Mixed Public-Private Enterprises in Europe: Economic Theory and an Empirical Analysis of Italian Water Utilities. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 4/July 2006

Mixed enterprises, which are entities jointly owned by the public and private sector, are spreading all over Europe in local utilities. Well aware that in the vast majority of cases the preference of local authorities towards such governance structure is determined by practical reasons rather than by the ambition to implement new regulatory designs (an alternative to the typical “external” regulation), our purpose is to confer some scientific value to this phenomenon which has not been sufficiently investigated in the economic literature. This paper aims at proposing an economic analysis of mixed enterprises, especially of the specific configuration in which the public partner acts as controller and the private one (or “industrial” partner) as service provider. We suggest that the public service concession to mixed enterprises could embody, under certain conditions, a noteworthy substitute to the traditional public provision and the concession to totally private enterprises, as it can push regulated operators to outperform and limit the risk of private opportunism. The starting point of the entire analysis is that ownership allows the (public) owner to gather more information about the actual management of the firm, according to property rights theory. Following this stream of research, we conclude that under certain conditions mixed enterprises could significantly reduce asymmetric information between regulators and regulated firms by implementing a sort of “internal” regulation. With more information, in effect, the public authority (as owner/controller of the regulated firm, but also as member of the regulatory agency) can stimulate the private operator to be more efficient and can monitor it more effectively with respect to the fulfilment of contractual obligations (i.e., public service obligations, quality standards, etc.). Moreover, concerning the latter function, the board of directors of the mixed enterprise can be the suitable place where public and private representatives (respectively, welfare and profit maximisers) can meet to solve all disputes arising from incomplete contracts, without recourse to third parties. Finally, taking into account that a disproportionate public intervention in the “private” administration (or an ineffective protection of the general interest) would imply too many drawbacks, we draw some policy implications that make an equitable debate on the board of the firm feasible. Some empirical evidence is taken from the Italian water sector.

Public and Private Regulation: Mapping the Labyrinth. CEPS Working Document No. 370, October 2012

Private governance is currently being evoked as a viable solution to many public policy goals. However, in some circumstances it has shown to produce more harm than good, and even disastrous consequences as in the case of the financial crisis that is raging in most advanced economies. Although the current track record of private regulatory schemes is mixed, policy guidance documents around the world still require that policy-makers give priority to self- and co-regulation, with little or no additional guidance being given to policymakers to devise when, and under what circumstances, these solutions can prove viable from a public policy perspective. With an array of examples from several policy fields, this paper approaches regulation as a public-private collaborative form and attempts to identify possible policy tools to be applied by public policy-makers to efficiently and effectively approach private governance as a solution, rather than a problem. We propose a six-step theoretical framework and argue that IA techniques should: i) define an integrated framework including both the possibility that private regulation can be used as an alternative or as a complement to public legislation; ii) involve private parties in public IAs in order to define the best strategy or strategies that would ensure achievement of the regulatory objectives; and iii) contemplate the deployment of indicators related to governance and activities of the regulators and their ability to coordinate and solve disputes with other regulators.

Development of Multisector Alliances (MSAs): Organization and Leadership. ACES Working Papers, 2012

The research team reviewed numerous several multi- sectoral entities and identified nine GGNs that became the subject of our case studies. The research team conducted semi-structured interviews with executives and staff from each of these GNNs and prepared a profile, including a description of the unique evolution of the organization, goals and objectives, organizational structure and governance arrangements for each GGN. The following list provides an overview of the nine GGNs profiled: 1. Every Woman Every Child is an unprecedented global effort that mobilizes and amplifies action by governments, multilaterals, the private sector, research centers, academia and civil society to address life-threatening health challenges facing women and children globally. 2. HERproject catalyzes global partnerships and local Networks to improve female workers’ general and reproductive health in eight emerging economies. 3. R4 Rural Resilience Initiative is a cutting-edge, strategic, large-scale partnership between the public and private sectors to innovate and develop better tools to help the world’s most vulnerable people build resilient livelihoods. 4. Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative is a coalition of governments, companies, civil society groups, investors and international organizations that aims to improve transparency and accountability in the extractives sector. 5. Global Network for Neglected Tropical Diseases works with international partners at the highest level of government, business and society to break down the logistical and financial barriers to delivering existing treatments for the seven most common neglected tropical diseases. 6. Global Alliance for Improved Nutrition is an alliance that supports public-private partnerships to increase access to the missing nutrients in diets necessary for people, communities and economies to be stronger and healthier. 7. Inter-Agency Network For Education in Emergencies is a global Network of individuals and representatives from NGOs, United Nations and donor agencies, governments, academic institutions, schools and affected populations working to ensure all persons have the right to a quality and safe education in emergencies and post- crisis recovery. 8. mHealth Alliance works with diverse partners to advance mobile-based or mobile-enhanced solutions that deliver health through research, advocacy, support for the development of interoperable solutions and sustainable deployment models. 9. The Rainforest Alliance is a global non-profit that focuses on environmental conservation and sustainable development and works through collaborative partnerships with various stakeholders.

EU-US S&T Collaborations, Challenges and Opportunities for Development. Innovation Diplomacy, Special case in point: the Hellenic-American innovation bridge and its underlying dimensions. ACES Working Papers, October 2012

Developed and developing economies alike face increased resource scarcity and competitive rivalry. Science and technology increasingly appear as a main source of competitive and sustainable advantage for nations are regions alike. However, the key determinant of their efficacy is the quality and quantity of entrepreneurship-enabled innovation that unlocks and captures the pecuniary benefits of science enterprise in the form of private, public or hybrid goods (for instance, bio-entrepreneur-millionaires, knowledge for the public good - ie: public health awareness, and new public-private research centers funded partly by bio-entrepreneur-millionaires and monies levied as taxes on bio-ventures).

Financing European Defence: Time to Call the European Investment Bank? IES Policy Brief Issue 2014/05/July 2014

Summary. Financing research and development programmes have never been more expensive in Europe. Defence budgets are on the wane, international competition is fierce and high-end technologies are increasingly expensive. Europe’s defence-industrial base is under significant strain, and options are needed to fund elements of a sector that is still crucial to Europe’s security and industry. This Policy Brief argues that the European Investment Bank could play a much greater role in Europe’s defence sector. As a public-private institution the Bank could serve as a life-line to defence R&D, dual-use projects and support for SMEs, especially where regional clusters are involved.

The Energy Performance of Buildings: Promises Still Unfulfilled. Egmont Paper No. 78, May 2015

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY All observers agree that energy efficiency must be the cornerstone of any serious EU energy strategy. In this general context, the EU building sector is critical. It represents about 40% of EU final energy consumption (residential houses, public/private offices, commercial buildings, etc.) and approximately 36% of EU CO2 emissions. This is massive. The EU has certainly not been inactive in this field. The Energy Performance in Buildings Directive 2002/91/EC (EPBD) was the first and the main instrument to address the problem of the energy performance of buildings. It has established numerous principles: a reliable methodology which enables the calculation and rating of the energy performance of buildings; minimum energy performance standards for new buildings and existing buildings under major renovation; energy performance certificates; regular inspection of heating and air-conditioning systems; and, finally, quality standards for inspections and energy performance certificates. They were strengthened in 2010 by the recast Directive 2010/31/EU. This directive also introduces a decisive concept for the development of the building sector: ‘nearly zeroenergy buildings’. In 2012, the new Energy Efficiency Directive 2012/27/EU dealt with other aspects. In the building sector, three of them are particularly important. They concern: (1) the establishment of long-term strategies for mobilizing investment in the renovation of the national building stocks; (2) the introduction of energy saving schemes for ‘designated’ energy companies with a view to reducing consumption among ‘final consumers’ by 1.5% annually; and (3), as an option, the setting up of an Energy Efficiency National Fund to support energy efficiency initiatives. This paper also briefly examines the different instruments put in place to disseminate information and consultation, and the EU funding for energy efficiency in buildings. Results, however, have remained limited until now. The improvement of the energy performance of buildings and the rhythm of renovation remain extremely weak. Member States’ unwillingness to timely and properly transpose and implement the Directives continues despite the high degree of flexibility permitted. The decentralized approach chosen for some specific aspects and the differentiation in the application of EPBD standards between Member States do not appear optimal either. Adequate financial schemes remain rare. The permanent deficit of qualified and trained personnel and the inertia of public authorities to make the public understand the stakes in this domain remain problematic. Hence the need to take new initiatives to reap the benefits that the building sector is meant to bring.

Disclosure of Leniency Materials: A Bridge between Public and Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law. Research Paper in Law 08/2013, December

The disclosure of leniency materials held by competition authorities has recently been under the spot. On the one hand, these documents could greatly help cartel victims to prove the damage and the causation link when filing damage actions against cartelists. On the other hand, future cartelists could be deterred from applying for leniency since damage actions could be brought as a result of the information submitted by themselves. Neither the current legislation nor the case law have attained yet to sufficiently clarify how to deal with this clash of interests. Our approach obviously attempts to strike a balance between both interests. But not only that. We see the current debate as a great opportunity to boost the private enforcement of antitrust law through the positive spillovers of leniency programmes. We hence propose to build a bridge between the public and the private enforcement by enabling a partial disclosure of the documents.