Claude Juncker’s election actually strengthened German Chancellor Angela Merkel. First she questioned the fact that the candidate whose party holds the parliamentary majority after the election should be appointed President of the Commission. Then she seemed strongly intent on democratising the Union, when she confronted David Cameron, who openly opposed Juncker, believed to be too federalist and old-fashioned a candidate. By doing so, she eventually reduced the symbolic dimension of the European Parliament’s initiative, and Juncker’s election. She also unquestionably embodied EU leadership. This paper aims at analysing Juncker’s election to the Presidency of the European Commission, as well as other questions it raises. In the first part, I lay out some thoughts about the sociohistorical context of voting in European elections in order to make the readers understand why the European Parliament should be bolder. Secondly, I try to explain how the European Parliament has used the logos as a weapon to grapple with member states for more power, as was the case during the 2014 European elections. Last but not least, I seek to show how Angela Merkel got hold of that weapon and took advantage of it, thus proving that despite MEPs’ best efforts, Juncker’s task will be all the more complicated as he was not the consensual candidate of all the governments.

How European Integration Impacts on National Legislatures: The Europeanization of The German Bundestag. CES Germany and Europe Working Papers, No. 06.2, 2006

In looking at the Europeanization of the German Bundestag, the paper brings together two different debates: the well-established debate on the democratic legitimacy of the European Union sees national Parliaments as guarantor of one branch of a "dual" legitimacy. The more recent debate on "Europeanization" addresses the impacts that European integration has had on its Member States. Analyzing the Europeanization of the German Bundestag, the paper identifies and analyzes three dimensions: legislative Europeanization – the extent to which legislative decision making by the German Bundestag has been influenced by European stipulations over the last twenty years; institutional Europeanization – how the Bundestag as an institution reacted to this loss of function by establishing institutional and procedural provisions for influencing the government's Euro-politics; and strategic Europeanization – the ways in which individual MPs started more recently to develop euro-political strategies that go beyond controlling the national government. The paper shows that the Bundestag only hesitantly reacted to the increasing loss of functions through legislative Europeanization by establishing effective institutional and procedural provisions for controlling the government's Euro-political activities. What is more, the establishment of institutions does not guarantee their effective use. All in all, Euro- politics continues to remain the activity of few MPs. These few, however, have more recently started to europeanize their strategies. The empirical findings support the claim that the traditional concept of chains of legitimacy is inadequate, both in conceptual and in empirical terms. With regard to the democ- ratic legitimacy of EU governance, this indicates that, apart from major reform projects, especially with regard to everyday legislation, not too great a burden should be placed on national Parliaments.

How can we enhance our security without damaging our liberty? For a Progressive and European Rehabilitation of Sovereignty. European Policy Brief No. 41, January 2016

How can we reinforce internal security without destroying basic freedoms? This dilemma will become increasingly topical in the context of rising terrorist threats and in view of some of the responses already put in place at the national level. Many observers have pointed out the threat that these measures pose to individual freedom. But few have highlighted their relative inefficiency. Indeed, if the right to security is one of the founding reasons for political government and one of its main sources of legitimacy, can states still guarantee this basic right? This article examines this dilemma and focuses more specifically on its implications for the notion and practice of sovereignty. It also sketches a strong, but nuanced, rescue of sovereignty at the European level in order to assure individual security while, at the same time, protecting our freedoms.

What do the Maidan protests tell us about Ukraine? Diagnosis and prospects for Ukrainian politics. OSW Commentary No. 125, 22.01.2014

The outbreak of the protests in the Maidan in Kyiv, and also periodically in other Ukrainian cities, has come as a surprise to both the government and the opposition. These rallies have now been ongoing for several weeks and their most striking feature is their focus on citizenship and their apolitical nature and, by extension, a clear attempt to dissociate the protests from Ukraine’s political opposition. Neither Batkivshchyna, UDAR nor Svoboda have managed to take over full control of the demonstrations. On the one hand, this has been linked to the fact that the protesters have little confidence in opposition politicians and, on the other hand, to disputes over a joint strategy and to rivalry between the three parties. As a result, the citizen-led movement has managed to retain its independence from any political actors. As a consequence of the radicalisation and escalation of the protests following 19 January, the political opposition has lost a significant proportion of the control it had been in possession of until then. Maidan should also be seen as the first clear manifestation of a new generation of Ukrainians – raised in an independent Ukraine, well-educated and familiar with new social media, but nonetheless seeking to ground themselves in national tradition. After the initial shock and a series of failed attempts to quell the protests, the government has seemingly opted to wait out the unrest. At the same time, however, it has been creating administrative obstacles for both the political and the civil opposition, restricting their access to the media and severely limiting the legal possibility to organise demonstrations.

Strengthening the euro area. CHALLENGE EUROPE Issue 22. Challenges and new beginnings: Priorities for the EU's new leadership, September 2014

Since 2007, a series of acute crises have threatened the very existence of the euro area. The financial crisis which spilled into the currency union in 2007 was followed by an unexpectedly strong downturn of the real economy. As of 2010, the euro area was confronted with a severe sovereign debt and banking crisis. Despite these troublesome developments, the euro area has proven to have a considerable degree of resilience. In each phase, governance weaknesses were revealed – and national governments together with the EU institutions have designed an impressive series of policy responses in crisis management and institutional innovation. The euro area today is completed by a banking union with a Single Supervisory and a Single Resolution Mechanism. National budgetary and economic policies are more closely overseen and coordinated. With the European Stability Mechanism, the euro area now has a permanent tool in place to manage sovereign liquidity crises and instabilities in the banking sector. Most importantly, the euro area's only true federal institution, the European Central Bank (ECB), has become its most effective crisis manager: with the announcement of its Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme, the ECB finally managed to calm the self fulfilling crisis in 2012. Meanwhile, the announcement of credit easing and quasi-quantitative easing in September 2014 is a move towards reducing financial fragmentation and countering deflation. The euro area in 2014 is hence a lot different from the one in 2007. And yet, further challenges need to be overcome. Prevailing stagnation, fragmentation and problems of legitimacy require a rethink of policies and further governance reform.

Coalitions, Power and Institutional Change in Global Patent Politics. IES WORKING PAPER 2/2013

With the 1995 Agreement on Trade - related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), a centralised rule - system for the international governance of patents was put in place under the general framework of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Since then, the number of patent – related institutions has increased monotonically on the multilateral, plurilateral and bilateral levels. I will explain this case of institutional change by focusing on the norm – setting activities of both industrialised and developing countries, arguing that both groups constitute internally highly cohesive coalitions in global patent politics, while institutional change occurs when both coalitions engage in those negotiating settings in which they enjoy a comparative advantage over the other coalition. Specifically, I make the point that industrialised countries’ norm – setting activities take place on the plurilateral and bilateral level, where economic factors can be effectively translated into political outcomes while simultaneously avoiding unacceptably high legitimacy costs; whereas developing countries, on the other hand, use various multilateral United Nations (UN) forums where their claims possess a high degree of legitimacy, but cannot translate into effective political outcomes. The paper concludes with some remarks on how this case yields new insights into ongoing debates in institutionalist International Relations (IR), as pertaining to present discussions on “regime complexity”.

What strategy for a genuine Single Market? CEPS Special Report No. 126/January 2016

This strategy paper focuses on making the most of the EU single market. The EU should pursue a genuine single market, and treat it as a common asset of all its citizens, economic operators and member states. The economic case to be made on behalf of the genuine single market is powerful and even more so due to the findings of recent empirical economic research. However, only the genuine single market can realise the expectations of such large gains. Weak, ‘feasible’ action plans cannot! The strategy is based, first of all, on a clear design of the genuine single market and subsequently concentrates on ‘what it takes’. Ten types of actions sum up ‘what it takes’: five at the EU level, four at the EU-member state interface, and finally, the realisation of legitimacy and acceptance.