The Unified Court on Patents: The New Oxymoron of European Law. Egmont Paper No. 60, October 2013

None.

European antitrust control and standard setting. Bruegel Working Paper 2013/01, February 2012

Standards reduce production costs and increase products’ value to consumers. Standards however entail risks of anti-competitive abuse. After the adoption of a standard, the chosen technology normally lacks credible substitutes. The owner of the patented technology might thus have additional market power relative to locked-in licensees, and might exploit this power to charge higher access rates. In the economic literature this phenomenon is referred to as ‘hold-up’. To reduce the risk of hold-up, standard-setting organisations often require patent holders to disclose their standard-essential patents before the adoption of the standard and to commit to license on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms. The European Commission normally investigates unfair pricing abuse in a standard-setting context if a patent holder who committed to FRAND ex-ante is suspected not to abide to it ex-post. However, this approach risks ignoring a number of potential abuses which are likely harmful for welfare. That can happen if, for example, ex-post a licensee is able to impose excessively low access rates (‘reverse hold-up’) or if a patent holder acquires additional market power thanks to the standard but its essential patents are not encumbered by FRAND commitments, for instance because the patent holder did not directly participate to the standard setting process and was therefore not required by the standard-setting organisations to commit to FRAND ex-ante. A consistent policy by the Commission capable of tackling all sources of harm should be enforced regardless of whether FRAND commitments are given. Antitrust enforcement should hinge on the identification of a distortion in the bargaining process around technology access prices, which is determined by the adoption of the standard and is not attributable to pro-competitive merits of any of the involved players.

The Italian Merck Case. Research Papers in Law, 1/2007

From the Introduction. Regulation 1768/921 created supplementary protection certificates (hereinafter, ‘SPCs’) for medicinal products (hereinafter, “pharmaceuticals”) protected by patents. SPCs afford the same exclusive rights as those conferred by patents once these expire and may be granted for a maximum of five years.2 Italy enacted similar legislation in 1991, the most salient difference between both texts being that, pursuant to Law No. 349/91,3 holders of Italian patents for pharmaceuticals could be granted supplementary protection for a maximum period of 18 years after the expiration of the patent. Following the enactment of Regulation 1768/92, SPCs granted by the Italian authorities were brought in line with the period provided for in that text. However, pharmaceuticals for which supplementary protection was sought in the lapse between the adoption of Law No. 349/91 and Regulation 1768/92 (around 400 products) continued to enjoy the protection provided for in the former text.4 Several steps were taken by the Italian authorities to progressively reduce the length of protection granted to these products.

Patenting Strategies of the EU Pharmaceutical Industry -Crossroad between Patent Law and Competition Policy. Research Papers in Law, 1/2011

From the Introduction. The pharmaceutical sector inquiry carried out by the European Commission in 2008 provides a useful framework for assessing the relationship between the patent system on the one hand and competition policy and law on the other hand. The pharmaceutical market is not only specifically regulated. It is also influenced by the special characteristics of the patent system which enables pharmaceutical companies engaged in research activities to enter into additional arrangements to cope with the competitive pressures of early patent application and the delays in drug approval. Patents appear difficult to reconcile with the need for sufficient and adequate access to medicines, which is why competition expectations imposed on the pharmaceutical sector are very high. The patent system and competition law are interacting components of the market, into which they must both be integrated. This can result in competition law taking a very strict view on the pharmaceutical industry by establishing strict functional performance standards for the reliance on intellectual property rights protection granted by patent law. This is in particular because in this sector the potential welfare losses are not likely to be of only monetary nature. In brief, the more inefficiencies the patent system produces, the greater the risk of an expansive application of competition law in this field. The aim of the present study is to offer a critical and objective view on the use or abuse of patents and defensive strategies in the pharmaceutical industry. It shall also seek to establish whether patents as presently regulated offer an appropriate degree of protection of intellectual property held by the economic operators in the pharmaceutical sector and whether there is a need or, for that matter, scope for improvement. A useful starting point for the present study is provided by the pharmaceutical sector competition inquiry (hereafter “the sector inquiry”) carried out by the European Commission during the first half of 2008. On 8 July 2008, the Commission adopted its Final Report pursuant to Article 17 of Regulation 1/2003 EC, revealing a series of “antitrust shortcomings” that would require further investigation1.

When and how to support renewables? Letting the data speak. Bruegel Working Paper 2014/01, February 2014

Low-carbon energy technologies are pivotal for decarbonising our economies up to 2050 while ensuring secure and affordable energy. Consequently, innovation that reduces the cost of low-carbon energy would play an important role in reducing transition costs. We assess the two most prominent innovation policy instruments (i) public research, development and demonstration (RD&D) subsidies and (ii) public deployment policies. Our results indicate that both deployment and RD&D coincide with increasing knowledge generation and the improved competitiveness of renewable energy technologies. We find that both support schemes together have a greater effect that they would individually, that RD&D support is unsurprisingly more effective in driving patents and that timing matters. Current wind deployment based on past wind RD&D spending coincides best with wind patenting. If we look into competitiveness we find a similar picture, with the greatest effect coming from deployment. Finally, we find significant cross-border effects, especially for winddeployment. Increased deployment in one country coincides with increased patenting in nearby countries. Based on our findings we argue that both deployment and RD&D support are needed to create innovation in renewable energy technologies. However, we worry that current support is unbalanced. Public spending on deployment has been two orders of magnitude larger (in 2010 about €48 billion in the five largest EU countries in 2010) than spending on RD&D support (about €315 million). Consequently, basing the policy mix more on empirical evidence could increase the efficiency of innovation policy targeted towards renewable energy technologies.

A flexible, scaleable approach to the international patent 'name game'. Bruegel Working Paper 2014/10i, September 2014

The inventors in PATSTAT are often duplicates: the same person or company may be split into multiple entries in PATSTAT, each associated to different patents. In this paper, we address this problem with an algorithm that efficiently de-duplicates the data. It needs minimal manual input and works well even on consumer-grade computers. Comparisons between entries are not limited to their names, and thus this algorithm is an improvement over earlier ones that required extensive manual work or overly cautious clean-up of the names.

R&D, Spillovers, Innovation Systems and the Genesis of Regional Growth in Europe. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 5/October 2006

Research on the impact of innovation on regional economic performance in Europe has fundamentally followed three approaches: a) the analysis of the link between investment in R&D, patents, and economic growth; b) the study of the existence and efficiency of regional innovation systems; and c) the examination of geographical diffusion of regional knowledge spillovers. These complementary approaches have, however, rarely been combined. Important operational and methodological barriers have thwarted any potential cross-fertilization. In this paper, we try to fill this gap in the literature by combining in one model R&D, spillovers, and innovation systems approaches. A multiple regression analysis is conducted for all regions of the EU-25, including measures of R&D investment, proxies for regional innovation systems, and knowledge and socio-economic spillovers. This approach allows us to discriminate between the influence of internal factors and external knowledge and institutional flows on regional economic growth. The empirical results highlight how the interaction between local and external research with local and external socioeconomic and institutional conditions determines the potential of every region in order to maximise its innovation capacity. They also indicate the importance of proximity for the transmission of economically productive knowledge, as spillovers show strong distance decay effects. In the EU-25 context, only the innovative efforts pursued within a 180 minute travel radius have a positive and significant impact on regional growth performance.

Coalitions, Power and Institutional Change in Global Patent Politics. IES WORKING PAPER 2/2013

With the 1995 Agreement on Trade - related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), a centralised rule - system for the international governance of patents was put in place under the general framework of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Since then, the number of patent – related institutions has increased monotonically on the multilateral, plurilateral and bilateral levels. I will explain this case of institutional change by focusing on the norm – setting activities of both industrialised and developing countries, arguing that both groups constitute internally highly cohesive coalitions in global patent politics, while institutional change occurs when both coalitions engage in those negotiating settings in which they enjoy a comparative advantage over the other coalition. Specifically, I make the point that industrialised countries’ norm – setting activities take place on the plurilateral and bilateral level, where economic factors can be effectively translated into political outcomes while simultaneously avoiding unacceptably high legitimacy costs; whereas developing countries, on the other hand, use various multilateral United Nations (UN) forums where their claims possess a high degree of legitimacy, but cannot translate into effective political outcomes. The paper concludes with some remarks on how this case yields new insights into ongoing debates in institutionalist International Relations (IR), as pertaining to present discussions on “regime complexity”.

Unified European Front: The Road towards a European Unitary Patent. EU Centre Singapore Working Paper No. 21, March 2014

For over forty years, European countries have held numerous conferences and signed multiple international agreements aimed at either creating a unitary patent which will be valid in all European countries upon issuance or establishing a specialized European court with jurisdiction over patents. This paper first outlines the need for a unitary patent in the European Union and then chronicles the measures taken to support and milestones toward the creation of a European-wide unitary patent system. The paper then discusses the few problems and pitfalls that have prevented European countries from coming to an agreement on such a patent system. Finally, the paper considers the closely related agreements of ‘Unitary Patent Package’, the challenges facing these agreements and examines if it would finally result in an EU Unitary patent system that benefits one and all.