Raiders of the Lost Art: Strategy-Making in Europe. Security Policy Brief No. 40, November 2012

Have Europeans lost the art of making grand strategy? In a reflection process initiated by Sweden, Poland, Italy and Spain, they are invited to rediscover it and draft a “European Global Strategy”. This policy brief argues that what the EU needs most is a short set of priorities for collective action, to be reassessed for each term of the High Representative.

Making or Breaking the Republic of Moldova? The Autonomy of Gagauzia. EDAP 02/2013

This article describes the process of self-determination and the creation of a territorial autonomy of the Gagauz people in the Republic of Moldova. It also analyses the situation in the autonomy after the change of government in Chisinau in 2009 and evaluates the current status of accommodation of the Gagauz’ interests in the country. Aspects of state-building and the influence of external actors are explored as well. Gagauzia (Gagauz Yeri) is one of the first post-Soviet autonomies. Since its establishment in 1994, no violent conflict has taken place there. However, the Gagauz language and culture remain relatively unprotected, and incentives as well as support for the integration of the Gagauz are low. The article outlines the potential for future disputes between the central government and local authorities, due to continuous attempts to limit Gagauzia’s self-governance and conflicting interpretations of how the autonomy should work. Furthermore, struggles between Gagauz political leaders and other local realities hamper the successful realization of Gagauz Yeri. With respect to Moldova’s efforts to resolve the Transnistrian conflict and to integrate with the European Union, compromises and cooperation through an ongoing dialogue between the centre and autonomy are clearly due. Resolving the remaining stumbling blocks could make Gagauzia a living, rather than symbolic autonomy.

Money for structural reforms in the eurozone: making sense of contractual arrangements. Egmont Paper 57, May 2013

Executive Summary. Both the Commission’s proposal for a ‘Competitiveness and Convergence Instrument’ and the ‘contractual arrangement’ presented by President Van Rompuy share a common concept: associating EU money with national structural reforms under a binding arrangement. The targeted ‘structural reforms’ are the labour market reforms and product and services market reforms in eurozone ‘peripheral’ countries facing the most severe external imbalances. Their implementation would speed up and facilitate the ‘internal devaluation’ process of these countries. In the worst case scenario, failure to adopt the necessary reforms and to adjust wages and prices downwards may lead the most vulnerable countries to leave the eurozone under social and political pressure. Contracts seek to reduce this risk by increasing compliance with the country-specific recommendations for structural reforms issued by the EU institutions within the European Semester, and in particular with the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP). As for the financial support, it follows two different, albeit overlapping rationales. First, the perspective of obtaining EU funding would incentivize the governments of vulnerable countries to adopt reforms that would bear a high political and social cost in the short term. That is, without some form of incentive, it is unlikely that the necessary reforms would be undertaken and this could have significant negative consequences for the EMU as a whole. The second rationale amounts to outright solidarity: EU support is needed to cushion the inevitable socio-economic costs implied not only by the structural reform, but also by the internal devaluation taking place. To make sense of contractual arrangements, some points should be considered in future discussions: 1. Contracts on a voluntary basis only: Contracts cannot be mandatory unlike initially suggested in the Van Rompuy report. This stems not only from the inherent definition of a ‘contract’ – where mutual consent is key – but also from the non-binding nature of the preventive arm of the MIP. Making the country-specific recommendations issued by the EU institutions systematically binding would imply transfers of sovereignty from the national to the EU level that go well beyond the present discussion. Instead, contracts would introduce the possibility of making the preventive arm binding for some countries where corrections are most needed and urgent for the EMU as a whole.

Making the Most of EU Labour Mobility. Report of a CEPS Task Force in Cooperation with the Bertelsmann Foundation. CEPS Task Force Report, 7 October 2014

This Task Force report combines the most recent data from Eurostat with national sources to highlight the most significant labour mobility trends within the EU. Overall, the recent recession has not induced previously immobile workers to become more mobile, at least not in the larger member states. Mobility flows have moved away from crisis countries in response to the economic downturn but the desired increase in south-north mobility has not been observed so far. This leads the authors to conclude that successfully fostering mobility within EU15 countries requires tremendous effort. It is important that workers who are willing and able to move are not discouraged from doing so by unnecessary barriers to mobility. Improving the workings of the EURES system and its online job-matching platform; better cooperation of national employment agencies; streamlining the recognition of qualifications; and supporting language training within the EU are important contributions to labour mobility. The authors conclude that the EU is right to defend the free movement of workers. National governments should keep in mind that their ability to tap into an attractive foreign labour supply also hinges upon the perception of how mobile workers are treated in destination countries. If the political imperative requires regulations to be changed, such as the one guiding the coordination of social security, it is essential that no new mobility barriers are put in place.

The relief of Vienna in vain. Assessing the Implications of Turkish EU-membership for Council of Ministers’ Decision-making. IES WORKING PAPER 1/2011

This research forecasts the implications of Turkish membership for decision-making effectiveness and dynamics within the Council of Ministers of the European Union (EU). Effectiveness is determined in this research by 'passage probability': the chance that a random proposal as put forth by the European Commission (EC) is accepted by the Council of Ministers. Dynamics are determined by means of the Shapley-Shubik Index (SSI), which plots power values of individual member states by forecasting a number of possible EU enlargement scenarios. This study falsifies earlier research by Baldwin and Widgrén.1 It finds that the implications of Turkish EU-membership for EU decision-making efficiency are ambiguous and depend on the number of other candidate states entering the EU alongside Turkey, as well as the timeslot - 2014 or 2020 - at which the accession would take place. Moreover, this study asserts that Turkish EU-accession would result in unequal- but generally negative - power changes among other EU member states, although member states with similar demographic weight will experience comparable changes. Finally, it appears that the larger a EU member state is, the more power it loses if Turkey would join the EU.

European Bank Resolution: Making it work! Interim report of the CEPS Task Force on Implementing Financial Sector Resolution. CEPS Task Force Report, January 2016

From the start of 2016, new rules for bank resolution are in place – as spelled out in the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) – across the EU, and a new authority (the Single Resolution Board, or SRB) is fully operational for resolving all banks in the eurozone. The implementation issues of the new regime are enormous. Banks need to develop recovery plans, and authorities need to create resolution plans as well as set the minimum required amount of own funds and eligible liabilities (MREL) for each bank. But given the diversity in bank structures and instruments at EU and global level, this will be a formidable challenge, above all with respect to internationally active banks. In order to explore ways in which the authorities and banks can meet this challenge, CEPS formed a Task Force composed of senior experts on banking sector reform and chaired by Thomas Huertas, Partner and Chair, EY Global Regulatory Network. This report contains its policy recommendations.