Investment behaviour of EU arable crop farms in selected EU countries and the impact of policy reforms. Factor Markets Working Document No. 42, May 2013

This deliverable provides a comparative analysis, among selected EU member states, of the investment demand of a sample of specialised field crop farms for farm buildings, machinery and equipment as determined by different types and levels of Common Agricultural Policy support. It allows for the existence of uncertainty in the price of output farmers receive and for both long- and short-run determinants of investment levels, as well as for the presence of irregularities in the cost adjustment function due to the existence of threshold-type behaviours. The empirical estimation reveals that three investment regimes are consistently identified in Germany and Hungary, across asset and support types, and in France for machinery and equipment. More traditional disinvestment-investment type behaviours characterise investment in farm building in France and the UK, across support types, and Italy for both asset classes under coupled payments. The long-run dynamic adjustment of capital stocks is consistently and significantly estimated to be towards a – mostly non-stationary – lower level of capitalisation of the farm analysed. By contrast, the expected largely positive short-run effects of an increase in output prices are often not significant. The effect of CAP support on both types of investment is positive, although seldom significant, while the proxy for uncertainty employed fails to be significant yet, in most cases, has the expected effect of reducing the investment levels.

Social Policy Reforms in the EU: A Cross-national Comparison. Social Inclusion Monitor Europe (SIM) – Reform Barometer. Pilot Study

European countries are losing momentum for social policy reforms: The results of the SIM Europe Index report on social justice, published in September 2014, suggested a growing social divide among the member states. Assessing six policy areas of social inclusion, the data revealed the deteriorating social situation since 2009 across the EU. The report stressed, in particular, the difficulties southern EU member states were having in coping with the effects of the financial and economic crisis. This second report, the SIM Europe Reform Barometer, takes up these results and delivers two tasks: to impartially assess the extent of problem awareness of governments, and to ask whether they have enacted concrete social policy initiatives to tackle these challenges and to counterbalance the growing divide. Southern European member states, especially, did not or have not been able to pursue reforms to limit their withering levels of a socially inclusive society. In almost all key dimensions of social inclusion, those member states most affected by the implications of the protracted economic and fiscal crisis in the EU have been least able to confine the ongoing ‘internal devaluation’ in terms of socially balanced governmental activity. By contrast, some northern member states have legislated acts which seem well-suited to at least stabilise or even increase their level of social inclusion.

The European Economic Community's Third Enlargement. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 12 No. 6, June 2012

The European Economic Community's third enlargement round brought up a series of tensions between member states, which would require a great amount of time and effort to be solved. Bigger issues, such as the British contribution, the community budget and the Common Agriculture Policy reforms, are going to be at the centre of EEC's agenda in the 1970-80's, and ultimately, British and French national interests on these matters will prevail. The basic argument of this article is that member states used the prospect of enlargement to achieve particular policy goals, such as improvements in decisionmaking procedures and budget reform, and only after those accomplishments, member states agreed on concluding the third enlargement.

Reshaping politics of the left and centre in Greece after the 2014 EP election. EPIN Commentary No. 21/10 September 2014

The political landscape in Greece is confused and volatile at the moment; the right and extreme- right-wing parties are accorded a disproportionately large place in political debate, while the radical left-wing SYRIZA party is attempting to maintain a ‘leftist’ profile and demonstrate its capacity to govern through a strategy of image normalisation. These tensions make it very difficult for the Greek government to stick to the EU’s tough reform agenda. The governing coalition is trying to conceal the social effects of implementing structural policy reforms, even postponing some measures to avoid bearing their political cost. At the same time, it is adopting a very rushed, and thus quite worrying, attitude towards a fast-track growth agenda, without taking into consideration the conditions for sustainable economic development.

Can the eurozone’s economic governance combine political accountability, legitimacy and effectiveness? EPC Discussion Paper, 1 September 2015

After years of economic crisis, resulting in significant changes to economic governance at EU level, especially for the eurozone, the time has come to consider the longer term political and economic implications of this new situation for the economic integration process. Not only to determine how well the system is likely to function but also what more needs to be done to ensure long-term stability and to provide the EU institutions with sufficient political legitimacy to carry out this new role. This article does not consider abolishing the euro, based on the conviction that introducing the euro created a path dependency that makes trying to unpick the seams of the process extremely costly. While, economically, the exit of one eurozone member state might conceivably be manageable (but costly, especially for that country), the long term political costs might end up unravelling the whole European integration process, with the potential for a bankrupt and politically unstable state outside the euro but still within the EU. However, the status quo situation is still unstable, politically and economically, and needs further policy reforms.

EU labour migration policy by other means? The potential impact of EU economic governance reforms on labour migration policymaking. EPC Policy Brief, 13 February 2015

Over the last 15 years, Member States have been quite reluctant to address labour migration issues at EU level. Will the forthcoming years reverse the tide and lead to the developement of ambitious and common actions in this policy field? There are currently no strong signs of such a move towards a greater management of labour migration policy at EU level. However, Yves Pascouau argues in this FIERI Working paper that the deadlock may be broken with the development of new policy tools taking place in the field of economic governance. More precisely, he underlines that recipes adopted to overcome the so-called ‘euro crisis’ may well have an impact on labour migration issues.As a consequence, this could initiate a coordination process which was not called for by home affairs decision-makers.

What Future for the Eurozone? Combining Discipline, Solidarity and Institutional Reforms. European Policy Brief No. 27, March 2014

This Policy Brief discusses the challenges that await policymakers in reforming the EMU. A balance between discipline and solidarity will have to be found, while institutional reforms should improve the eurozone’s legitimacy and efficiency. The key decisions on EMU reforms will have to be made during the 2014-2019 parliamentary term, as the window of opportunity for major reforms is likely to be closed afterwards.

Economic Policy Committee Annual Report on Structural Reforms 2000. Report addressed to the Council and the Commission. 13 March 2000

2nd annual report. The Economic Policy Committee (EPC) is made up of representatives of the Member States and contributes to the work of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Council as regards the coordination of Member State and Community economic policies. The EPC also provides the Commission and the Council with advice in this area, focusing particularly on structural reforms.

What kind of European Banking Union? Bruegel Policy Contribution [2012/12?]June 25, 2012

This paper discusses the creation of a European Banking Union. First, we discuss questions of design. We highlight seven fundamental choices that decision makers will need to make: Which EU countries should participate in the banking union? To which categories of banks should it apply? Which institution should be tasked with supervision? Which one should deal with resolution? How centralised should the deposit insurance system be? What kind of fiscal backing would be required? What governance framework and political institutions would be needed? In terms of geographical scope, we see the coverage of the banking union of the euro area as necessary and of additional countries as desirable, even though this would entail important additional economic difficulties. The system should ideally cover all banks within the countries included, in order to prevent major competitive and distributional distortions. Supervisory authority should be granted either to both the ECB and a new agency, or to a new agency alone. National supervisors, acting under the authority of the European supervisor, would be tasked with the supervision of smaller banks in accordance with the subsidiarity principle. A European resolution authority should be established, with the possibility of drawing on ESM resources. A fully centralized deposit insurance system would eventually be desirable, but a system of partial reinsurance may also be envisaged at least in a first phase. A banking union would require at least implicit European fiscal backing, with significant political authority and legitimacy. Thus, banking union cannot be considered entirely separately from fiscal union and political union. The most difficult challenge of creating a European banking union lies with the short-term steps towards its eventual implementation. Many banks in the euro area, and especially in the crisis countries, are currently under stress and the move towards banking union almost certainly has significant distributional implications. Yet it is precisely because banks are under such stress that early and concrete action is needed. An overarching principle for such action is to minimize the cost to the tax payers. The first step should be to create a European supervisor that will anchor the development of the future banking union. In parallel, a capability to quickly assess the true capital position of the system’s most important banks should be created, for which we suggest establishing a temporary European Banking Sector Task Force working together with the European supervisor and other authorities. Ideally, problems identified by this process should be resolved by national authorities; in case fiscal capacities would prove insufficient, the European level would take over in the country concerned with some national financial participation, or in an even less likely adverse scenario, in all participating countries at once. This approach would require the passing of emergency legislation in the concerned countries that would give the Task Force the required access to information and, if necessary, further intervention rights. Thus, the principle of fiscal responsibility of respective member states for legacy costs would be preserved to the maximum extent possible, and at the same time, market participants and the public would be reassured that adequate tools are in place to address any eventuality.

An agenda for the European Council: feasible steps to bring the eurozone back from the precipice. CEPS Policy Brief No. 274, 20 June 2012

In the run-up to the emergency European Council meeting at the end of June, Stefano Micossi outlines in this Policy Brief the main elements of a realistic and yet incisive policy package, capable of reassuring financial markets and a bewildered public opinion. It is more than Germany has been willing to accept so far but much less than many of the demands it will confront at the Council meeting. More importantly, it only requires a minimum of additional disbursements by the member states, while strengthening risk-sharing for sovereign and banking risks.

Implementing Basel III in Europe: disgnosis and avenues for improvement. CEPS Policy Brief No. 275, 27 June 2012

This Policy Brief provides a preliminary diagnosis of the proposed regulatory reforms contained in the Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation (CRD IV-CRR), which translate into EU law the Basel III standards adopted by the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, and suggests avenues for improvement. The main criticism is that the proposal is not ambitious enough. In some crucial areas, such as the leverage ratio and the long-term liquidity requirements adopted under the Basel III framework, the CRD IV-CRR proposal stops short of making a strict commitment to introduce binding requirements and instead is contented with weaker (and possibly divergent) disclosure requirements.

Central Banks in Times of Crisis: The FED vs. the ECB. CEPS Policy Brief No. 276, 11 July 2012,

Different economic and financial structures require different crisis responses. Different crises also require different tools and resources. The first ‘stage’ of the financial crisis (2007-09) was similar on both sides of the Atlantic, and the response was also quite similar. The second stage of the crisis is unique to the euro area. Increasing financial disintegration within the region has forced the ECB to become the central counterparty for the entire cross-border banking market and to intervene in the sovereign bond market of some stressed countries. The actions undertaken by the European Central Bank (ECB), however, have not always represented the best response, in terms of effectiveness, consistency and transparency. This is especially true for the Securities Markets Programme (SMP): by de facto imposing its absolute seniority during the Greek PSI (private sector involvement), the ECB has probably killed its future effectiveness.

Unholy compromise in the eurozone and how to right it. CEPS Policy Brief No. 277, 16 July 2012

This paper reviews the causes of the ongoing crisis in the eurozone and the policies needed to restore stability in financial markets and reassure a bewildered public. Its main message is that the EU will not overcome the crisis until it has a comprehensive and convincing set of policies in place; able to address simultaneously budgetary discipline and the sovereign debt crisis, the banking crisis, adequate liquidity provision by the ECB and dismal growth. The text updates and expands on his Policy Brief contributed in the run-up to the emergency European Council meeting at the end of June.

Can Italy and Spain survive rates of 6-7%? CEPS Policy Brief No. 279, 27 July 2012

The sentiment that the euro is now in real danger is based in large part on the widespread conviction that interest rates of 6-7% are simply unsustainable for both Italy and Spain., After taking a closer look at the fundamentals, however, Daniel Gros concludes in this new Policy Brief that both countries should be able to live with this level of interest rates for quite some time, but only if they mobilize domestic savings, which remain strong in both countries. For Spain, some debt/equity swaps are also needed.