The EU-EFIGE/Bruegel-unicredit dataset. Bruegel Working Paper 2012/13, October 2012

This paper describes the EU-EFIGE/Bruegel-UniCredit dataset (in short the EFIGE dataset), a database recently collected within the EFIGE project (European Firms in a Global Economy: internal policies for external competitiveness) supported by the Directorate General Research of the European Commission through its 7th Framework Programme and coordinated by Bruegel. • The database, for the first time in Europe, combines measures of firms’ international activities (eg exports, outsourcing, FDI, imports) with quantitative and qualitative information on about 150 items ranging from R&D and innovation, labour organisation, financing and organisational activities, and pricing behaviour. Data consists of a representative sample (at the country level for the manufacturing industry) of almost 15,000 surveyed firms (above 10 employees) in seven European economies (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, United Kingdom, Austria, Hungary). Data was collected in 2010, covering the years from 2007 to 2009. Special questions related to the behaviour of firms during the crisis were also included in the survey. • We illustrate the construction and usage of the dataset, capitalising on the experience of researchers who have exploited the data within the EFIGE project. Importantly, the document also reports a comprehensive set of validation measures that have been used to assess the comparability of the survey data with official statistics. A set of descriptive statistics describing the EFIGE variables within (and across) countries and industries is also provided.

De Gaulle and Europe: Historical Revision and Social Science Theory. Program for the Study of Germany and Europe Working Paper Series 8.5

The thousands of books and articles on Charles de Gaulle's policy toward European integration, whether written by historians, social scientists, or commentators, universally accord primary explanatory importance to the General's distinctive geopolitical ideology. In explaining his motivations, only secondary significance, if any at all, is attached to commercial considerations. This paper seeks to reverse this historiographical consensus by examining the four major decisions toward European integration during de Gaulle's presidency: the decisions to remain in the Common Market in 1958, to propose the Foucher Plan in the early 1960s, to veto British accession to the EC, and to provoke the "empty chair" crisis in 1965-1966, resulting in the "Luxembourg Compromise." In each case, the overwhelming bulk of the primary evidence-speeches, memoirs, or government documents-suggests that de Gaulle's primary motivation was economic, not geopolitical or ideological. Like his predecessors and successors, de Gaulle sought to promote French industry and agriculture by establishing protected markets for their export products. This empirical finding has three broader implications: (1) For those interesred in the European Union, it suggests that regional integration has been driven primarily by economic, not geopolitical considerations--even in the "least likely" case. (2) For those interested in the role of ideas in foreign policy, it suggests that strong interest groups in a democracy limit the impact of a leader's geopolitical ideology--even where the executive has very broad institutional autonomy. De Gaulle was a democratic statesman first and an ideological visionary second. (3) For those who employ qualitative case-study methods, it suggests that even a broad, representative sample of secondary sources does not create a firm basis for causal inference. For political scientists, as for historians, there is in many cases no reliable alternative to primary-source research.